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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Chelsea S. Henson 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of English 
 
June 2012 
 
Title: Between Animals and Angels: Rethinking Extracategorical Bodies in Medieval 
Literature  
 
 
Medieval bodies often push against easy categorization. Hybrids, saints, giants, and 
transformative bodies are represented in literature as falling between or occupying multiple 
taxonomic hierarchical positions of divine, human, or animal. Between Animals and Angels 
argues that these bodies function to reveal the insufficiency of such a rigid categorical 
system. Verticality and discrete categories create a distorted, incomplete view of what these 
bodies encompass; a better system for comprehending them is a horizontal continuum of 
relationality. To present this scheme of connectivity, I use Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari’s principles of multiplicity, assemblage, and becoming-. I read these bodies 
rhizomatically, privileging not what they are, but how they move between and resist 
categories. Medieval bodies are not only multiplicitous, but performative: what they do 
changes how we read them and how they mean.  
In each chapter, I trace alimentary and sexual behaviors of nonnormative or 
transgressive bodies like the giant in the Alliterative Morte Arthure, the degraded human 
populations in Cleanness, or St. Cecelia in Chaucer’s Second Nun’s Tale to show problems 
with rigidly classifying interstitial bodies. Alimentary and sexual behaviors provide a basis 
for investigation because they dictate bodily survival. The texts I examine, written during 
 v 
 
the second half of the fourteenth century, display anxiety about the fragility and flexibility 
of humanness. I suggest this anxiety may be in part a reaction to the equalizing ravages of 
the Black Plague. In the wake of this pandemic, bodily transformation and survival take on 
a disturbing precariousness for the authors and audiences of these texts, in many cases 
governed by sexual and digestive (mis)behaviors. 
In this investigation of bodies and application of poststructuralism and 
performativity, I add to and complicate the still growing field of body studies that began in 
the 1980s. Rather than merely averring the importance of bodies as bearers of meaning, or 
settling for the observation that transgressive figures connote an unelaborated Otherness, I 
call for a more inclusive method of reading these bodies to circumvent the insufficiencies 
caused by language and hierarchy and reveal the multiplicity of these complex shifting 
figures and their interconnected spectrums of existence. 
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1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: “MANY DIVERSYTEES OF MEN” 
In addition to detailing a voyage to Jerusalem, and how and where a traveler 
should go, the fourteenth-century Book of John Mandeville also promises to relate 
observations from numerous foreign lands “wher that dwelleth many diverse folk of 
maneris and diverse lawes and shapes” (Mandeville 66). Diversity, notably in physical 
form and behavior, seems to be Mandeville’s primary interest as he narrates his travels. 
Mandeville employs paratactic style and objective language1 to describe these “folk.” 
This lack of causality and judgment results in a kind of flatness; we are not told explicitly 
how to interpret the bodies he describes. Because he neither praises nor castigates these 
groups, his descriptive rather than prescriptive language makes categorizing them as 
human, animal, monstrous, or other, complicated. Not only is it difficult to decide what 
these “folk” might be, the narrator’s metric for categories is unclear, and the 
indecisiveness of his descriptions provides an opportunity for anxiety to arise about the 
way bodies are depicted and classified.  
Mandeville’s representation of peoples presents a challenge to his audience 
because he does not seem to define them according to any consistent system. Readers 
interested in establishing some kind of clear hierarchy of what Mandeville’s races “are” 
confront an obstacle: Mandeville’s inability – or unwillingness – to characterize the 
people he describes.2 For example, on an island called Tracota, the inhabitants “beth as 
beestes and noght resenable, for they eten eddres and they speke noght but make soch 
                                                 
1
 Apart from a few examples such as groups that practice cannibalism; Mandeville does use judgmental 
language to describe these extreme behaviors.    
 
2
 That is, how to fit them into the orders established in the civilized world Mandeville’s reading audience 
occupies.  
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noyse as eddres don” (1848-50). Tracota’s inhabitants seem dehumanized as a result of 
their behaviors – they eat snakes and make snake-like noises to communicate, and 
therefore they are “as beestes” who lack reason. However, a mere sixty lines later 
Mandeville speaks of Mancy, a kingdom in India where “ther is good chepe of vitayles, 
and ther is gret plenté of gret eddres, of which they make gret festes and ete hem in gret 
solempnytees” (1911-12). Further, Mandeville reveals, no matter what dainties are 
prepared, unless adders are included in the feasting no one is thankful for the meal (1913-
14). Why, then, are the island inhabitants of Tracota “as beestes” but the people of Mancy 
are men? For Mandeville, unusual diet seems not to be a firm governing factor for 
determining human status. Perhaps it is the question of speech, though he never claims 
that the people of Mancy speak like Europeans. Further, he also discusses an island where 
“men beth right smale, and they have a litel hole instead of her mouth, and they mowe 
noght ete. But when they sholde ete other drynke, they souke hit thorgh a pype that is 
holgh thorghout” (1897-1900). Though he does not mention speech in this case either, the 
fact that these men have only small holes that will not permit the passage of solid food 
suggests they may also lack the ability to speak. Yet they, too, are called “men” without 
question.  
The other important quality we learn about the Tracotans is that they are “noght 
resenable.” This seems an important qualifier for determining humanness, yet how the 
quality itself is ascertained is unclear in Mandeville’s descriptions; as the comparison to 
the people of Mancy reveals, reason does not appear soldered to behavior. To uncover 
possible patterns in how reason might be assigned, therefore, two more island groups 
must be compared: the reasonable denizens of Natumeran, and the less reasonable people 
  
 
 
3 
of Pytan. On Natumeran, Mandeville explains “Men and wymmen of that contré hath 
houndes hedes, and they ben resonable. And they worshipeth an oxe for her god, and they 
gon all naked save a lytel cloth byfore her prevyteis” (1854-57). Though the Natumerans 
are not fully human in form, because they are reasonable, Mandeville treats them as 
human beings.3 Some medieval theologians debated whether a rejection of Christianity 
constituted lack of reason and therefore animality,4 but this cannot apply for the 
Natumerans who, though they have a religion, base it around an animal idol and yet are 
still described as rational men.  
The people of Pytan, on the other hand, are “smale men, but noght so smale as 
ben pigmans. These men liven with the smel and savour of wild apples. And when they 
goth fer out of contré they berith apples with hem, for also sone as they leveth the savour 
of the apples they deye. And they ben noght ful resonable, but as bestes” (2639-42). 
These small people, intelligent enough to understand what sustains them, nevertheless 
apparently lack reason and are therefore beast-like. Though they do not produce or 
consume food like ordinary humans – Mandeville says they “tylyeth no corn lond, for 
they ete noght” – this does not seem a sufficient reason to deny them rationality, and no 
other explanation is provided (2638-39). In fact, Mandeville never provides justification 
for why a group of people with dogs’ heads are rational, but a group of people who 
subsist on the smell of apples are not. Further, and more importantly, the level of 
rationality the Pytans possess is ambiguous: Mandeville says they are not “ful” rational, 
                                                 
3
 Yet even here, Mandeville’s paratactic style makes assigning this causality – human because reasonable – 
questionable. The repeated conjunction “and” does not imply “because” or “therefore,” leaving us able only 
to assume how these clauses relate to one another.  
 
4
 Dorothy Yamamoto cites in particular twelfth-century ecclesiastics, who questioned the humanity of Jews 
based on their irrational decision to reject Christ (13).  
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which insinuates that, while they are less rational than the dog-headed Natumerans, they 
are perhaps more human than the Trecotans, who are simply “noght resenable” with no 
quantifiers. Leaving such distinctions unexplained creates questions about how rationality 
and physicality might be connected to status, and Mandeville’s own inconsistency in 
description suggests using a system for categorization with a rigid framework or 
unchanging properties for categorical inclusion is insufficient to encompass the complex, 
individual bodies and types of bodies found in the medieval world.5 As I will argue, these 
bodies function in fourteenth-century literature to show us, through their alimentary and 
sexual habits, the insufficiency of such a rigid hierarchy.  
Though The Book of John Mandeville is ostensibly a travel narrative and therefore 
seems more interested in reporting observations than in explicating or justifying them, it 
is curious that Mandeville provides no reason that a physically hybrid group should be 
rational while other behaviorally different but presumably human-shaped groups should 
not. Jan Ziolkowski has said the fourteenth century was obsessed with taxonomic 
hierarchizing and categorical analysis,6 yet The Book of John Mandeville, a mid-
fourteenth-century text, seems to challenge this claim (5). Not only does Mandeville 
refuse to analyze his subjects, he tumbles groups together without clearly illuminating 
                                                 
5
 Even the form and textual history of The Book of John Mandeville contributes to this difficulty in 
categorization. “Sir John Mandeville,” the self proclaimed narrator, is likely a convenient fiction – rather 
than the original author, “Mandeville” is more probably a compiler, collecting and reorganizing snippets of 
others’ writings into the manuscript bearing his name. The Book of John Mandeville is of French origin, 
translated into English, and though both versions were composed during the second half of the fourteenth 
century, the exact dates of composition and translation are unknown. As C. David Benson and Tamarah 
Kohanski phrase it, contemporary scholarly appraisal of the work and its narrator is that “‘Sir John 
Mandeville, knight of St. Albans’ was probably not a knight, not named Mandeville, not English, and 
perhaps never traveled much at all, except among the volumes of a well-stocked library – though any of 
these claims might yet prove to be true” (2). This uncertainty in origin and authorship make the work – like 
the bodies within it – difficult to categorize according to normal genre distinctions. Benson and Kohanski 
cite it as not history, anthropology, literature, or theology in any usual sense, leaving it a kind of “other” on 
the margins of the medieval canon, defined by what it is not (2).  
 
6
 See also Gregg 1-22; Denton 1-5; Black 30; Flandrin, Montanari, and Sonnenfeld 307-314.  
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where they belong. Further, Mandeville’s own reports of the “many diversytees of men” 
occupying distant lands raise a question about definition and categorization: what does 
“diversytees of men” actually mean? (Mandeville 1870). As he claims in his opening 
explanation, he will deal with people who not only have a variety of customs and laws, 
but have a variety of shapes. Thus these people are not simply members of different 
nations or different religions. They are also different in physical form, and clearly not 
equivalent to humans, as Mandeville’s animalization of the Trecotans and Pytans proves. 
Even the way he articulates their status is indefinite: they are not animals but are “as 
beestes.” This construction of status as a simile creates ambiguity: we know they are not 
“like us,” but we do not know by how much. Are they actually humans but troubling for 
us to accept as such? Are they some kind of hybrid man-animal for which no certain 
definition exists? As Mandeville presents them, they are caught between standard 
taxonomies and therefore “what they are” and by extension how we should think of them 
is unclear.  
The privilege Mandeville gives reason as a distinguishing factor suggests he is 
following Augustine’s taxonomic hierarchy:7  
living things are ranked above inanimate objects; those which have the 
power of reproduction, or even the urge towards it, are superior to those 
who lack that impulse. Among living things, the sentient rank above the 
insensitive, and animals above trees. Among the sentient, the intelligent 
take precedence over the unthinking – men over cattle. Among the 
intelligent, immortal beings are higher than mortals, angels being higher 
than men. (City of God XI.16)  
 
 
                                                 
7
 Augustine follows in the steps of Plato, Aristotle, and various Neo-Platonists in assigning a ranked 
hierarchy to living beings in the universe.  
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For animate beings, therefore, there seem to be three categories: animals, humans, and 
angels.8 Animals are mortal and irrational, humans are mortal and rational, and angels are 
rational and immortal. Thus mankind shares the mortality of animals but the intelligent 
minds of angels – our capacity for rational thought links us with the divine. Where, then, 
should we place the apple-sniffers of Pytan? They are clearly mortal, since they are 
doomed to die if they venture too far from the apples that sustain them. They are, 
however, not “fully” rational, and therefore “as bestes.” Yet they appear human in all 
other respects, and Mandeville calls them “men.” Their intermediate status leaves them 
no place in Augustine’s hierarchy, suspending them in a nebulous space between human 
and animal.  
Most of Mandeville’s island groups, including the apple-sniffers, can be found 
among Pliny’s description of the “monstrous races” from his Natural History, and 
Augustine does make room in City of God to discuss these ambiguous people.9 Though 
he does not mention the apple-sniffers, he does discuss cynocephali – the dog-headed 
people to whom Mandeville allots rationality and therefore humanity. Augustine asks 
What am I to say of the Cynocephali, whose dog’s head and actual barking 
prove them to be animals rather than men? Now we are not bound to 
believe in the existence of all the types of men which are described. But 
no faithful Christian should doubt that anyone who is born anywhere as a 
man – that is, a rational and mortal being – derives from the first-created 
human being. And this is true, however extraordinary such a creature may 
appear to our senses in bodily shape, in colour, or motion, or utterance, or 
in any natural endowment, or part, or quality. (XVI.8)  
 
Augustine’s intent here is not to determine whether or not the cynocephali are truly 
human or animal, but to assure us that if they do prove to be mortal and rational, then 
                                                 
8
 God is superior to the angels and everything else, existing divinely above all (XI.16).  
 
9
 Besides Pliny, Augustine also references “genera” of men found in Herodotus and Homer (XVI.VIII).   
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they are descended from Adam and therefore fully human. Further, as he closes his 
discussion of monstrosities, he admits to providing only a “tentative and cautious answer. 
The accounts of some of these races may be completely worthless; but if such peoples 
exist, then either they are not human; or, if human, they are descended from Adam” 
(XVI.8). Though he is willing to provide the principles by which humanness is 
determined – mortality and rationality – his aim is not to make definitive conclusions or 
apply these principles to particular ambiguous groups. Instead, Augustine falls back on a 
tautology that neither allows for interstitial status nor makes clear determinations about 
“monstrous” races.10  
By Augustine’s governing principles, Mandeville’s decision to treat the hound-
headed Natumerans as human is sound. Though Mandeville does not say how he knows 
they are rational (unless their government and religious practices prove this), because 
they possess reason and are presumably mortal, according to Augustine’s hierarchy they 
are fully human. By contrast, one would presume Augustine thinks the cynocephali are 
not rational, since he seems to assert they are animals rather than men. This introduces 
further complication: both Mandeville and Augustine seem to be referring to the same 
race and using the same system to categorize, though they come to opposite conclusions. 
The physiological otherness of this race affects the way it is interpreted differently for 
different writers, thus opening a debate about how important physical bodies are for 
                                                 
10
 As I will explain below, there are strong reasons for the rigidity of Augustine’s system, and more fluid 
accounts exist of bodies within Christianity and Biblical literature that this tripartite system glosses over. I 
do not mean here to attack or make Augustine my straw man: his work in conversion and integration make 
his system a reasonable move, and his deep investigation in the human mind and its intersections with 
Christianity make him a deeply reflective and intelligent thinker. However, this tripartite hierarchy does set 
up a strong sense of inflexible categorization mirrored in later systems like the Great Chain of Being and 
perhaps even Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed, with its explanation of the physical structure of the 
universe. Within Augustine’s system, the dependence upon rationality but relative neglect of physical form 
makes it a good model against which to frame my argument.  
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determining status. It seems strange, despite Augustine’s declarations, to expect 
physically normative people to accept that a “person” with a human body but a dog’s 
head could be just as human as they are. Such extreme physical difference must mean 
something with regard to status: even if cynocephali are human, they still appear 
different.11 Should they be ranked above or below human beings with ordinary human 
heads? Further, the urge to categorize these people at all betrays a certain anxiety: 
knowing what they are is important because it tells us not only how they differ from us, 
but also how they should be interacted with, and what will happen to them spiritually. It 
determines whether they have human or animal souls.  
The state of the soul in Mandeville’s fourteenth-century society was crucial both 
for status in this world and in the next. Humans had a chance at resurrection, while 
animals simply died and rotted in the ground. Therefore knowing whether or not some of 
these oddly shaped people were human – knowing whether they had rational souls – 
revealed not only how they should be treated, but determined their chances of salvation.12 
Accessing this knowledge during life, however, was difficult thanks to the soul’s 
                                                 
11
 Cynocephali and other “races” that appear in texts like The Book of John Mandeville are, of course, 
textual bodies, not “real” bodies living in the geographical, historical world. Therefore their ability to 
interact physically with living human beings is impossible. However, I speak about them as though they 
could have been real. Because they had not been disproved, and in fact, because texts like Pliny’s Natural 
History, Augustine’s City of God, the Anglo-Saxon Wonders of the East, and Mandeville’s compilation, 
among others, continued to heap observations and interactions of and with them upon their readers, I would 
argue they came to occupy another kind of interstitial space. They exist between literature and reality, 
meaning that they were represented only in literature but entered the imaginations of a reading audience as 
real possibilities. Because they might have existed, just beyond the margins of the explored world, their 
status did bear thinking about, as the possibility of their existence necessitated consideration of how they 
would be treated were they discovered. They were, in a manner of speaking, the extraterrestrials of their 
time: not completely proven, but not yet disproven either.  
 
12
 How they should be treated, importantly, was a question not only for a secular, popular audience who 
would likely never interact with these people, but for an ecclesiastical audience as well: should 
missionaries be sent to distant lands to attempt to convert the indigenous people? If they were definitively 
human, it was a worthwhile mission, while if they were just animals conversion was not possible. But if 
they fell somewhere in between, like Mandeville’s “noght ful resonable” Pytans, the answer remained 
unclear.  
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incorporeality. We cannot see or touch the soul; we can only see the body.13 The body 
itself, in its shape, its abilities, and the way it interacts with the world is a living human 
being’s only conduit for accessing the universe, and therefore it is only through and with 
the body that we can encounter and interpret the world, ourselves, and other living things 
around us.14 Mandeville’s Pytans suggest there is something between human and animal, 
but Mandeville’s description of their bodies does not offer us sufficient information to 
explain how their betweenness is determined, or what the correct procedure might be for 
engaging or representing this group.15 If there are indeed bodies between standard steps 
of the hierarchy, we must ask how their status is determined, what is the importance or 
role of that interstitial group, and how it should be talked about. 
The human urge toward hierarchical placement to which Ziolkowski points, 
despite the difficulty Mandeville’s and other literary texts present, has social and 
theological precedents. Socially, order and hierarchy were methods of governance and 
control: secular and ecclesiastical authorities instilled hierarchies as systems of 
maintaining order in their respective spheres of influence to prevent chaos or anarchy. As 
                                                 
13
 Interestingly, in much medieval art the soul is depicted not as an amorphous, invisible entity, but as a 
homunculus or small, child-like human body emerging from the mouth of the dead person. This suggests 
that even knowing the soul was something incorporeal and mystical, the body as a medium for engaging 
with the world was so pervasive that medieval artists used it as a model for the spiritual as well as the 
physical. See Le Goff and Camille.  
 
14
 Jacques Le Goff cites the body, not the soul, as a key point of importance in Western Christianity: “Even 
those ancient doctrines that gave priority to the soul never conceived of virtue or the good without 
reference to the mediation of the body” (83). Though he was operating outside a Christian framework, 
Aristotle’s discussion of souls also incorporates and privileges the body. In his assessment of sentient life, 
Aristotle cites locomotion and sensation as the two qualities all beings with souls must have (“On the Soul” 
1.2). Though having a soul connotes having senses, sensation as a quality is enacted through and by the 
body: our five senses are the way we encounter the world. It seems, then, that status should be readable to 
our senses and therefore physically perceptible: humans take what we sense and interpret or translate it in 
our rational minds into the abstraction of status or belonging. 
 
15
 For more examples of humanoid groups with questionable status, see also Richard Bernheimer and 
Dorothy Yamamoto on wild men.  
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Jeffrey Denton explains, “the orders of society were set unerringly in a hierarchical 
framework. Social inequalities were not just facts of life. They were essential to social 
harmony and a prime element in European Christian thinking… Society’s organisation 
was an extension of, or a mirroring of, the perceived hierarchical structure of the 
universe” (4-5). Numerous metaphors for the shape of a well-ordered society existed, 
including the images of a ship with an orderly crew, and a body whose head represented 
the ruler and whose obedient limbs and organs represented the accommodating populace 
(Denton 4, Morrison 58). Disruptions to social order needed to be quickly and carefully 
smoothed over, and one way of doing so was to firmly instill a sense of hierarchical 
belonging in the less powerful majority. Rules for establishing social order generally 
involved enacting criteria on which exclusion was based – drawing a line along which 
outsiders are marked off from insiders (Rigby 19).  
This push for social organization was backed up by the Church. As Gregory I 
famously explained, Christian society was patterned upon God’s divinely ordained 
hierarchical cosmos (Black 30). Christianity, and by extension society, was orderly 
because God desired order (Denton 5). Further, the image of the Great Chain of Being 
supplied a clearly tiered vertical order for all living things, placing them by order of 
importance and thus assigning belonging.16 Much like Augustine’s tripartite system, 
however, this image of a carefully ordered chain became problematic when faced with 
difficult or hybrid links. Joan Young Gregg suggests that “In the uncompromising 
hierarchal universe construed by the medieval mentality, where all phenomena were 
assigned fixed places in a grand chain of being, those things not holding to their 
                                                 
16
 This Great Chain permeated society so completely it even influenced how and what people ate. See 
Flandrin, Montanari, and Sonnenfeld 307-314.  
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designated places or partaking of two realms simultaneously were monsters, ominous 
departures from the accepted structure and purpose of their kind” (18). Disorderly links 
on the chain, or misbehaving parts of the social body, had to be amputated, and this was 
done through monsterizing or otherwise “Othering” the disruption.  
If bodies or beings that did not fit into the scheme or chain of being were 
monstrous or castigated, those who wished to remain within the confines of orderly 
society had to set themselves clearly apart from the elements causing the “Othering” to 
occur. In her assessment of Other figures in medieval exempla, Gregg cites in particular 
devils, women, and Jews as negative examples. Exempla tell us how to behave – how to 
be human and accepted and worthy of salvation – through negative examples of “the 
Other.” Through learning the consequences of sin by non-believers or transgressors, we 
learn to act correctly lest we are also made Other through our sins and have to face 
condemnation, excommunication, or damnation (9-13).17 Taught by the Church what 
kinds of behaviors were “good” and what kinds were “bad,” both religious and secular 
medievals often attributed negative characteristics to those considered external Others, 
and this permitted a rationalization of exclusion, harm, or even extermination (20). With 
such serious consequences for negative or transgressive behavior, the desire to clearly 
differentiate oneself from what was considered Other was strong, and fear of becoming 
Other caused anxiety. Many aspects of a medieval worldview were based on binaries; 
Gregg cites a “continual spiritual tension characterized by pairs of opposites” in which 
medieval humankind was held (18). Key examples of these pairs include body vs. soul, 
man vs. woman, angel vs. devil, and life vs. death. However, even within these 
                                                 
17
 Gregg explains further that exempla were designed to convert and conform the listener’s conduct, 
promoting “an achievable set of core beliefs and behaviors that would mark off the Christian, with his hope 
of life eternal, from the condemned Other” (16). 
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dichotomies, “there was a contiguousness as well as a separation; perhaps they might be 
viewed as obverse sides rather than opposites of each other” (18). Despite their 
monstrousness, bodies or beings not adhering to the hierarchical structure of the universe 
still fitted into God’s salvatory scheme as examples or as a test for believers (18).  
Yet totalization and firm boundaries are not possible, even within the strain of 
Christianity that preached order and separation. Dissent and adherence to pre-Christian 
traditions still existed despite the Church’s attempts at hegemony, and society always 
contained marginal or liminal figures. Stephen Rigby suggests one of the problems with 
many approaches to understanding medieval social structure is that “individuals are not 
just ranked in one dimension of social inequality (of property, ownership, esteem or 
whatever) but are instead positioned at the meeting point of a number of ‘axes’ of social 
inequality” (18). People could occupy multiple categories at once, which made placing 
them in a particular order more difficult. Additionally, transgressors of hierarchy were 
not always viewed as negative. Liminal groups like women or rural peasants were often 
marginalized by the clergy, perhaps suggesting an ecclesiastical fear of difference and a 
desire to separate themselves from what they were not, yet both women and peasants 
were still considered members of the Church (Goodich 4). Further, despite the flourishing 
of clerical and noble status in late medieval Europe, ecclesiastical reform and increasing 
interaction with other cultures through trade were producing a greater consciousness 
about – if not always tolerance toward – diversity and flexibility that might initially be 
considered “disorderly.”  
Within Christianity itself, the idea of Otherness as negative and the 
straightforward hierarchy of being or status proposed by some of the Church fathers 
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becomes overly simplistic as well. Key central tenets of Christianity – the Trinity, the 
Incarnation, and the Resurrection – annihilate any attempt to apply rigid hierarchy or 
body-based categories, allowing for multiple existences in a single body, the blending of 
divine and human while still completely both, and the promise of embodied life after 
death. This hybridity within Christian doctrine is far from negative; it is in large part what 
constitutes the faith. Miracles surrounding Christ’s birth, death, and rebirth, as well as 
posthumous actions performed or permitted by saints and their bodies, proliferate in early 
as well as medieval Christianity. Thus discussing hybridity, order, categorization, and 
embodied existence within a magical Christian worldview like that of the Middle Ages is 
extremely complex. Godly existence and divine fiat disrupt categories more radically 
than transgressive humans or literary monsters ever could. Yet perhaps this very valence 
within Christian thought encourages the kind of rigorous hierarchy and categorization to 
which I have been pointing. As exempla established “correct” or desirable behavior by 
pointing to negative examples – through identifying Otherness we find a self – only by 
instituting and upholding a rigid “normal” state for reality can we recognize miraculous 
exceptions to it. This sets up an inherent dialectic. Saints’ bodies are special because they 
transgress boundaries ordinary human bodies cannot – exuding healing oils or resisting 
decay after death, for example. Without knowing firmly that human bodies do not enact 
these kinds of posthumous behaviors, we would not be able to recognize this impossible 
action as a miracle.  
Further, within Christianity hybrid or physiologically Othered human bodies can 
provide positive as well as negative examples. While saints are a special category seen as 
positive despite their physiological differences, “ordinary” humans in Biblical literature 
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sometimes transgress or exceed what we might consider “normal” human abilities or 
bodily appearance without suffering castigation or condemnation – in fact, these 
differences are often what mark them as blessed.18 Job, for example, experiences 
incredible bodily torment, suffering, and deformity. Yet his steadfastness and faith 
despite his punishment mark him as a true believer: rather than a sign of sin, his extreme 
physical infirmity becomes a sign of his faith. Marked in a different way, but still firmly 
differentiated by his body, Samson is a superhuman yet still positive example of physical 
difference. His strength and mandated attempts at genocide make him not a monster, but 
a hero and a faithful servant of God.19  
In Biblical as well as secular texts like Mandeville’s, the literary presentation of 
extracategorical beings is complicated by their bodies.20 This dissertation looks at 
numerous examples of such multifaceted bodies in fourteenth-century narratives – both 
those situated in between animal, human, and divine, and those who move through and 
around such categories, beginning with one status and ending with another – and 
investigates ways we might locate meaning in concert with their complex materiality. 
Because rigid taxonomic hierarchies do not seem sufficient for literary representations of 
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 As we shall see in my fifth chapter, saintly abilities are particularly tied to their bodies and the way those 
bodies, in rejecting outside influence, differ from and therefore exceed, “normal” humanness.  
 
19
 His weakness in succumbing to Delilah of course problematizes his role as a good example, but his final 
act of destroying the Philistine temple and his textual placement as one of the Israelite Judges in the Tanakh 
suggest he is ultimately remembered and interpreted positively.  
 
20
 Even marginalized groups like lepers and women can become positive examples through their 
interactions with Christ. Mary Magdalene and the woman caught in adultery were castigated as a result of 
their bodily actions, yet Christ forgives these differences and returns them to the fold. In healing the sick, 
infirm, and diseased, Christ also disrupts the judgment placed upon people carrying bodily afflictions that 
were thought to be caused by compromised morality: in restoring normalcy to injured or leprous bodies, not 
only does he change the relationship between infirmity and sin, but through miracle he expands the realm 
of what is possible for human bodies to achieve. These bodies might become interstitial because they act or 
are acted upon in ways that make them not fit well within the carefully organized schema laid out for 
mortal human bodies, yet they cannot be monsterized or ignored. Thus in multiple ways they complicate, 
resist, and trouble rigid categorization. 
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nonnormative bodies, I argue that we must collapse and move beyond inflexible systems 
and read bodies more inclusively with an eye toward interconnectedness. Such a reading 
entails attending not only to their rationality (if they possess this) and physicality, but 
their behaviors, inter- and intraspecies interactions, and their placement and movement 
within their environments, both the world and form of the text. This inclusivity is most 
important when considering the historical project of literature: how anxieties and 
differences are presented in literature reveals cultural truths about that literature’s 
surrounding world. Bodies in medieval literature, therefore, reveal to us ways in which 
medievals thought about humanity, about difference, and about themselves. For us, as 
contemporary readers of fourteenth century literature, how we read medieval bodies also 
informs us about ourselves. Though we try to refrain from anachronism, we inevitably 
bring our own norms and constructs to the literature we read, and thus our interpretations 
are influenced by our own worldview. Despite our advances in social and cultural 
awareness of and resistance toward normativity, the urge to categorize interstitial bodies 
in medieval literature still finds parallels in our own society: the dehumanization of 
people suffering from obesity, for example, or the names we give diseases or disorders 
like ichthyosis vulgaris or the outbreaks in recent years of “avian” flu or “swine” flu. 
Though there is clearly no transfer of truly animal characteristics to the humans carrying 
the condition, the linguistic suggestion of similarity has the potential to cause association 
and uneasiness.21 Thus attending to bodies and how they are represented in literature 
sheds light not only on the need for inclusivity as a project of reading, but on a need to 
continue to assess our own ideas about bodies and how those ideas affect humanness. 
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 I would suggest this is in large part why political and medical officials quickly moved to replace the label 
“swine flu” with “H1N1 influenza”: reducing the linguistic similarity to an animal condition helped 
separate human patients from the same association.  
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To unravel these complications, I draw on three distinct methodologies: 
ecocriticism, disability studies, and poststructuralism. These approaches permit a more 
inclusive assessment of bodies because they privilege interconnectivity and multiplicity.22 
Ecocriticism calls not only for an awareness and resistance to anthropocentrism but also 
an understanding of how we are connected to and constitutive with a wider world (Rudd 
6-7, 10). Philosopher Lisa Heldke, in her work on ethics and food justice, advocates what 
she calls “withness”: a system of interconnectivity that requires an assessment of a 
myriad of relations related to production, distribution, and consumption (Heldke 2011). 
Her insistence on connectedness and interdependency corresponds and intersects with 
ecocritical calls for extra-anthropocentric awareness. My examinations of 
extracategorical bodies in the subsequent chapters will show how they operate through 
“withness”: stressing their environmental and interspecies relations to emphasize their 
complexity and multiplicities of meaning. Disability studies highlights the particularities 
and extraordinary features of nonnormative bodies, and points to the insufficiency of 
relying on physicality to generate definitive truths or judgments about bodies. Finally, 
poststructuralism rejects the idea of a singular origin and embraces plurality. The major 
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 I recognize the paradoxical nature of this claim: by privileging or “in”cluding certain threads of analysis 
over others I am recreating formally the very dichotomy of categorization I resist in my textual analysis. 
But I am trapped within categories – as we all are – even as I am trapped within language. By choosing a 
strand of analysis as “good” or inclusive and castigating another as “bad” or “insufficient” and exclusive, I 
am creating categories in which to define types of analysis, and planting myself firmly within one of these 
categories in order to argue against the other. To eliminate categories entirely, we would have to eliminate 
language, which is possible neither for communicative human existence, nor for a literary project such as 
this one that requires argumentation and explication. Because we rely on language for understanding, and 
because language requires a form of categorization as part of its system of meaning, a full escape from this 
problem of categories is not possible. However, what I strive to do here is to advocate for dialogue. Being 
more inclusive entails widening and making more permeable the edges of existing categories – of 
acknowledging bodies shoved between these arbitrary lines of demarcation and opening not prescriptions, 
but suggestions of new ways to go about understanding them. Though this still leaves me methodologically 
snared in categories, calling for dialogue and expansion provides richer results than any single method 
alone simply because it allows for greater complexity (indeed, even the word “dialogue” is constraining, 
etymologically suggestive of only a two person interaction.  Conversation, perhaps, or discourse, might be 
preferable).  
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contribution poststructural analysis has made to body studies is its demand for fracturing, 
or at least resisting, the idea of a common single body image (Kay and Rubin 3). Within 
poststructuralism, I will address Judith Butler’s ideas about performativity and 
personhood, and use Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s metaphor of the rhizome to 
coordinate these approaches and create a more comprehensive spectrum of connection. 
Reading extracategorical bodies with an eye toward multiplicity and interconnectivity – 
reading rhizomatically – allows for multiple and sometimes contradictory elements of 
bodily existence to operate and offer meaning simultaneously.  
Of course this mode of reading does not come without challenges. Placing these 
ideas in conversation requires me to move carefully among and between a crowded set of 
tasks. As I offer the following case studies of both how rigid categorization can be a 
problem for textual bodies, and what a rhizomatic reading sensitive to interconnectivity 
and multiplicity might look like, I have at least two tasks to which I must attend. First, in 
considering the popular fourteenth-century narratives which comprise my studies, I 
acknowledge the dominant ideological contours of the Middle Ages, containing (in some 
ways) a rigidity in categories pertaining to bodies. In no way was a medieval 
understanding of these texts monolithic – diverse audiences with diverse understanding 
could have accessed these texts and brought interpretations based on their unique 
experiences to them. Neither was medieval Christianity monolithic – dissent, resistance, 
and transgression still existed (as they always will in a world where there is difference) 
despite the Church’s attempts to institute hegemony. A faith founded on bodily paradox 
and hybridity necessitates questioning about bodies, both within its doctrine and of its 
believers: while “normal” humans were expected to act within their hierarchies according 
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to the Great Chain of Being, the existence of miracle and Incarnation always trouble and 
complicate this system. Whether we need an Other to define and separate the self or not, 
to engage responsibly and deeply with these texts it is necessary to consider medieval 
theological and philosophical perspectives with and against the texts I examine.  
In conjunction with this attendance to dominant medieval ideology, I also 
acknowledge the complexity of twentieth and twenty-first century theories about bodies 
and physicality, philosophy, and performed existence. Though there are perhaps aspects 
of Butler or Deleuze and Guattari that medievals would have found intriguing or perhaps 
even acquiesced toward, such as the radical split between physicality and meaning, 
material existence and linguistic expression, or permeable, multiple boundaries, I do not 
suggest they would certainly have come to the same conclusions about bodies as do these 
contemporary theorists. I aim to deploy this theory with these texts, not on them. The 
historical difference between the fourteenth and the twentieth and twenty-first centuries 
makes for a wide divide, and this is a difference and a distance that must be 
acknowledged and respected.  
Yet I believe we can still aim for a dialogue between these ideas: considering 
medieval ideology in conjunction with modern theoretical complexity gives us a rich, 
deep way of looking into and rethinking these poems. Even if medievals did not read 
their own literature as we do, we can still learn from their texts by reading through a 
rhizomatic lens, just as we can when we apply a feminist, poststructural, or 
environmental framework. As Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge in the opening of A 
Thousand Plateaus, “The two of us wrote Anti-Oedipus together. Since each of us was 
several, there was already quite a crowd… We are no longer ourselves. Each will know 
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his own. We have been aided, inspired, multiplied” (3). With one of my feet in each camp 
– medieval literature and ideology on one side and modern theoretical thought on the 
other – I am not only cautiously balancing, but peering into a set of already crowded 
rooms. Coming to a definitive conclusion about how, what, and why bodies mean in the 
ways they do may be impossible, but deploying theory and text together creates a rich 
and productive rethinking of how these bodies, positioned and oscillating between, 
against, and around categories, operate to make their diverse and fascinating meanings. In 
what follows, I detail the problems with a hierarchical reading based on rationality and 
physical form, then introduce the rhizome as an alternative mode of reading. I end with a 
brief synopsis of the subsequent chapters.  
Bodies: Mixed Messengers 
Bodies as couriers of meaning are ambivalent. For medieval people, they were 
viewed as vessels or cages for the soul – a trap in this fallen world of muck and 
materiality as well as a gift from God and the shape and existence shared by Jesus Christ. 
The metaphor of a body as a building housing the soul was commonplace in medieval 
literature.23 Within this metaphor of enclosure, the body might be thought alternatively as 
a prison for the soul, or (and sometimes simultaneously) as a sanctuary or a habitation for 
the spirit. In a similar acknowledgment of this vacillation, as Masha Raskolnikov notes in 
her study of sowlehele,24 despite theological understanding to the contrary, the most 
common relationship used to explain self-constitution in medieval allegory was 
“hierarchical dualism: good soul, uncomprehendingly trapped for a time in a bad body” 
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 See Joyce Tally Lionarons 43.  
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 Raskolnikov defines sowlehele as “a mode of didactic writing that makes use of allegorical narrative to 
educate sinners about the nature of their own sinning selves” (9).  
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(22). Though death liberated the soul, the resurrection was a bodily resurrection – the 
body was perfected and rose again, and such salvation was not possible without it (Le 
Goff 14-15). Regardless, some religious individuals and groups worked to control and 
even deny the body, fasting or inflicting physical injury on themselves to show that the 
strength of their spirituality overwhelmed the appetitive needs of their flesh. Jacques Le 
Goff details this conflict between physiological reality and spiritual expectation; he 
explains that for some, “Sin manifested itself in the form of physical deformity and 
disease. Leprosy, the ultimate symbolic and ideological malady of the Middle Ages… 
was first and foremost an affliction of the soul. The way to spiritual perfection involved 
mortification of the flesh” (83-84). Though this extreme form of humility was practiced, 
it was not fully sanctioned by the Church.25 Irina Metzler points out in her study of 
medieval impairment that the Fourth Lateran Council declared sickness only sometimes a 
result of sin; unlike the common interpretation of leprosy, many illnesses did not reflect 
moral shortcomings (46-47). The health or well-being of the body, that is, was not always 
a direct conduit to the state of the soul. Bodies were understood in multiple and 
sometimes seemingly contradictory ways. Illness could be a sign from God, but it could 
also be a result of spoiled food or inadequate medical treatment. Further, rejecting the 
body was also rejecting God’s chosen form for human beings, and degrading Christ’s 
incarnation. Though the next life was the goal, worldly, material existence was a complex 
reality and could not be interpreted solely as punishment.  
Because ideas about the body were diverse and sometimes contradictory, bodies 
within literary texts merit careful consideration. As Sarah Kay and Miri Rubin helpfully 
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 Nor, as I previously suggested, by Biblical accounts: Christ’s interaction with lepers calls this judgment 
into question.  
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contend, “The body both produces knowledge and is shaped by it, both is determined by 
it and colludes with it” (6). That is, not only does the literary body generate meaning, it is 
also constructed by our existing knowledge: affected but also created by our 
understanding of it. In their examination of transgression, Peter Stallybrass and Allon 
White aver that “the body cannot be thought separately from the social formation, 
symbolic topography and the constitution of the subject. The body is neither a purely 
natural given nor is it merely a textual metaphor, it is a privileged operator for the 
transcoding of these other areas. Thinking the body is thinking social topography and 
vice versa” (192). Similarly, Lisa Lomperis and Sarah Stanbury note that “the study of 
the body in the Middle Ages necessitates an understanding of ideological structuring: the 
critical task of making the body intelligible – indeed, of establishing its literal existence – 
demands that one regard it as a politically charged discursive construct, a representational 
space traversed in various ways by socially based power relations” (ix). That is, the 
textual body, medieval or contemporary, can never be removed from its structure and its 
circulation among other bodies; it is always operating with and within other systems – 
political, social, cultural or anthropological – and understanding it in conjunction with the 
systems and constructions it informs both reveals contemporaneous attitudes toward 
physicality and material existence and leads to a better understanding of the world in 
which it exists.  
To understand bodies, however, we have to understand what material and 
discursive systems influence their representation. Materially speaking, it was a fairly 
common idea in the Middle Ages that human nature could be read on the skin or on other 
bodily surfaces (Groebner 362). If that is the case, status should be physically 
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determinable. By status, I mean not social standing, necessarily, but something more akin 
to species categorization – where does the body sit (or lie, or stand, or oscillate) on a 
hierarchy we might try to draw based on physicality? Returning to Mandeville’s 
Natumerans, then, their status – in this categorical sense – should be evident in their 
physical form. Yet their rationality does not seem to be readable on their bodies – why 
would people with dogs’ heads be considered rational, when they are clearly part animal? 
Dorothy Yamamoto points to the complex relationship between rationality, physicality, 
and behavior. She asks “If men stand upright and beasts crawl on all fours, what are we 
to make of a man who copies a beast’s posture? If he starts to live like an animal, does he 
forfeit his humanity?” (8). If man is by nature rational, his physical behavior is part of his 
status. But if he seems to forfeit that rationality and his body does not change in form, is 
he a man who is acting like a beast, or something more difficult to define? As cases of 
mental impairment or madness indicate, loss of rationality was possible, and the body it 
happened within remained human in form. When a human being loses reason, he or she 
does not turn into an animal. His soul may be in jeopardy, but during this life, and 
especially in secular literature, poets and readers do not and cannot have definitive access 
to knowledge of the soul’s future. Therefore all determination about status and the social 
consequences of that status (how to think about, talk about, and treat that “person”) 
hinges on what can be physically observed.  
Augustine’s interest in designating all descendants of Adam as human was in part 
intended to eliminate the possibility for multiple “races” of humans to exist. If a being is 
mortal and rational, then it is human, and if human, it is definitively descended from 
Adam – and, secondly, thanks to the flood, from Noah. For Augustine, writing during a 
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period of intense conversion of people whose belief structures included many sorts of 
interstitial beings, proposing this definitive, strict hierarchy may have been part of a 
conversion project. Yet within the Biblical literature Augustine and others read and 
embraced, interstitiality exists. Goliath – interstitial thanks to his monstrous size and 
pagan practices – exists after the flood, along with other giants like the Nephilim and 
Rephaim. In medieval tradition Nimrod, who was frequently credited with constructing 
the Tower of Babel, was a giant.26 Bodies with questionable mortality exist, like Lazarus: 
restored to earthly life and health after death. The Book of Revelation presents interstitial 
and hybrid bodies in abundance: locusts with human faces, women’s hair and lions’ teeth, 
the dragon and the seven-headed beast, and numerous others. But despite this incredible 
variety of transgressive, extracategorical bodies, Augustine’s system does not make room 
to acknowledge their differences in a satisfying way. Physical difference does matter, in a 
way separate from rationality and mortality. How can we see a giant or a hybrid as the 
same as us, even if they are also rational and mortal, and therefore, at least according to 
Augustine, descended from Adam? How can we see them, like the Natumerans, as “fully 
human”? Such a project seems difficult, if not impossible, tending as we do to search for 
likeness and castigate difference.  
To account for these physical markers of difference, then, there must be more 
room in any system of categorization than a rigid hierarchy can account for. 
Extracategorical bodies are present, sometimes aggressively so, in fourteenth-century 
literature as well as Biblical texts. Therefore they are also present in our imaginations, 
and they need attention because they have meanings. When categorical thought bumps up 
against exceptions, as in the case of interstitial bodies in the texts I will examine, either 
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the category must change to accommodate the exception, or we must refigure how we 
understand the exception. Rigid, inflexible categories cannot work for every case, as 
these bodies show us, so we must determine how to live within a flexible, oscillating 
framework of understanding.   
Despite Augustine’s reluctance to create space for interstitial bodies and his 
system’s implicit affirmation that the line between human and animal is clearly drawn, 
medieval representations of animality as well as humanness recognize the same kind of 
blurring and fluidity offered by interstitial bodies in Biblical literature. Jan Ziolkowski 
explains that “the line between human and animal in the Middle Ages was at once 
sharply drawn and porous” (22). He enumerates three factors that made the 
differentiation between human and animal difficult: the monstrous races, human-animal 
hybrids, and “the excommunication, malediction, juridical trials, and proselytizing of 
animals” that seemed to raise them to a rational level by assuming they had awareness of 
the morality of their actions (1-4). He notes noble literary animals, like companions of 
saints or Yvain’s lion, whose actions seem to suggest rational or near spiritual capacity 
(3). Conversely, he cites examples of pigs who were exiled from villages for injuring or 
defacing human infants; far from simply applying anthropomorphic qualities to fictional 
beasts, real animals were held to human standards of responsibility for their actions (3-4). 
That Ziolkowski uses the term “excommunicated” blurs this divide even more: his word 
choice implies a human level of understanding, rationality, and perhaps even a human 
soul assigned to an animal for the purposes of applying human ethics to animal actions 
and punishing the animal accordingly. If human ethics could be applied to animals, and 
those animals consequently praised or punished, were they still animals, or were they 
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superior to extramoral barnyard denizens? Though human beings possessed a rational 
soul and animals did not,27 these blendings in form and in treatment “generally blurred 
the otherwise stark dividing line between the human and the animal in the Middle Ages; 
and the animals and human beings lived in such proximity to the border zone that it was 
bound to be crossed frequently” (5). The porousness of this dividing line, and the fact that 
there could be unintentional as well as advantageous transgressions from one side to the 
other, seems to be why there was an urge to create sharp differentiations. Even knowing 
how fluid the borders were between human and animal did not necessarily mean people 
were comfortable with this continuum. When the Other approaches, resembling the self 
in its behaviors or appearance, the need to re-differentiate the self arises. To keep your 
status – bodily and spiritual – safe, the firmer the differentiation you could draw, and the 
more externally visible it was, the better.  
Disability and Personhood: Problems with the Physical  
As the hybridity of the Natumerans and Ziolkowski’s explanation of “rational” 
animals suggests, we cannot depend solely on the physical form of the body to reveal 
status. In addition to the social and cultural ideas always already attached to textual as 
well as “real” bodies, ramifications for a concentration on the physical lie in the 
inevitable truth that bodies do not always conform to physical norms. Even during 
“normal” life, bodies age and may suffer injury, both of which could cause changes to 
physical form that should not endanger their status as human. Gender studies, disability 
studies, and queer studies, to name a few, have already pointed out ethical dangers of 
concentrating on physical appearance as a means of determining social standing or 
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“personhood.” In her groundbreaking study on disability, Rosemarie Garlan Thomson 
points to early twentieth-century circus freaks and sideshow performers: anomalous 
bodies such as Siamese twins, unusual heights or weights, or the extremely hirsute, 
arguing that these bodies were Othered as a way of legitimating a system of 
empowerment for “normates” – her term for people with normative bodies – based on 
physiological difference (8). Discourse on disability, and other physiological differences 
such as race, gender, and sexuality, operates within culture “to create figures of otherness 
from the raw materials of bodily variation” (6). Just as Gregg discusses in the case of 
medieval interactions, the immediate effect of this Othering is often a difference in 
treatment for those figures who have been set apart based on their physiology. Prejudice, 
segregation, and dehumanization are some of the dangerous results of this method of 
differentiation. Yet human beings who simply look different from the norm should not be 
discriminated against as a result of their physiology; their genetic similarity should be 
adequate proof of status belonging, though this is still too often an ideal and not a 
universal belief or practice.  
Judith Butler also points to the system of Othering in her studies on gender and 
materiality, positing that the matter of bodies themselves is inseparable from the 
“regulatory norms that govern their materialization and the significance of those material 
effects” (Bodies That Matter 2). Bodies which deviate from these regulatory norms are 
shunted into abjection, “those ‘unlivable’ and ‘uninhabitable’ zones of social life which 
are nevertheless densely populated by those who do not enjoy the status of the subject, 
but whose living under the sign of the ‘unlivable’ is required to circumscribe the domain 
of the subject” (3). She cites in particular “abjected beings who do not appear properly 
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gendered; it is their very humanness that comes into question” (8). Though Butler is 
referring to real, biological bodies, her rhetoric engages a linguistically represented body 
that in some ways makes the biological body inaccessible: bodies become what they are 
verbally represented as being.28 Again, just as Thomson describes, the Other is 
formulated to cement and maintain the norm, and this creation of an Other in language is 
often based on physical form and appearance.29 Yet in the case of real biological bodies, 
these Others are still human, we should recognize them as members of the same species, 
and treating them as otherwise based on physical difference is an issue of social justice 
and equality. Bodies have variations, and determining that some arbitrary level of 
physical difference is “too much” and therefore a boundary line must be drawn to 
separate these different bodies from “normal” humans is problematic.    
These Others – bodies with human form but sometimes diminished status – seem 
to fall into the same interstitial category as Mandeville’s Pytans. As modern studies of 
race, gender, sexuality, and disability have asserted, physiological difference should not 
diminish status. Medieval people were less certain, however. Thomas Aquinas deemed 
physical or mental defects an evil, though not the moral fault of the person carrying them. 
He claims “not every absence of good is an evil, but only that which a thing by nature can 
have and is expected to have. The lack of sight is an evil in an animal, but not in a stone 
which is not made to see” (127). Physical “evils” of this kind, he notes, “seem to be in a 
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 Thus applying her ideas to textual bodies, though they perhaps do not call for the same kind of social 
justice Butler’s application of language to real bodies does, makes a kind of critical sense: the bodies in the 
texts I will examine exist only in language, and thus cannot be separated from the words that surround and 
define them. Their “regulatory norms that govern their materialization” are the text and cultural background 
that surrounds and permeates their representation in the texts in which they “appear” to us.  
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 In medieval Christianity, as I have noted, this Othering is not always a castigation: Job, Samson, and 
Christ himself are examples of bodies with physiological differences that signal their blessedness or faith. 
Similarly, in my examination of hagiography, the physical differences and bodily suffering of Chaucer’s 
“litel clergeon” and St. Cecelia mark them as holier than the “normal” human beings who surround them.  
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majority only among human beings” (147). Thus deformity or impairment is not a sign of 
sin, but evil by virtue of a privation of what is good or “natural” for a type of body. 
Albertus Magnus “opined that the physical appearance of a person can influence their 
character, qualifying this remark, however, by adding that this does not make a person 
behave in a certain way absolutely. This means a person retains an element of free will, 
so that instead individuals should strive to overcome the negative affects of physical 
blemishes” (Metzler 54). Nevertheless, Magnus also describes a dwarf girl as a 
monstrosity resulting from badly practiced intercourse, dehumanizing her and giving no 
indication that her “physical blemish” is something she can overcome (80).  
Impairments and disabilities within medieval communities were treated with 
ambivalence, regardless of their presumed cause.30 Metzler argues that medieval 
impairment was a state of liminality: impaired or disabled people were neither healthy 
nor sick, and in some sense treated as though they were neither fully alive nor completely 
dead (156). In some hagiographies, many impaired people cured by saints are described 
as monstrous or visibly inhuman according to their conditions (154). Hermaphrodites 
were considered “monstrous” until they chose a sex, at which point their physical 
appearance and behavior were normed and they could be part of the human community 
(Rubin 101-103).  On the other hand, as Julie Singer has written, during the fourteenth 
century some impairments began to carry increased and symbolically positive 
significance. Blindness, for example, began to be interpreted as “a key contributor to 
valor, virtue or artistic creation,” and loss of one sense resulted in the enhancement of 
others (39). Even when disabled or impaired people were seen as social or bodily 
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 Dating back to Galen and humoral theory, often these causes were determined to be some form of bodily 
imbalance. Sometimes this imbalance was caused by untimely or improper forms of intercourse, sometimes 
by food consumed during pregnancy, and sometimes by planetary influence (Metzler 83-85, 86, 92).  
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disturbances to order, they were considered valuable to the spiritual well-being of a 
community, “providing opportunities for penitence and philanthropy” for the abled 
population (Skoda 60). Though this positive opportunity existed, “The most common 
reaction to disability… was not supportive, but rather negatively constructed disability as 
social disfiguration,” and it is reacted to in miracle stories with mockery, exclusion and 
fear (62).  
While medievals treated cases of disability and impairment within their real, lived 
communities ambivalently, secular literature displays a clear anxiety about how to 
understand more foreign, external differences.31 Grouping together strange peoples based 
on the fact that their appearance, behavior, or rationality differs from the norm and 
placing them under a blanket term like “monstrous races” or “subhuman” is a way of 
containing and discussing these bodies. This is not sufficient, however, because it does 
not take into consideration the particularities and specificities of individual types of 
bodies. As Thomson explains, “it is precisely the variation among individuals that 
cultural categories trivialize and that representation often distorts” (13). Further, “As with 
all culturally imposed categories extrapolated from biological differences, the identity 
[‘disabled’] thus has a forced quality that levels intragroup variations” (15). She 
introduces the term “singular bodies” to talk more specifically about individuals and 
respect and acknowledge their particularities. This is, perhaps, a way of considering 
groups like the Pytans: not on the basis of their difference from the norm, but in their 
individuality as a type of body which interacts with the world in a particular way. I do not 
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 I have provided here a necessarily cursory assessment of medieval disability as it may have been 
experienced or reacted to. Though this is an intriguing counterpoint to the interstitiality of the textual or 
extra-human bodies in my study, I am more interested for this project in how disability studies discusses 
non-normative bodies for the purpose of applying it to textual, imagined extracategorical bodies.   
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mean to suggest that the textual extracategorical figures I examine are equivalent to 
disabled people, contemporary or medieval, but to point to the similarity in the way they 
are often lumped together: separated based on general difference from the norm, but 
without respect for their individual differences between one another. Though men with 
dogs’ heads and diminutive people who subsist on the aroma of wild apples are both 
different from “normal” Europeans, they are certainly not equivalent, nor should they be 
treated as such, because their particularities convey different messages that would remain 
garbled were they simply considered either “monsters” or “men.”  
The attempt to contain difficult bodies by grouping them in a category is not just a 
problem of discrimination or segregation, but a problem of language. From a linguistic 
standpoint, a vertical hierarchy like Augustine’s is insufficient because language itself is 
insufficient. Though language – our most prevalent system of conveying information – is 
necessary for literature, its creation by human beings makes it only representative, not 
universal, and the possibilities for multiple interpretations make a singular or essential 
meaning unstable. To represent existence to ourselves we name beings with words, but as 
with status categories, words are often constraining because they allow us to more easily 
assume sameness amongst people or things sharing the name they are given, even if we 
recognize the ability of language to represent reality only approximately. For example, as 
I will explain further in the next chapter, we use the word “giant” to mean a humanoid 
figure of extraordinary height. Even taking for granted that this word means differently to 
different cultures and time periods, within medieval literature alone the various kinds of 
figures we call giants are so different it is questionable whether they should be placed in 
the same linguistic category. Certainly their functions within their respective texts, 
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whether they are incorporated for didacticism, titillation, or shock value, differ, and the 
meanings they lend to the text are not the same. Yet we call them all “giant” without 
necessarily considering how the word inhibits, falsifies, or reduces their being. I propose 
instead to read these figures attending to their actions and individual bodies, privileging 
how they connect to and situate themselves with their surroundings in language, thus 
giving a more complete picture than the words “humanoid” or “monster” or even “giant” 
can give. Of course we are still bound by language and thus perfect representation is 
impossible, but reading for multiplicities and connections is an acknowledgment of 
complexity, which moves us toward a richer, more nuanced understanding of bodies that 
resist and overflow their insufficient titles.  
In their arguments about identity, both Dorothy Yamamoto and Jeffrey Jerome 
Cohen touch on the question of interstitial bodies in interesting and helpful ways. 
Yamamoto’s readings of the wild man figure – a hirsute, uncivilized but still human-
shaped denizen of forests and folklore – reveal that his status could not be deduced from 
his appearance, so the complicated question remained about whether he was human or 
animal, and therefore how he should be treated were he encountered (153-155). That the 
answer to this question remained disputed reveals the contradictory nature of the wild 
man’s characteristics – fluid enough that standard categorization systems were 
insufficient to contain and firmly define him. The boundary between human and animal, 
traversed and tangled by figures like the wild man, is fragile and arbitrary: “in one sense 
a site of play, richly productive of cultural enterprises, but it is also a danger area, a place 
where human identity – construed as difference from animal kind – may slip from one’s 
grasp” (225). For Yamamoto, behavior in addition to appearance seems to be a factor, 
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and a complication, in determining what someone is and how that person should be 
treated. Not only do physical interactions with animals trouble this boundary, but also 
animalistic actions, and even bodily processes humans and animals share.  
Yamamoto does not come to a definitive conclusion about why this boundary is 
so fragile, however, or how best to engage with the interstitial figures like wild men who 
seem to resist and cross it. Cohen, however, offers cultural conflict as an answer to 
representations of hybridity in his examination of twelfth-century chronicles. He explains 
hybridity as “a fusion and a disjunction, a conjoining of differences that cannot simply 
harmonize” (Cohen 2). Thus for Cohen, hybrids are not smooth blendings, but ragged, 
uncomfortable melds between human and animal, or human and monster, etc.32 Further, 
“hybridity enticed identities to mutate into forms seemingly beyond the borders of the 
humanly possible, forms that in fact dwelled alarmingly close to home” (3). As 
Yamamoto observes of the wild man, hybridity reflects not only difference but also 
disturbing likeness to normative bodies. Those figures who have been Othered by 
hybridization, Cohen warns, seem segregated by a firm boundary from the cultural 
majority. Like Ziolkowski, Cohen points to the porousness of this boundary. He 
complicates this idea of porousness, however, by pointing to the tremendous space 
between categories, which is not merely crossed, but populated: “the geography of this 
border space always turns out to be vast. Between belongings stretch precarious expanses 
inhabited by hybridities irreducible to one side or another of a bifurcated world” (5). 
Thus, Cohen seems to be saying, a firm hierarchy is not sufficient for containing 
hybridities. Their multiplicity places them between boundaries in a way that does not 
prohibit them from overlapping those boundaries on either side.  
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 For more on hybridity in the twelfth century, see Bynum, Metamorphosis and Identity.  
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The Rhizome: Collapsing Hierarchy, Embracing Multiplicity  
As Cohen suggests, this inability to contain bodies is due to their own 
complexities, whether physical, behavioral, or cultural. The problem is attempting to 
bracket these bodies into single categories: human, animal, monster, etc. Rather, these 
bodies are multiplicitous – each contains characteristics linking it to diverse categories 
and, sometimes, contradicting these categories even as it seems to belong to them. 
Addressing this problem entails metaphorically toppling vertical systems of hierarchy 
which require each body to conform to cultural requirements lest it be debased into 
undifferentiated, still-contradictory space. We will replace these vertical systems with a 
flexible, horizontal assemblage: a rhizome. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari introduce 
the rhizome as an alternative to the kind of single-stranded, structuralist systems of 
analysis they call arboreal or arborescent. They explain: “arborescent systems are 
hierarchical systems with centers of significance and subjectification, central automata 
like organized memories” (Deleuze and Guattari 16). Instead of this system of isolated 
interpretation, in an effort to account for the possibility of multiplicity, slippage, or 
transformation, they offer the possibility of a horizontal, comparative map of meaning: 
“Unlike a structure, which is defined by a set of points and positions, with binary 
relations between the points and biunivocal relationships between the positions, the 
rhizome is made only of lines” (21). Further, “A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is 
always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo. The tree is filiation, but the 
rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance. The tree imposes the verb ‘to be,’ but the fabric of 
the rhizome is the conjunction, ‘and… and… and…’ This conjunction carries enough 
force to shake and uproot the verb ‘to be’” (25). By highlighting their key principles of 
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connection, heterogeneity, multiplicity, and asignifying rupture, Deleuze and Guattari 
emphasize that a rhizomatic model is made up not of a series of individual, separated 
points or a single, isolated interpretive strand, but a map or collection of interconnected 
“lines of flight” that all provide fodder for exploration (8). With a vast map of lines 
forming an assemblage of meaning that can be entered or exited from any point, attaching 
to one of these lines of flight creates a tracing from part of the map. Each individual 
interpretive filament is a tracing that ultimately must be placed back onto and into the 
rhizome to reconnect to all other points (13). This does not mean interpretation is not 
possible, but that we should be willing to accept and consider multiple possibilities, while 
resisting the urge to choose one to the detriment of others.33 The kind of horizontal, 
structure-less system a rhizome entails is a way not of containing bodies, but of mapping 
their diverse meanings in a way that does not constrict or inhibit their constituent 
multiplicities.  
Complex, hybrid, and multiplicitous, the extracategorical bodies in my study are 
also what Deleuze and Guattari call assemblages: “An assemblage is precisely [an] 
increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it 
expands its connections” (8). Using books as models for this kind of collection of 
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 Again, this seems to signal paradox: while Deleuze and Guattari encourage the application of many 
forms, I am advocating their method – suggesting through my choice that this is the most useful way of 
reading representations of bodies in medieval literature. I do not think, however, that Deleuze and 
Guattari’s approach is the only way of reading; it is a productive lens through which to view these complex 
textual bodies, but it is only one such lens: one of many methods that might be employed in the project of 
understanding and interpretation. Poststructuralist theory does not seek to disprove interpretive efforts, but 
to interrogate and expand the originary or arboreal systems structuralism imposes. Even Deleuze and 
Guattari are caught in this linguistic trap, however. These are their ideas, and as we can see words like 
“ultimate” and “should” and “being” creep in, leaving them caught in categories even as they try to uproot 
them. Yet they are moving toward something – having a dialogue or conversation instead of a monologic, 
arboreal statement of “fact.” Opening possibilities for additional modes of thought does not shut down 
previous analyses, it allows for greater richness of consideration. Perhaps there is no “ultimate” or “full” or 
“complete” answer, because that would close things down again. Movement toward greater openness, 
however, even within a formal system of categories, seems a productive and worthwhile engagement.  
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linkages, they explain “In a book, as in all things, there are lines of articulation or 
segmentarity, strata and territories; but also lines of flight, movements of 
deterritorialization and destratification. Comparative rates of flow on these lines produce 
phenomena of relative slowness and viscosity, or, on the contrary, acceleration and 
rupture. All this, lines and measurable speeds, constitutes an assemblage” (4). Further, 
“As an assemblage, a book has only itself, in connection with other assemblages and in 
relation to other bodies… We will ask what [a book] functions with, in connection with 
what other things it does or does not transmit intensities, in which other multiplicities its 
own are inserted and metamorphosed, and with what other bodies… it makes its own 
converge” (4). When we read bodies, then, treating them as multiplicitous assemblages 
and creating rhizomatic maps of interpretation, we must read not for a single strand of 
meaning, but for interconnections and relationships, and what we can learn from them. It 
is not only the bodies themselves that are assemblages, but assemblages mapped onto the 
larger assemblage of the world itself.  
Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of the rhizome rejects singularity in favor of 
multiple possibilities, and by extension raises the idea that being as a stable state might 
also have problematic, constraining effects on bodies.34 As Cohen points out, “Medieval 
authors, like their classical predecessors, wrote as if peoples retain their identities 
unchanged over long periods of time, typically in their flesh” (12). However, as he proves 
through his examination of contact and conflict between encroaching cultures in twelfth 
century England, the reality of what it meant to be “English” changed drastically over 
                                                 
34
 That is, a single interpretation is not necessarily wrong, but we should acknowledge that other 
interpretive strands could also be just as valid. It is not a gesture toward locating meaning that Deleuze and 
Guattari criticize, but the tendency toward privileging a single meaning to the detriment of many others. 
Theirs is a model for reading, not a definitive interpretation.  
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short periods. The same is true of bodies in literary texts, changing their behaviors, forms, 
and meanings as a result of the connections they make and break within the assemblage 
of the text. Bearing in mind Deleuze and Guattari’s rejection of the verb “to be,” the 
permanence a vertical hierarchy enforces upon bodies is also problematic. Though 
Deleuze and Guattari choose to replace “to be” with the repeated conjunction “and,” we 
might think about the verb not just as singularity to be replaced by multiplicity, but as 
stasis to be replaced with activity. These bodies do not remain fixed. They move and 
change and enact their own existences through their connections. Here Butler’s vision of 
performativity is useful: rather than insufficiently named “beings,” a word which can 
connote permanence and unchanging existence, Butler would prefer we think of bodies as 
what they do – that is, the actions and behaviors they perform for themselves and the 
surrounding world (Gender Trouble 34). They construct themselves, and are constructed 
by, constantly fluctuating cultural standards, and perform their identities through 
corporeal signs and discursive movements to be read and interpreted by their audiences 
(185). In problematizing “being” as a stable state Butler posits instead the idea of a body 
as “a variable boundary” regulated by language and cultural perceptions (180-81, 189). 
The way bodies act, and the connections, dependencies, and consequences this creates, 
show us their importance and their function.  
For the textual bodies in my study, performativity is clearly different from the 
real, biological and social bodies Butler discusses. Textual bodies have no physical 
“movement” – they are created in and from words, and their literal physical presence in 
the world is stable and unchanging ink on a page. But one of the projects of literature – 
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the work a narrative does – is to make the imaginary and the textual a kind of reality.35 
As we read the words describing what, who, and how these textual bodies are, how and 
why they act, and in what ways they connect and relate to other aspects of the text, they 
“move” for us in our own minds. Our perceptions of them change and shift as the words 
that create and represent them are revealed, which results in a kind of performativity 
enacted by the reader and applied to the figure(s) in the text. They become “real” for us, 
even though they may exist only in narrative, and we imbue them with movement and 
flux, despite their static existence as words. Within the world of the text and the world 
that text creates, these bodies and their doings are enacted physically, often through 
sexual and alimentary circumstances, as I discuss below.  
Because both assemblages and rhizomes privilege and constantly create endless 
connections that weave their way around and through one another, reading to 
accommodate and include all such connections is nearly impossible. Thus the rhizome’s 
characteristic of asignifying rupture is useful. Deleuze and Guattari allow that “A 
rhizome may be broken, shattered at a given spot, but it will start up again on one of its 
old lines, or on new ones” (9). This kind of rupture occurs “whenever segmentary lines 
explode into a line of flight, but the line of flight is part of the rhizome. These lines 
always tie back to one another” (9). Such a rupture is “asignifying” not because it does 
not hold meaning, but because the signification it creates is not singular or ultimate. It is 
just one thread of the rhizome we might choose in any particular moment to follow. To 
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 Particularly a medieval narrative received by a world of magical Christianity and informing and affecting 
that world – after all, the Bible itself was a narrative received as reality which influenced profoundly how 
and why people lived their lives. The “characters” who were represented only by words in the Gospels 
were people who lived physically and textually for their readers. Their “movement” as described by the text 
reflected real movement in the world in the minds of readers and listeners. I would argue that for us, bodies 
in many secular literary texts operate in the same way.  
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explore the interstitial bodies in the texts I have chosen, I will focus on two lines of flight: 
food and sex. Investigating the kinds of connections created by the alimentary and sexual 
behaviors of hybrid and interstitial bodies reveals not only how they operate within their 
respective texts, but how they inform the cultures they exist in, and conversely how they 
inform us about their audiences.  
Alimentary and sexual behaviors are fruitful avenues for investigation about 
attitudes toward the body because they are both so physical: both are necessary activities 
for bodily survival, and both are required for all mortal creatures.36 The necessity 
associated with these activities, linked with the “natural” desire they inspire – a desire 
considered instinctual and therefore potentially animalistic – seems a likely source for the 
concern surrounding these activities: they cannot be avoided, and they might prove a 
wellspring for aberrant behavior. They mark a similarity between human and animal, and 
therefore become a liminal zone: a place of anxiety about bodies. Both Cohen and 
Yamamoto have also noted the liminality of food and sex. Cohen thinks differences in 
sexual practice are often used to highlight bodily difference, and goes on to remark that 
“Diet offers a similarly corporeal division for the segregation of people” (20). That is, 
atypical behaviors are translated into physiological difference, and those figures who 
engage in them can therefore be Othered. Yamamoto cites sex and eating as dangerous 
because, even as they simultaneously guarantee bodily survival, they put body integrity at 
risk (30-31). If bodies constitute their own identities, breached or broken body surfaces 
call that body’s identity into question. Both sex and eating have the capacity to cause this 
breakage because both activities require a literal and figurative opening of the bodies that 
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 Joan Cadden acknowledges food and sex as both natural and necessary, and remarks that many examples 
of pleasures considered “unnatural” – that is, against expected human behavior – may be categorized as 
food or sex related (227). 
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engage in them. Literally, both digestion and sex involve ingesting and excreting 
materials that are changed by the body and also enact change on the body – arguably 
become part of that body – during the process. Figuratively, these processes represented 
in texts open bodies to readers by describing not only the actions themselves, but also 
ramifications or interconnections resulting from those actions.37 These behaviors are such 
prominent sites of anxiety within the confines of a vertical hierarchy because, in requiring 
a weakening of bodily boundaries, they seem to simultaneously fracture – or expose the 
porousness of – the arbitrary line separating what is human from what is not. In choosing 
these behaviors as lines of flight, a rhizomatic reading can go beyond the simple 
observation that transgressive or nonnormative sex and eating connote otherness, as my 
chapters will show.  
In his examination of bodies, attendant to dietary and sexual actions as sites of 
difference, Cohen concentrates on the twelfth century. Citing racialized bodies of Welsh, 
Scottish, Celtic, and Norman groups brought together by the Norman conquest into 
nervously cementing communities, Cohen concludes that these bodies, represented as 
hybrids in twelfth-century texts, are “a playground for animal elements but [they] are still 
in the end a human form. Impure and hybrid flesh mingling beast and human, the body of 
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 Figuratively, consumption implicates readers as well. Medieval scholars practiced ruminatio: that is, a 
meditation on the texts they read described as metaphorical “chewing” like ruminant animals chewing their 
cuds before digestion. Thus reading was a much more physical experience for medievals than it generally is 
for us, and the invocation of an image of chewing, swallowing, and digesting links the reader to a 
consumer. They were not just observing the material in texts, but figuratively eating it to gain some kind of 
nourishment from it. Hugh of St. Victor writes that Scripture’s ideas “like so many sweetest fruits, we pick 
as we read and chew [ruminamus] as we consider them” (qtd. in Carruthers 205). Augustine references the 
idea of “chewing over” Scripture as a means of incorporating and digesting information in his sermons, 
claiming “Volebamus enim hodierna die vos in ruminatione permittere” (Sermons 352.I). In literature, 
Bede explains Cædmon’s study of Scripture in the monastery as ruminatio as well. Instructed by the 
monks, Cædmon “learned all he could by listening to them and then, memorizing it and ruminating over it, 
like some clean animal chewing the cud, he turned it into the most melodious verse” (IV.24). For 
medievals, then, a text becomes part of a person by entering his or her imagination just as food becomes 
part of a body through physical ingestion. This system of reading as digestion has a variety of implications 
for status and interpretation, which I will discuss individually in the subsequent chapters as they apply.  
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the other was in the end not an animal but a chimera, a monster on whose body 
unresolved differences in species stood in for inassimilable differences of culture” (41). 
While this seems a reasonable explanation for chroniclers like Geoffrey of Monmouth or 
Gerald of Wales, anxious about their own hybridity thanks to their mixed nationalities, it 
does not fit the fourteenth century texts I will examine. The Normans were immersed 
enough in English life to think about and call themselves English38 within only two 
generations after the Battle of Hastings, well before the fourteenth century began (41). 
Further, the definition of Othered bodies as chimeras, while it allows for mutability, still 
envelopes these bodies in the realm of monstrosity, a category in which they do not all fit 
or remain in the texts I address. The reason for this anxiety about bodies represented 
through extracategorical figures must differ for the fourteenth century – I will suggest it 
relates to and perhaps even results from the Black Plague.  
Because both food and sex are life sustaining activities, the suggestion of death is 
always present in them through their attempts to evade or delay it. The Black Plague, one 
of the most prominent and devastating historical events in the fourteenth century, 
involves death on a large scale. The most devastating outbreak of the plague in England 
lasted from 1348-1350, and in addition to carrying off at least a third of Europe’s overall 
population, various sources record the death toll as between 40 and 70 percent for 
England alone (Aberth 3). The mean clergy mortality rate cited by English episcopal 
registers was 45 percent (3). This pandemic had the effect not only of devastating the 
population physically, but causing social and cultural upheaval precisely because it was 
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 Englishness in this new moment necessarily included half of what we now think of as France. The 
Normans were, by the end of these two generations, part of what it meant in that moment to be English, so 
their cultural difference was not acknowledged in the same way, or with the same anxiety, as it was in the 
twelfth century literature Cohen and Bynum (see note 32) examine.  
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so wide ranging. The plague killed everyone. The wealthy, the spiritual, and the 
aristocratic were not spared. Every victim suffered an identical consequence: human 
beings of various hierarchical ranks and national identities became indistinguishable 
corpses.39 Bodies were no longer divided by shape, station, or behavior, but were marked 
by their equality and fragility: anyone could, and did, die, and the use of mass graves to 
bury the incredible number of dead bodies further emphasized how identical bodies were; 
no special allotments were made for people considered higher of station in life.  
As the plague leveled social class through the equalizing power of death, it also 
leveled status: it collapsed the vertical hierarchy separating humans from animals in its 
own way. Bereft of life, human bodies and animal bodies were just corpses, and there 
was no observable physical evidence from these dead bodies that any kind of salvation 
had or ever would occur. When there were too many dead to bury they were left lying in 
the streets. Those still living could watch their decomposition. It must have been 
uncomfortable to think about these bodies as having once been human, since in death 
they broke down in the same way as “lower” animals. As Yamamoto explains, “In 
death… all bodies are alike… Death has no room for fastidiousness, and none of our 
articulations of status or hierarchy can save us from finally being reduced to the same 
level as everything we had once despised” (73). This, then, creates anxiety: if all bodies 
become corpses, is there any way to know absolutely that humans are special and 
separate from other living things? Faith and theological doctrine promise resurrection and 
salvation, and indeed the hope for a secure afterlife to follow the suffering of this world 
was strong, but it is difficult to see the power of the soul – invisible, untouchable, 
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 With the exception of Poland and Bohemia, which may have been spared due to their relative isolation 
from trade routes, every country and region in Europe was decimated by the plague (Aberth 2).  
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inaccessible – in a world of dead and rotting bodies.40 The literature of the fourteenth-
century, with its proliferation of fluid, transformative, extracategorical bodies, enacts this 
question repeatedly, troubled by the permeability and transience of the boundaries 
between what is human and what might not be. As the authors Cohen highlights were 
anxious about their own bodily belonging due to national and ethnic hybridity, the 
fourteenth-century authors whose texts I explore here were no doubt acutely aware of 
their own mortality and the fragility of their lives and humanity, having most likely lived 
through the plague outbreak and seen, even in childhood, the equalizing devastation it 
wrought on their surroundings.  
Transforming Bodies: Chapter Synopses 
Interestingly, the Plague has a similar razing effect on literature as it had on 
society: it crosses generic “boundaries” in a way that mirrors its decimation of the 
population regardless of their status or physicality. In locating fluid, extracategorical 
bodies my investigation moves through romance, epic, allegory and dream vision, 
sermonic homily and hagiography, and though each genre presents and engages with 
bodies differently, in all cases an anxiety about bodies and the difficulty of representing 
and containing them emerges. Chapter II engages monstrosity, epic and romance. I argue 
that modes of dietary and sexual consumption push the Alliterative Morte Arthure’s Mont 
St Michel giant at once toward and away from humanness and monstrosity. This constant 
resistance and approach make him readable as a Deleuzian block of becoming-, rather 
than reducible to a single category.  
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 Even within the devastation, however, the medieval capacity for multiplicity is clear. While theologians 
reacted to the plague as a sign of the impending apocalypse, Aberth reminds us that the apocalypse was just 
as much a new beginning as it was an end (4).  
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Moving from the sweeping scale of British sovereignty and exotic hybrid bodies 
of romance to the sermonic, in Chapter III I investigate dehumanized bodies in 
Cleanness. I contend that the poem uses abjection to try to contain and control these 
transgressive bodies, reorganizing the world it represents by creating and populating a 
category called “flesch.” As the abject is part of the self, however, and can never be 
completely purged, the poem’s form reveals this reorganization to be unsuccessful: 
unstructured meter, a blending of languages, and metacommentary on the shortcomings 
of writing show humanity’s inherent imperfection, based on its inescapable fleshliness.  
My fourth chapter examines the insufficiency of rigid categorization in both 
bodies and in genre in William Langland’s allegorical dream vision Piers Plowman. 
Langland’s Doctor of Divinity and Haukyn and their focus on eating are presented in a 
modified form of allegory that slips between figuration and realism, requiring us to read 
characters, events, and language at once literally and metaphorically. Consumption 
becomes a physical and spiritual project that must be understood on both levels in order 
to gain nourishment from either. This mirrors an allegorical reading and allows for bodies 
– whether human or textual – to push against multiple categories simultaneously, while 
never completely breaking those categorical margins to transgress or transcend.  
To investigate the paradox of achieved transcendence and open the 
underexamined and tenuous realm of superhuman interstitiality, in Chapter V I look to 
Chaucer’s hagiographies. The Prioress’s Tale and The Second Nun’s Tale employ 
elements of digestion and abjection to depict the paradox of achieved superhuman status 
through increased bodily impermeability. Empowered against but ultimately not 
impenetrable to torture and death through their very skin, St. Cecelia and the Prioress’s 
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“litel clergeon” are liminal figures, occupying multiple and contradictory “categories”: 
they are at once both and between what is human and what is divine, as well as what is 
living and what is dead.  
My conclusion models a closure of asignifying rupture. I return the food and sex 
tracing I have created back into the rhizomatic map, and turn to romance and the question 
of performed identity as a potential future line of flight for extracategorical bodies. I pair 
Bertilak from Sir Gawain and the Green Knight with the Loathly/Lovely Lady from 
Chaucer’s Wife of Bath’s Tale, examining the multiple forms and shifting identities each 
poem offers. Mapping these bodies with their multiple identities against Judith Butler’s 
explanation of drag as double inversion, I argue that neither Betilak nor the 
Loathly/Lovely Lady has a true “essential” being at the core of their transformations, but 
are instead comprehended by the collective of their performed identities. Thus I resist the 
urge to close down the conversation I have entered, and instead engage again with the 
heterogeneity intrinsic to a horizontal assemblage as I embark on a new line of flight.  
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CHAPTER II 
SLIDING STATUS: BECOMING- AND HUMANNESS IN THE ALLITERATIVE 
MORTE ARTHURE  
In the anonymous fourteenth-century Alliterative Morte Arthure, King Arthur’s 
campaign to overthrow the Roman emperor Lucius is interrupted when he scales Mont St 
Michel to battle a giant who has been terrorizing Brittany – carrying off and eating 
children and abducting and raping a duchess. As is common in medieval literature, this 
giant’s characteristics and behaviors mark him as antithetical to the chivalric, civilized 
society King Arthur represents. Giants in medieval literature frequently connote 
Otherness; they mark knights or heroes as human by embodying everything they are not, 
and thereby permit these human men to uphold civilization or cultural practices through 
their defeat. Giants draw a problematic, permeable behavioral boundary on the line that 
separates the human from the other-than-human. Ideally, their gross excesses signify 
what is not acceptable for men to do and to be. However, these excesses sometimes 
mirror what is dark and bestial in men; giants at once represent what is often established 
as “contrary to the human” and simultaneously reflect the grotesque potential in 
humanity. To complicate matters even more, some giants practice eerily human-like 
behaviors, making it difficult to decide exactly what they are: monster, human, 
subhuman, or some other hybrid between categories; sometimes they seem to occupy 
more than one category concurrently. This permeable boundary is represented in their 
physicality which combines familiarity (human shape, some primitive or quasi-human 
behaviors) and excess (size, animal characteristics, some inhuman and inhumane 
behaviors). Given these typifying qualities, it is tempting to simply write giants off as 
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“Others” intended to threaten and then be quelled by civilization – to read them 
arboreally. To do so, however, ignores their disturbing correspondences with human 
beings, and thus oversimplifies the complex possibilities for interpretation offered by the 
multiplicitous ways giants’ bodies are represented in the literature of the period.  
In the case of the Alliterative Morte Arthure (henceforth AMA), the giant Arthur 
faces on Mont St Michel provides a slippery challenge to classification for both the king 
and the readers of the poem. At first encounter this giant seems typical of the “race,” 
decimating the French coast and committing the usual abominations against the area’s 
helpless civilians.41 Indeed, numerous critics have read him as a simple marker of anti-
civilization. Rebecca S. Beal posits that the encounter with the giant marks Arthur as the 
bearer of civilization. Arthur’s arming scene before ascending Mont St Michel details the 
geographical origin and the human labor involved in creating each piece of armor he 
dons, which makes him literally dressed in civilization, and therefore a perfect antithesis 
to the barbarous giant, who has only a club (Beal 32, 37-38). Kateryna Rudnytzky Schray 
sees the giant as an almost allegorical precursor to Arthur’s subsequent battles with 
Lucius and later Mordred, and comments that the giant, even after death, hangs 
ominously over the remainder of Arthur’s deeds as a reminder that Arthur needed to 
defeat him in order to establish himself as a worthy king (1-19). Jeffrey Jerome Cohen 
and Valerie Krishna have collapsed this juxtaposition, pointing out the giant’s presence in 
the rest of the narrative not simply as a haunting reminiscence, but as direct cause of 
Arthur’s increasingly tyrannical behavior: in defeating this seemingly inhuman monster, 
                                                 
41
 By “typical of his ‘race,’” I refer to common representations of giants in medieval literature such as 
chronicles and romances. There are, of course, folkloric and biblical giant traditions as well. I will expand 
upon giants’ role and heritage in biblical tradition in Chapter III, where I explore a text morally and 
contextually immersed in its Biblical source material.   
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Arthur takes on figuratively cannibalistic elements of the giant’s character in his 
subsequent conquests and treatment of victims (Cohen 153, Krishna 22).  
Not all analyses of the AMA focus around or even acknowledge the giant as an 
important figure. It is with the inception of monster theory and monster studies with 
scholars like John Block Friedman and Jeffrey Jerome Cohen that monsters, the AMA 
giant among them, seem to demand acknowledgment from critics of their importance in 
and to their respective texts.42 Yet my engagement with the giant is not intended to prove 
his centrality to the AMA as a whole. Rather, I will argue his physical and behavioral 
complexity illustrates medieval cultural significances and anxieties about bodies, 
consumption, and physicality. Simply because he is so difficult to contain within a single 
linguistic category, he performs medieval anxiety about the unknown – how can we 
accurately define him when there doesn’t seem to be a single essence to which all his 
characteristics can be referred? Though for ease of understanding we refer to him as a 
“giant,” a complex web of behaviors and interrelations – with foes, with victims, with 
food and his landscape – make him too big for the noun that denominates him. This 
difficulty upsets the coherence and depicts the insufficiency of a hierarchical system of 
categorization that would place him below humans. I will show that he is also in some 
respects the same as the men he opposes, and in some ways, perhaps even exceeds them, 
constantly and simultaneously approaching and being pushed away from the audience’s 
understanding of what culturally, socially, and physically constitutes humanness.  
                                                 
42
 The AMA giant was passed over in the same way that most Beowulf scholarship ignored the monster 
fights until Tolkein’s pivotal 1936 lecture “Beowulf: The Monsters and the Critics.” In early full-length 
analyses of the AMA the giant is often treated as nothing more than a brief digression to cement Arthur’s 
heroism. 
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Clearly there is more to this giant than a marker of the borders of barbarism. It is 
worth noting that though Arthur’s encounter with him is not original to the AMA, this 
work offers unquestionably the most violent, most blatantly anthropophagic, and most 
disturbing incarnation of the figure. The AMA draws its English source material mainly 
from Geoffrey of Monmouth’s twelfth-century Historia Regum Brittaniae and 
Layamon’s thirteenth-century Brut, the English translation of Robert Wace’s French 
Roman de Brut. Both Geoffrey and Layamon pit Arthur against an anthropophagic, rapist 
giant atop Mont St Michel, a small peak in Brittany which had, from the eighth century, 
been home to a Norman abbey legendarily co-founded by Bishop Aubert of Avranches 
and the archangel St. Michael (Smith 348, 349).  
In Geoffrey’s rendition, Arthur is told that a ravaging giant has abducted Helena, 
niece of Duke Howell of Brittany. The giant has also carried away survivors of his raids 
and eats them, presumably alive. Arthur, joined by Kay and Bedevere, leaves camp to 
wreak vengeance on this monster. Part way up the Mont, Bedevere encounters a wailing 
old woman who tells him she has served as nursemaid to Helena her whole life. She has 
recently been forced to bury the maiden, however, who died of fright before she could be 
violated by the giant. Angered and unsatisfied, the giant took out his voracious sexual 
appetite on the nurse, who reveals to Bedevere that the giant rapes her repeatedly on a 
nightly basis, and that he will soon return to the site to carry out his desires again. Our 
first view of this giant, shared by a horrified Arthur, is of a monster from Spain roasting 
whole swine on a spit. He is so uncivilized, and so gluttonous, that he tears apart and 
consumes half of his meal raw as he waits for the other half to roast. In the ensuing 
struggle, during which Arthur slices open the giant’s forehead only to have him casually 
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wipe the blood off his face and redouble his efforts, victory finally comes when the giant 
crashes to the ground like a felled oak tree (Geoffrey X.92).  
In Layamon’s retelling, Mont St Michel is made part of Britain, and again the old 
woman Bedevere encounters serves as the giant’s sexual victim, as the maiden has died at 
the moment the rape was about to take place (Layamon 12806-8, 12935-6). The giant 
mingles human and animal food products, again eating swine both raw and cooked, in a 
curious and uncomfortable blending of animalistic predatory behavior with perhaps 
primitive but nevertheless human-like cooking practices. Though the encounter is more 
gruesome than in Geoffrey – the rape of the old woman in particular, who tells Bedevere 
the giant has broken every bone in her body with his repeated violations – the monster is 
also more humanized; the giant actually speaks to Arthur; he asks for mercy moments 
before Arthur decapitates him (13014-13018).   
It is this disturbing move toward human-like behavior, and the extent to which it 
is supplemented, embellished, and complicated in the AMA episode, on which I wish to 
concentrate. As we shall see, the giant in the AMA cannot be bracketed easily into a 
single category. The way his body is represented seems at first animalistic, but the way 
he uses that body – his practices and predilections – and the way that body is textually 
dismantled, gives him a far more disturbing and fluid status. This chapter will assess the 
giant’s appearance, his sexual and alimentary behaviors, and his interactions with both 
Arthur and the landscape of Mont St Michel to show how a simple categorization of the 
giant cannot contain the complexity of his character. By examining how the giant 
continually approaches and falls away from “the human” in both embodied and linguistic 
ways, I will show that he inhabits a state Deleuze and Guattari call “becoming-,” even as, 
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in more medieval terms, I show how he cannot be firmly categorized without losing 
essential, meaning-making aspects of his character. Given this need for inclusion and 
recognizing fluidity, I will analyze the differences and excesses that distinguish this giant 
from his forbearers, his animality, his sexually rapacious behavior and how this ties him 
both to the land he occupies and to Arthur. I will also discuss his anthropophagism, a 
complex subject I see as both Other-ing and culturally, ritualistically indicative of 
proximity to medieval humanness through (in part) its contrast with consumption of the 
Eucharist during Christian communion. Finally, considering the way cultural and social 
norms operate to distinguish us from what we are not, I will employ Judith Butler’s 
arguments about how language applies to and designates personhood – even while its 
inexactness problematizes our interpretive attempts – to analyze the diverse and 
destabilizing titles the giant is given throughout the episode.  
When Deleuze and Guattari speak of “becoming-” in their chapter “1730: 
Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming Imperceptible…,” they describe the 
process as  
certainly not imitating, or identifying with something; neither is it 
regressing-progressing; neither is it corresponding, establishing 
corresponding relations; neither is it producing, producing a filiation or 
producing through filiation. Becoming is a verb with a consistency all its 
own; it does not reduce to, or lead back to, ‘appearing,’ ‘being,’ equaling,’ 
or ‘producing.’ (239) 
 
Further, “A becoming is not a correspondence between relations. But neither is it a 
resemblance, an imitation, or, at the limit, an identification… To become is not to 
progress or regress along a series” (237-38). Rather, a becoming is a never-completed 
process of collective correspondence, an interstitial body forming alliances and affects 
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with other types of bodies, moving along an asymptotic line of approach.43 Thus, in order 
for the Mont St Michel giant to subsist in a “becoming-,” he must be recognized as a 
unique being in an interstitial space, where he continually performs his becoming through 
his actions, not through his culturally assigned identity of “human” or “monster.” 
Escaping from insufficient categorization – the binary of human/animal or 
human/monster – can be achieved through becomings. Deleuze and Guattari explain that 
“The only way to get outside the dualisms is to be-between, to pass between, the 
intermezzo” (277). Like the rhizome, a becoming is a multiplicity which must be 
recognized as its own alliance of confluences. Multiplicity “is defined not by its 
elements, nor by a center of unification or comprehension. It is defined by the number of 
dimensions it has; it is not divisible, it cannot lose or gain a dimension without changing 
its nature” (249). This is the crucial point for the AMA giant. Explaining him according to 
a vertical hierarchy in which he must assume a set position as human, monster, 
subhuman, or similar identifying term restricts him to a category established by a 
collection of attributes from other similar or “corresponding” beings. In the process, we 
lose part of him, we change his nature. To fully capture and appreciate all of his alliances, 
we must recognize they all belong to the same individual – they are the giant’s becoming.  
Like Butler, who defines gender as a performative act rather than a set state of 
being,44 Deleuze and Guattari insist that an individual body must be defined not by 
                                                 
43
 Interestingly, Deleuze and Guattari depend mainly upon a definition by negation here: most of their 
explanation of “becoming-,” at least initially, hinges upon what it is not. This seems to fit with their 
poststructural project; rather than close down our understanding by emphasizing a single definition, they 
offer a range of negated possibilities we seem encouraged to consider as ways of engaging with this 
difficult concept they are introducing.  
 
44
 Butler explains: “within the inherited discourse of the metaphysics of substance, gender proves to be 
performative – that is, constituting the identity it is purported to be. In this sense, gender is always a doing, 
though not a doing by a subject who might be said to preexist the deed” (34). I use Butler’s conception of 
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characteristics of a genus or a species, but by a counting of affects (257). They explain, 
“We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its 
affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the 
affects of another body, either to destroy that body or to be destroyed by it, either to 
exchange actions and passions with it or to join with it in composing a more powerful 
body” (257). Recognizing multiplicity and becoming allows a body to exist according to 
its actions, not according to what it “is.”  
Deleuze and Guattari insist becoming is never completed, but always exists in 
process – an approach but not attainment of the category definition toward which a being 
moves.45 Rather, “Becoming is involutionary, involution is creative… to involve is to 
form a block that runs its own line ‘between’ the terms in play and beneath assignable 
relations” (258-59). To be a block of becoming is a process and a state of doing/being 
that has no point or time of origin. The giant did not begin as human and then start to 
become something else; he was always and is always in between: “a becoming” defined 
by his affects and alliances in a process of change. His existence as a textual being aids 
this: though he is based on figures in other texts, in the AMA he exists always and only as 
he is on the page – he has no history within the text that simplifies his definition or 
                                                                                                                                                 
gender as my analogue to becoming and personhood here not because I think it is a one-to-one correlation, 
but because her explanation of performativity as applies to “being” translates well into the giant’s 
complexity and Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomatic assemblage of confluences.  
 
45
 Butler agrees, claiming in her discussion of gender that “woman itself is a term in process, a becoming, a 
constructing that cannot rightfully be said to originate or end. As an ongoing discursive practice, it is open 
to intervention and resignification” (45). Though for Butler the sought after category may be occupied, 
which Deleuze and Guattari deny in the case of a becoming, the process of doing/being that category is 
never completed; one has never “done” enough to simply and consistently “be” something.  
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establishes an origin of his process of becoming.46 He is what he does, and even to 
approximate an understanding of him, all of his affects must be considered.  
Because the giant is neither human nor animal, but a block of becoming between 
at least these two categories, he is moving simultaneously toward and away from 
“becoming” any single denominational being. The difficulty in dealing with this giant is 
that he seems to approach humanness, and yet, as Deleuze and Guattari explain, 
becoming moves toward a variable of minority, which means that even as the giant seems 
more human, he is not “becoming-man.” For them, there are many “becomings of man, 
but no becoming-man” because “man is majoritarian par excellence, whereas becomings 
are all minoritarian; all becoming is a becoming-minoritarian” (291). For Deleuze and 
Guattari “man” is generic, a standard of being human, and thus everything differing from 
this definition of “man” must become what it is as a point of difference from “man.”47 
However, they also explain that “In a way, the subject in a becoming is always ‘man,’ but 
only when he enters a becoming-minoritarian that rends him from his major identity” 
(291). As we shall see, the idea of the giant of Mont St Michel being identified as “man” 
is at once so horrific and so suggestive that applying “man” as his “major identity” seems 
almost as impossible as considering him a “minoritarian” man. If rending him from his 
major identity through becoming means disrupting his status as something other-than-
                                                 
46
 Because the giant is referred to as a “giant of Genoa,” Italy could be posited as a geographical origin for 
him, but he lacks any familial or kin relations, a narrative of his appearance in France, or other elements of 
“back story.” He is suddenly just there on Mont St Michel, supposedly waiting for Arthur to challenge him. 
Similarly, it could be argued that Biblical background of giants as a race provide him with a lineage, but 
just as he exceeds, resists, and complicates his own literary predecessors, he serves a different purpose from 
and enacts his existence far differently from his Biblical forbears.  
 
47
 Establishing a human male as the standard of being seems perhaps less certain for medievals than it does 
for Deleuze and Guattari, given man’s fallen state and therefore his status as always already inadequate. 
However, despite the ideal, man as human male – and for Western Christianity, white, Christian human 
male – could be considered a standard simply because this is the most available, recognizable figure for 
comparison.  
  
 
 
54 
man or other-than-human, it seems possible to posit that he could in fact be a becoming-
human, and perhaps becoming-animal and becoming-monster as well. This places him in 
a cyclical space of affect-identity tug-of-war, continually exhibiting affects that approach 
but simultaneously pull away from affects that accrue to becoming human.  
The anxiety, proximity, and ambivalence generated by the giant is nicely 
articulated by Jeffrey Jerome Cohen in his analysis of Geoffrey of Monmouth’s Mont St 
Michel giant. He cites this giant as limitless and outside of both physical and linguistic 
control, and considers the liminality and hybridity of this figure as points of both 
fascination and discomfort: 
The giant’s form is unmistakably human, and male, but his vast size 
indicates that he fits neither of these categories well. Alone among the 
“singular” giants of medieval tradition, the monster of Mont Saint Michel 
has no proper name… Perhaps the giant is terrifying because he is a 
liminal body, partially human and partially other, a form suspended 
between categories who threatens through his unnamability to smash the 
distinctions on which categorization is based. (Cohen 38)   
 
Threatening categorization – how we tell who is human and who is not – threatens social 
order as well as identity politics, and Cohen suggests this is what makes giants such 
terrifying but also desire-filled characters. My analysis takes Cohen’s discussion of 
suspension and liminality and expands it: what marks the AMA giant as even more 
simultaneously human and other-than-human are the ways he exceeds his predecessors. 
Not only is he basically human in form (though unrealistically enormous and horrifyingly 
hideous), he exemplifies elements of extremely civilized humanness, while at the same 
time pushing even more firmly away from what is considered civilized human behavior 
in the nightmarish way he enacts these civilizing characteristics. 
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 In her analysis of the AMA Mont St Michel giant, Geraldine Heng points not only 
to the giant’s increased excesses and increased violence in both his sexual and gustatory 
consumption, but also the increased detail in the descriptions of his appearance, habits, 
and gradual, play-by-play dismemberment as reasons this giant might stand out against 
other incarnations as the most fearful because the most unsettled. For Heng, the giant also 
teaches medieval conceptions of embodiment; his “monstrofied, hyperbolized body… 
discloses yet another public secret of a medieval kind. The idea that the truth of a person 
may somehow be read on his body, or within his body, suggests a certain capacity, on the 
part of a narrative, to essentialize the body as the ground of reference and truth” (168). 
This giant is the worst of his kind, it seems, and the best representative of how existing 
categories are insufficient, because in comparison to his predecessors in Geoffrey and 
Layamon he is at once closest to and furthest away from humanness – both extremes 
marked on his physical body. Therefore from within his becoming- he can portray 
anxieties about the fragility and performativity of human status: what does it take to stop 
being human, if simply inhabiting a human-shaped body is not enough?  
The ways in which the giant’s actions echo civilized life are disturbing for two 
reasons: first, they display how closely he resembles human beings – in this case Arthur 
and his court – and second, because the giant perverts these actions, they show how 
easily humanness can be lost, and replaced with liminal monstrosity or otherness. As 
Arthur approaches the giant’s camp, he finds the kidnapped duchess’s wailing nursemaid, 
who warns him that he has no chance against the giant, and further, that he should not 
irritate the monster by interrupting at mealtime. The giant’s chosen entrée, she explains, 
consists of “seven knave childer, / Chopped in a chargeur of chalk-white silver, / With 
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pickle and powder of precious spices, / And piment full plenteous of Portingale wines” 
(1025-1028). This is a far cry from the earlier incarnations of this giant who tear apart 
partially cooked swine. The giant is not just a cannibal out of violence or necessity; he is 
a gourmand who enjoys both his food and the niceties of service. Spiced, marinated, and 
served in a decorative vessel, the feast could easily be for a nobleman, were it not for the 
species of meat in this courtly dinner.48  
Disturbingly, this presentation of a meal is reminiscent of an earlier scene in the 
AMA, when Arthur explains to Kay how the feast for the visiting Roman senators should 
be prepared. The senators must “be herbered in haste in those high chambers, / sithen 
sittandly in sale served thereafter, / That they find no faute of food to their horses, / 
nother wine ne wax ne welth in this erthe, / Spare for no spicery, but spend what thee 
likes” (158-62). This is to be a meal worthy of royalty in the court that represents the 
pinnacle of civilization and courtliness, and so Arthur names two specific items to 
impress the senators and enhance their experience: wine and spices. These items reappear 
as the feast is presented, again highlighted by their rarity and high cost: “Then spices 
unsparely they spended thereafter, / Malvesy and Muskadell, those marvelous drinkes, / 
Raiked full rathely in rosset cuppes” (235-37). Significantly, wines and precious spices 
are also specific food items the giant uses to dress up his dinner, conjuring in our minds 
an image of him as just as epicurean as a royal court. Further, Arthur’s guests are served 
“Grete swannes full swathe in silveren chargeours” (185). How the giant acquired his 
                                                 
48
 The temptation to find the absurdity of the giant’s meal humorous – particularly the issue of the children 
being pickled – is perhaps a human urge to ease anxiety about his liminality and uncomfortable proximity. 
By pointing to the absurd we have a release for our discomfort and inoculation against horror. Literature, 
because no matter how realistic it seems we can divorce it from our lived reality (in some cases, and to 
some extent), is a safe outlet for these anxieties; no matter how “real” these textual events get, we can 
always put down the book and walk away.  
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“chargeur of chalk-white silver” is unclear, but the image of the vessel is identical to 
those used in Camelot (1026). Because the dressings of these feasts are so linguistically 
similar, we are encouraged to compare them.  
Just as the giant’s behavior pushes him toward and away from human status, the 
comparisons between his actions and the actions of Arthur and his court move in both 
directions. While the giant’s similarities to the court push him toward humanness and 
point to his disturbingly civilized methods, we cannot ignore that this means the court 
also bears resemblance to the giant. These feasting scenes mirror one another not only in 
their wealth and courtliness, but in their celebration of excess. Arthur’s feast is attended 
to “unsparely” and features “full” goblets and “grete” quantities of everything. Though 
his dinner consists of excess in food we understand as acceptable to consume and the 
giant’s assuredly does not, the poem here seems to critique Arthur’s court even as, and 
because, it points to the ways the giant’s feast resembles Camelot’s celebration. As the 
giant is a monster of consumption, we must question the value, and virtue, of the 
consumption the human hero commands.  
Two other elements of Arthur’s feast anticipate the giant’s with uneasy and 
potentially critical similarity. Amidst the directions to provide expensive spices and 
plenty of wine for his guests, Arthur tells Kay to be sure enough food is provided for their 
horses (160). Suddenly providing for men and for their animals is equally important, 
enough so that Arthur mingles the ideas in his instructions. This anticipates the giant’s 
perverse feast, in which “Bernes and bestail broched togeders” (1050). Here again men 
and beasts are unceremoniously mingled in food matters. Though Arthur was serving and 
the giant is eating, both presentations fail to draw a clear distinction between how men 
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and how animals are treated. In the same kind of anticipation, Arthur explains to his 
Roman guests “We know nought in this countree of curious metes,” suggesting that in 
other countries, curious meats might be available (223). In the giant’s feast, held on a 
hilltop in Brittany, the meats are indeed curious in the most horrific way. Despite key, 
unavoidable differences, the giant’s predilections remind us of the courtliest, most 
civilized behavior, in this poem exemplified by Arthur’s court.49 
Though in Geoffrey and Layamon’s accounts Arthur’s primary motivation for 
slaughtering the Mont St Michel giant is to avenge the kidnapped duchess, in the AMA 
the Templar who brings Arthur news of this monster mentions anthropophagy first. He 
tells the king that this giant “has freten of folk mo than five hundredth, / And als fele 
fauntekins of free-born childer. / This has been his sustenaunce all this seven winteres,” 
and that during these seven years the giant “has clenly destroyed all the knave childer, / 
And them carried to the crag and clenly devoured” (844-46, 850-51). Only after citing the 
giant’s disgusting dietary habits does the Templar mention that “The duchess of Bretain 
today has he taken” (852). As we shall see, though the description of the duchess’s fate is 
horrific, it is mentioned quickly and then passed by. The poet lingers, however, on the 
detailed description of the giant’s anthropophagic feast. It is clear that in the giant’s list of 
sins, though they are clearly connected as forms of excessive consumption, his eating 
habits are more appalling than his violent sexual offenses.  
Given this focus on dietary transgression, it is worth questioning why 
anthropophagy deserves such notice. Though debate has raged over whether various 
human groups have ever been truly cannibalistic as a regular practice, instances of 
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 These similarities again push back against Arthur as the exemplar of civilization: we must ask whether 
his conquest is also consumptive of people, though in a figurative way, as he takes over various foreign 
lands and kingdoms.  
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cannibalism have occurred, mostly as acts of desperation.50 In stories about Aztec human 
sacrifice and then consumption of the bodies, or the Caribbean tribe from which the word 
“cannibal” comes, there is more speculation: as in Montaigne’s famous essay “Of 
Cannibals,” accounts are generally explained not as direct observations, but as hearsay or 
transcription from previously documented sources.51 In fictional literary accounts, 
cannibalistic characters are routinely presented as gratuitous, horrifying, and 
representative of other cultural fears as well as this nightmarish gustatory practice. Thus 
the idea of humans, or humanoid “people,” eating other humans, becomes complicated in 
terms of motivation and meaning.52  
In her examination of cannibalism as a symbolic system, Peggy Sanday asserts 
that cannibalism never simply concerns eating, but is a system for conveying messages 
pertaining to the foundation, regeneration, or maintenance of the cultural order. Though it 
is often tied to hunger statistically, hunger is not always linked to cannibalism (Sanday 
63). Though hunger is perhaps the motivating factor, the way in which it is carried out 
makes the practice itself highly structured and implicitly imbued with power relations. 
The one who is eaten ceases to have an individual physical identity, and is subsumed, 
both literally and figuratively, into the one doing the eating. Sanday postulates that this 
practice can be undertaken for two reasons: either the body is consumed to impart 
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 The Donner Party and the survivors of the plane crash detailed in Piers Paul Read’s 1974 Alive are well 
known examples of actual cannibalism in the Western Hemisphere. 
 
51
 See Heng for examples of cannibalism associated with the Crusades and their cultural implications. 
Mandeville also lists cannibalistic races among the foreign lands he visits in The Book of John Mandeville.  
 
52
 If the giant is not human, or at least not fully human, as I have suggested, the question arises of whether a 
thorough examination of cannibalism is necessary. However, I would argue that his very proximity to 
humanness – his basic human shape and disturbingly civilized characteristics – make his consumption of 
humans, especially human children, much more disturbing to us than would be such an action undertaken 
by a being clearly marked as an animal. It may not be cannibalism from the giant’s perspective since in 
many ways he is not the same as the boys he eats, but for us, as human readers, the correlation is 
unavoidable.  
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specific characteristics or forces into the eater, or to break down and negate aspects of the 
one being eaten (36). That is, cannibalism can be either positive or negative. In the 
positive sense, the eater gains power, strength, or control of the qualities and attributes 
the eaten possessed.53 In the negative sense, cannibalistic eating occurs as a way of 
eliminating the identity of the person being consumed.54 Having your body consumed 
makes you suddenly part of another body, and no longer an autonomous being. Thus a 
question of status arises: are you still “you,” and in either case, “what” are you after being 
consumed by another? 
This potential for loss of identity for the eaten is not only dangerous in a physical 
sense; it also throws a person’s spiritual status into question. As Caroline Walker Bynum 
explains in her study of fragmentation, twelfth- and thirteenth-century theological 
discussions about bodily resurrection focused primarily on issues of part versus whole 
(Fragmentation and Redemption 253). Theologians were concerned not as much about 
the relationship between body and soul (though this was still important), but about how 
much of the body had to be in one piece in order for successful resurrection to take place 
(253-54). This discussion of fragmentation was extended to include even hypothetical 
cannibalistic situations. If human beings were consumed by other human beings, what 
happened to the bodies in question, both of eater and of eaten? (243-44). The AMA giant 
would not be saved, but would the children he had eaten be able to reclaim their now 
fragmented earthly forms and resurrect?  
                                                 
53
 In ancestral cannibalism, the eater may also be consuming as a method of memorializing: becoming the 
conduit for continued life of the dead person. 
 
54
 Heng confirms the idea of negative cannibalism as power transfer, asking “In the realm of the political, 
what after all is cannibalism but a hideously somatic literalization of the language of military conquest, 
which encompasses how successful conquerors swallow up and absorb into themselves the land and 
possessions of the defeated?” (31). 
  
 
 
61 
For medievals, the idea of one’s identity being consumed and therefore ceasing to 
exist would have been terrifying. Because medieval understanding of physiognomy and 
diet were based on the Galenic ideas of humors and balance, eating was a crucially 
determining factor in maintaining health, but also status and identity. As Carlin and 
Rosenthal put it succinctly, “In a world that relied on humoural theory to explain both the 
unity of the cosmos and the nature of individual temperaments and health, ‘you are what 
you eat’ was a good deal more than a cliché” (xi). Galen’s humoral theories stated that all 
items consumed must be balanced both in quantity and attributes (150, 202). Bodily 
irregularities result from excesses or deficiencies of intake, and therefore in imbalanced 
mixtures within the body (295).55 If it was so important to maintain balance, both in 
terms of quantity and identity of ingredients, the giant’s identity is clearly destabilized by 
his dietary choices.56  
Geraldine Heng discusses the proliferation of cannibalistic figures in medieval 
English romance as a coping response to a historical instance of European cannibalism 
during the Crusades. Heng explains “concomitantly, medieval texts of social history and 
popular tradition cannot conceive of the European Christian as a cannibal. Instead, they 
enact the supposition that the act of cannibalism decisively constructs a living creature as 
something other than Christian, European, or human” (28). She elaborates: “cannibalism 
to the medieval Christian was that dehumanizing, monstrous condition which canceled 
out the coordinates of recognizably human identity, and reduced the sentient to the 
                                                 
55
 For a medieval comparison, see also Hildegard of Bingen in “Causes and Cures.” Hildegard advises that 
in order to maintain a healthy diet, food intake should be alternated relative to its temperature and texture 
“so that the qualities can thus be tempered by their opposites [C&C 2.222, K 136]” (112).  
 
56
 The giant’s identity is destabilized in one way. In another, his dietary choices establish that identity: as an 
unsettled block of non-human becoming.  
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subhuman” (29). Interestingly, Heng does not specify whether this reduction occurs for 
the eater or the eaten. Though she likely means the eater loses human status, given the 
fears to which Bynum points it could also be that the eaten person’s humanness is thrown 
into question. This ambiguity fits into Peggy Sanday’s structure of cannibalism: 
incorporation changes the essence of both the eater and the eaten.  
The uncertainty and revulsion surrounding cannibalism even extends to its 
linguistic heritage. “Cannibal” is an Early Modern word, developing out of a perversion 
of “Carib,” the name of a West Indian tribe suspected to be cannibalistic, which 
Columbus heard about during his Caribbean explorations (“cannibal” [n.] OED). 
Previous to this coining, the word to describe eaters of humans existed only in the Greek 
anthropophagi. Medieval Latin did not possess a word to even name this despicable act 
(Heng 29). While the basic connotation of these words is the same, their definitions give 
them slightly different meanings. “Cannibal” is defined by the OED as “a man (esp. a 
savage) that eats human flesh; a man-eater, an anthropophagite,” with a second meaning 
of “an animal that preys on its own species” (“cannibal” [n.] OED). Conversely, 
“anthropophagi” is defined as “men-eaters, cannibals” (“anthropophagi” [n.] OED). 
Though these at first look simply like synonyms with reversed definitions, “cannibal” is 
species-specific, while “anthropophagi” is not. Cannibals, therefore, are humans who eat 
their own kind. Anthropophagi are simply beings that eat humans. Their own humanness 
is not necessarily determined.  
This subtle difference in vocabulary becomes important when analyzing the Mont 
St Michel giant. For the purposes of the kind of categorization literary interpretation likes 
to make, designating the giant a cannibal, though it is the more familiar and better 
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understood word for a modern audience, makes assumptions about his status the text does 
not seem entirely willing to support. This giant, as I have said and as most critical 
analyses concur, is not completely human. He may be approaching humanness as part of 
his block of becoming, but both his appearance and his behaviors make the otherness or 
the unfinished nature of his becoming abundantly clear. Arthur addresses the giant as 
“dog-son,” a social slur that also anticipates the subsequent description, a horrible kind of 
anti-blazon in excruciating detail (1072).57 The giant “grenned as a greyhound with grisly 
tuskes,” his “fax and his foretop was filtered togeders / And out of his face fom an half 
foot large,” recalling some kind of rabid animal (1075, 1078-79). As the portrait 
continues, the poet moves away from mammalian similes in an effort to distance the giant 
even further from Arthur, the human, and the familiar: “His front and his forheved, all 
was it over / As the fell of a frosk and franked it seemed; / Hook-nebbed as a hawk, and a 
hore berde, / And hered to the eyen-holes with hangand browes, / Harsk as a hound-fish” 
(1080-84). In the space of four lines, the giant has changed species three times, flowing 
almost seamlessly between amphibian, bird, and fish. He is also compared to a fluke, a 
bear, a dolphin, a boar; he is “bull-necked,” and the folds of his lips are twisted like a 
wolf’s head (1088-95). He has “rude armes as an oke with ruskled sides,” and is “Grees-
grown as a galt” (1096, 1101). In his attempts to distance the giant from anything 
recognizably human, the poet even momentarily compares him to a tree before returning 
to the more familiar and perhaps expected comparison to swine.58   
                                                 
57
 This long description is unique to the AMA. Layamon does not describe the giant’s physical appearance 
at all (see 21987-13013), and of Geoffrey’s giant we learn only that his face is smeared with pig blood 
(X.75). 
 
58
 This comparison to pigs hearkens back to Geoffrey and Layamon’s versions, in which the giant is 
roasting swine.  See Heng for implications of this movement from a descriptor of diet to a simile for the 
giant himself. Despite the horror of this animal/vegetable amalgamation, it is worth noting that all these 
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Given this monstrous amalgamation of parts,59 it seems neither unexpected nor 
particularly anathema that such a being would eat humans. Wolves, bears, and hawks are 
predators and sometimes scavengers, and boars are dangerous animals that could easily 
kill a human being if threatened.60 This constantly shifting grotesquery should simply be 
a miasmatic nightmare, but it is not. The poet never lets us forget that this is a humanoid 
figure, continually drawing us back not only to the meal he is eating, but to his basic 
shape and all-too-familiar features. Each of the animal similes melds with a human 
feature. The giant has a humanoid mouth, but it also contains snarling tusks like a 
greyhound. He has hair and eyebrows but they are coarse and matted like animal fur. 
Even after all these animal similes, the poet confirms that the giant “stertes he up sturdily 
on two stiff shankes, / And soon he caught him a club all of clene iron” (1104-5). 
Prepared to battle Arthur, the giant attacks not with fangs or claws, as a predatory animal 
would, but on two legs and with a club: primitive perhaps, but still a human weapon.61 
Despite all the animalizing the poet attempts to accomplish in his description, the giant 
still maintains disturbing elements of human behavior. He cannot be animalized 
completely because he exists for us in an extracategorical space – a betweenness that is 
also movement toward (and away from) an uncomfortable identification with humanity.  
It is significant that this animalistic miscellany comes after the description of the 
giant at his feast. When Arthur first approaches, we see through his eyes:  
                                                                                                                                                 
animals to which the giant is compared were created by God and placed under man’s dominion, perhaps 
signaling Arthur’s worthiness to conquer this giant.  
 
59
 Karl Heinz Göller confirms twelve different animals mentioned “ranging from a boar to a badger” (22). 
 
60
 See, for example, the Old English motif of the beasts of battle, and Bertilak’s second hunt in Sir Gawain 
and the Green Knight. 
 
61
 Further, his club is not a rough tree broken tree branch, but “clene” metal, as if to point out its purity in 
contrast with the giant’s horrific admixture. 
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How unseemly that sot sat soupand him one! 
He lay lenand on a long, lodgand unfair,  
The thee of a mans limm lift up by the haunch;  
His back and his beuschers and his brode lendes 
He bakes at the bale-fire and breekless him seemed; 
There were rostes full rude and rewful bredes, 
Bernes and bestail broched togeders, 
Cowle full crammed of crismed childer,  
Some as bred broched and birdes them turned. (1044-52) 
 
With the exclusion of only a few details, this is a man by his campfire, resting and 
waiting for his meal to be ready. He leans back, warming himself by his fire, surrounded 
by roasted meats, while his attendants turn the spit to cook his next course. He is perhaps 
tyrannical and lawless, but still essentially human. The poet emphasizes this in the parts 
of the giant he highlights: the back, the buttocks, and the loins, which we can see by the 
firelight, since he appears not to be wearing pants (1047-48). Though some translators 
have chosen to interpret “seemed” as “was,” making the giant’s bottom half definitively 
nude, the MED defines “seemed” as similar to the Modern English: the giant seemed or 
appeared pants-less (“s men” [v.(2)] MED). This ambiguity is preferable to clear 
nakedness, as it points to the poet’s vacillating attempt to push the giant away, while 
never quite managing to evict him due to his human-like behaviors. Animals don’t wear 
clothing. Humans do. That we cannot tell whether this giant is clad in trousers or not 
makes it already unclear which realm he occupies, when in fact he drifts between both.62  
It is in the details of his meal that the giant clearly differs from “human” behavior. 
Not only is he lifting a man’s thigh up to his mouth languidly to savor, he has a whole tub 
full of children standing by to be roasted, and has indiscriminately spitted men and beasts 
together, lumping together categories in his behavior just as his body itself is multiple 
                                                 
62
 He does wear a kirtle, as we discover later, but in this first image his nudity is undetermined, and I 
consider this uncertainty deliberate and important: for us as human readers, even as his appearance is 
slowly clarified, with every new detail we also receive a new ambiguity about what this giant “is.”  
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and uncontainable. The description of this meal records the horror of the imagined scene 
as the poet again attempts to distance the giant. Even while comparing the giant’s 
features to wild animals, the poet mentions “the flesh in his fore-teeth” and “all faltered 
the flesh in his foul lippes” (1089, 1092). It is hard not to recall the image of the giant 
casually lifting the remains of a man’s leg up to his mouth when we are asked to notice 
bits of flesh caught between his teeth, and difficult to avoid the image of his all-but-
human face as we simultaneously envision this horrifically inhuman behavior.  
Despite this disturbing image of a humanoid creature with animal characteristics 
and flesh-eating habits, there is something almost enticing about the giant’s behaviors. In 
pointing out medieval fascination with the monstrous and grotesque, Cohen has posited a 
system of desire relating to giants: for the audience, giants occupy dual functions of dread 
and deeply embodied enjoyment (xii). Disturbingly, this giant’s feast draws us in. If we 
can overlook the species of the meat, his meal is a plentiful collection of savories, 
carefully attended to and served with courtly elegance. As the poet describes both the 
giant and his meal, we cannot look away from his constantly shifting figure. He offers a 
freedom from restrictions to which we, as human beings who wish to maintain that status, 
are bound. His lawlessness and barbarism are enticing because they free him from the 
regulations we must obey. This desire has deep consequences, however, in that 
succumbing to the giant’s system constitutes joining his otherness. Thus through his 
behaviors and our responses, not only do we attempt to push the giant away from 
humanness, but our fascination and complicity with his actions, as I will discuss below, 
also operate to suggest the bestial and the Other in ourselves.  
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If there is a fascination with the giant’s excess and monstrousness, this fascination 
and macabre desire cannot ignore his anthropophagic practices. Curiously, this activity 
for a medieval audience connotes both the horror of having one’s identity subsumed as 
well as the utter delight of the same action through its resonances with the incarnation 
and Eucharist. Cohen explains “The material incorporation of one body into the flesh of 
another, cannibalism condenses a fear of losing the boundary that circumscribes identity 
and produces discrete subjects” (2). That is, what were once two identifiable individual 
bodies become one body with unclear identity. While this certainly includes the kinds of 
empowering, ritualized behaviors Sanday describes in her examination of cannibalism, it 
is also reminiscent of the Eucharistic practice of eating the body and blood of Christ, an 
activity at the very center of civilized Christianity.  
Thanks to its resonances with cannibalism, the Eucharist has a history of being 
regarded with suspicion by non-Christians: Romans were horrified that Christians 
actually ate their god as part of the faith. The doctrine of transubstantiation was 
developed in 1215 by the Fourth Lateran Council in part as a way of answering such 
claims. Church Fathers explained, assuaging these uncomfortable comparisons, that 
consuming Christ through the Host was different from ordinary eating. Hugh of St. 
Victor notes, taking Augustine as his model, that “unlike other kinds of food, which are 
incorporated into the body of the one who eats, the Body of Christ is eaten in the 
sacrament in order that we might be incorporated into Him” (Astell 38). Maggie Kilgour 
examines communion and cannibalism as linked acts of incorporation, and says of 
communion, “The act is one of reciprocal incorporation, as both are identified by the 
single word and substance, the Host, so that the absolute boundary between inside and 
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outside, eater and eaten, itself appears to disappear” (15). Further, she explains that 
communion’s simultaneous eating and being consumed provides a model for 
transcending the distance between guest and host, a model which Augustine also 
discovers in Christ’s role in the incarnation (51). Consuming the Eucharist, that is, does 
not simply incorporate food into the physical body. It is a reciprocal integration of 
parishioner and the divine: the human eater attaining a modicum of divinity by 
consuming the Host, and simultaneously becoming one with God – being subsumed into 
Him. Ann W. Astell confirms “Whereas cannibalism aims at the loss of the Other (either 
through the Other’s absolute destruction or through his absorption into the eater), 
Communion aims at the loss of the ‘I’ in either the ‘you’ or the ‘we’” (11). Far from 
horrifying, this loss of individual identity is Christian salvation.  
While this mutual incorporation is one key to separating communion and 
cannibalism, another differentiating factor is the body being consumed. Christ’s body 
performs the dual and contradictory functions of lifting the human body into the sphere of 
the sacred while simultaneously transposing divinity into the banality of a human body 
(Beckwith 60). Christ is figured in medieval theology as fully human and fully divine. 
The complicated implications of this bothness make it difficult to discuss Christ 
according to any existing categories: he stands alone because he occupies human and 
godly status. The symbol that is Christ’s body is thick with signification because he is not 
bound to the classifying lines of the system (Beckwith 114). His symbolic body flows 
over and around dividing lines between what is human and what is other-than-human in a 
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way similar to the category-defying giant.63 Ordinary humans do not have abilities like 
rebirth, transformation, or multiple existence, and when they are observed of humanoid 
figures other than Christ, they are usually considered monstrous.  
The link between the giant and Christian doctrine is present also in the specifics 
of his feast. The AMA-poet is not content just to make the giant a man-eater; he 
emphasizes three times that the children being consumed are baptized, highlighting their 
Christianity. When the Templar gives Arthur the distressing news about the giant, he 
claims that in addition to the five hundred people the giant has eaten, there have been “als 
fele fauntekins of free-born childer” (845). Larry D. Benson glosses this line “as many 
infants (baptized babies) of noble children,” emphasizing their baptism (157). It is not 
just young boys the giant has a tub crammed with, but “crismed childer,” which is what 
both the poet and Arthur call them (1051, 1065). When Arthur accuses the giant, he 
particularly emphasizes the children’s Christian status,64 and even makes them 
reminiscent of saints or Christ-like martyr figures, explaining “Because that thou killed 
has these crismed childer, / Thou has martyrs made and brought out of life / That here are 
broched on bente and brittened with thy handes” (1065-67). Declaring the children 
martyrs makes them more than just a sacrifice; it moves them into the realm of the 
symbolic. This emphasis on the children’s Christianity and martyrdom makes a 
                                                 
63
 R. Mills argues in “Jesus as Monster” that Christ signifies “‘like a monster’, if not actually as one” 
through his abilities to transform (into bread or the wafer), to be two things at once, and in his capacity for 
rebirth (37). 
 
64
 Russell Peck concurs, explaining in his examination of the AMA as a Boethian tragedy that “The poet 
takes pains to present Arthur as a model Christian king in the encounter with the giant. He heightens the 
religious implications of the conquest, by making the giant specialize in devouring ‘fawntekyns’ and 
Christian maidens” (164).  
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grotesquery of Holy Communion.65 Given concerns about communion being 
misunderstood as cannibalistic, the giant’s consumption of Christians seems a perversion 
of the Eucharist, intended both to horrify the audience and remind them that Holy 
Communion is not an act of cannibalism, but a divine form of incorporation to bring the 
eater closer to Christ. The children are, in addition to a horrible reminder of the giant’s 
anthropophagy, also an inoculation against this horror in their parallels to Christ.  
Though this juxtaposition serves to remind the poem’s audience of the differences 
between cannibalism and consuming the Host, the very comparison does link the giant, 
Christ, and the audience in a disturbing way. Since the children are Christians and are 
being consumed, the giant can be interpreted in one of two ways: he is either a perverse 
reflection of the audience, or of Christ. If the giant is interpreted as Christ-like in the 
sense of his monstrous abilities to occupy multiple categories simultaneously, that makes 
the children he eats the poem’s Christian audience, and it seems quite clear that rather 
than incorporation into the divine, this kind of consumption is the negative form of 
cannibalism, in which the identity of those being eaten is erased as they are subsumed 
into the gluttonous eater.66 On the other hand, because the poem’s audience consisted of 
practicing Christians for whom consumption of the Host was a sacred sublimation, the 
idea that the giant’s consumption practices are a perversion of communion is a terrifying 
one. If the giant is a reflection of the audience and his food is not divine, the audience is 
pulled closer to his cannibalism. Because cannibalism results in immediate expulsion 
from human status, the audience’s humanness, not to mention the state of their souls, is 
                                                 
65
 Martyrdom is also strongly linked to the Crusades and the Othering of Saracens; see Heng for more.  
 
66
 It could be argued that the children maintain an identity apart from the giant because their existence is 
recorded and forever remembered in the poem, but within the space of the narrative their textually 
imagined physical identity is eradicated in the sense that they become inseparably part of the giant’s body. 
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jeopardized as a result of reading. The giant Others us as we relate to him, again pushing 
toward and away from humanness simultaneously.  
The idea that the giant could reflect the poem’s audience and therefore reflect 
their own potential for inappropriate consumption is more than a frightening suggestion 
of cannibalism. In addition to eating, for a medieval audience reading was another 
method of consumption. Everyone ingests information through reading, of course, but for 
medieval readers the process was typically much more physical. As Mary Carruthers 
explains, “Reading is to be digested, to be ruminated, like a cow chewing her cud, or like 
a bee making honey from the nectar of flowers. Reading is memorized with the aid of 
murmur, mouthing the words subvocally as one turns the text over in one’s memory” 
(205). Jean Leclercq notes that this method of reading not only communicated the 
information on the page, but created “a muscular memory of the words pronounced and 
an aural memory of the words heard” (72-73). Leclercq describes the medieval reading 
process as “sometimes described by use of the theme of spiritual nutrition. In this case the 
vocabulary is borrowed from eating, from digestion, and from the particular form of 
digestion belonging to ruminants. For this reason, reading and meditation are sometimes 
described by the very expressive word ruminatio” (73). By pronouncing the words as 
they processed the information, readers actually formed the syllables with their mouths, 
giving their lips, tongues, and teeth a similar sort of exercise as that used when chewing 
and consuming food.67 Augustine, Bede, and Hugh of St. Victor, among other medieval 
writers, use the image of ruminatio to explain textual digestion and incorporation of 
                                                 
67
 The parchment on which the text was written was made from animal skins, linking their consumption to 
physical food in yet another way: while an animal’s skin was chemically transformed into manuscript 
pages, its body – or bodies of other animals like it – was transformed into the meat that graced a medieval 
table and provided physical sustenance on which people chewed and incorporated.  
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information: readers must not only meditate on meaning, but metaphorically chew the 
ideas presented to come to a full understanding and gain the spiritual nutrition the text 
contains.68  
Though “chewing over” the text is most commonly cited in reference to spiritual 
doctrine, the practice of reading aloud extends to secular texts, and therefore the same 
kind of “consumption” could be performed by medieval readers of the AMA. This 
“consuming” and “digesting” of the text through audible pronunciation and physical as 
well as mental consideration has correlations with Peggy Sanday’s explanation of 
“positive” cannibalism. As in cases of human consumption intended to preserve a 
person’s memory or ingest his positive attributes, readers here “chew” the text to gain 
understanding, and in digesting it learn from, enjoy, and remember the narrative. Thus 
even while the audience might recognize the problems with consumption, particularly 
anthropophagic consumption, by reading the AMA they are unavoidably implicated in 
consuming the same children as the giant, both digesting the material they have read, and 
pronouncing the words that move the giant’s victims closer to his lips – performing the 
same kind of chewing motions he might be in their formation of the words that signify 
and describe his actions.  
In eating baptized children and perverting the Eucharist, one of the sacraments of 
the Catholic Church, the giant is not only a threat to Christianity at large, but conjures for 
us a particular contempt for the sacred practices of Arthur’s faith. That these are Christian 
children the giant has singled out to devour suggests a perversion of the sacrament of 
                                                 
68
 Augustine cites Ambrose’s reading habits in the Confessions, explaining that he could not yet see “quod 
erat in corde eius, quam sapida gaudia de pane tuo ruminaret,” emphasizing the practice of applying 
alimentary metaphors to information and spiritual learning (6.3.3). For additional examples from 
Augustine, Bede and Hugh of St. Victor, see Chapter I, note 37.  
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baptism. Not only is their baptized status highlighted, but the image of them crammed 
together in a large tub may even serve as a sick reminder of the ceremony itself, with the 
tub reminiscent of the baptismal font. Because the children have been baptized, their 
souls should be safe from Purgatory when they expire. Because, however, they are being 
devoured, the poem suggests the uncertainty of their fate with their fragmented bodies. 
As Bynum has explained, if the children are eaten, they may not have complete bodies to 
occupy when they are resurrected. This same ambiguity can be observed in the giant. The 
act of eating humans removes the possibility that the giant could be considered human. If 
we accept Heng’s definition, cannibalism is not possible because the act of eating your 
own species evicts you from it. Again the giant is caught between, becoming-human 
through the way we interpret his affects, while those same affects push him away from 
occupying the status he approaches.  
In his gluttonous consumption, the giant of Mont St Michel perverts marriage as 
well as the Eucharist and baptism. In the versions of the story by Geoffrey and Layamon, 
the woman kidnapped by the giant is a virgin who dies before the giant is able to violate 
her. Geoffrey’s maiden is Helena, niece of Howell of Brittany. The old nursemaid tells 
Bedevere: “My sweetest charge felt in her most tender heart such terror at his wicked 
embraces that she breathed her last, though she deserved a longer life. When he could not 
inflict his foul desires on her… maddened by vile lust, he raped me, against my will, by 
God and my old age” (Geoffrey X.61-65). In Layamon’s account, Helena is Howell’s 
daughter, and the old woman explains to Bedevere that as soon as the giant came to the 
mount, “he wolde mon-radene habben wið þan maidene. / Ælde næfde heo na mare buten 
fihtene ȝere, / ne mihte þat maiden his mone iþolien; / anan swa he lai hire mide, hire lif 
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heo losede sone” (Layamon 12932-12935). Infuriated but not willing to engage in 
necrophilia, the giant exacts his rage and frustration on the old woman repeatedly on a 
nightly basis.  
In the AMA, by contrast, the kidnapped duchess does not escape without violation. 
Unnamed, she is not only not a virgin, but is Howell’s wife rather than his niece or 
daughter. She is also a blood relation to Gaynor; the Templar tells Arthur “Sho was thy 
wifes cosin,” linking her at least tangentially to the royal line and perhaps marking her 
body as socially significant – a reflection of the kingdom’s maternal and procreative state 
(864). She dies not from fear, but as a direct result of the giant’s obscenely violent rape 
on the very day Arthur comes to the mount. The old woman tells Arthur: “He had 
murthered this mild by mid-day were rungen, / Withouten mercy on molde, I no what it 
ment; / He has forced her and filed and sho is fey leved; / He slew her unsely and slit her 
to the navel” (976-79). It is the sexual act itself that kills the duchess, as the giant has 
essentially split her body in half with the force of his violation. Her body is here left 
broken and barren, not whole and preserved as in the other versions of the episode.69  
Killing a young aristocratic woman in an act of sexual violence seems to gesture 
toward the giant’s consumptive power. As Heng confirms, the giant only eats male 
bodies, preferring to consume women as sexual conquests rather than physically 
ingesting them (123). Indeed, the nursemaid Arthur encounters specifies that the giant 
“soupes all this sesoun with seven knave childer,” marking the sex of his victims as 
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 As the giant’s feasting forced a cultural critique of the excess at Camelot, here the giant’s assault against 
the royal line through Gaynor’s cousin serves as a reminder of Arthur’s own history: Uther Pendragon 
impregnates Igrayne while disguised as her husband Gorlois, making Arthur both illegitimate and a product 
of unrealized rape. Arthur later sires Mordred – in some version on his aunt, in some on his half-sister – 
who steals Gaynor from him, marking yet another instance of female violation in the Arthurian tradition 
with which this monstrous rape resonates. The poem seems to critique here the violence Arthur’s history 
contains, and its destructive consequences on (female) bodies.  
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important in how we understand his entrée (1024). The giant’s human affects are strong 
enough that we are drawn to read humanness into his behaviors even while the poem’s 
language pushes him away. Even as giving him human motives pulls him horrifying close 
to us, assigning understanding to him makes it easier to castigate him for immorality and 
“unnatural” behavior. Therefore rather than seeing him as an animal who enjoys the 
flavor of flesh, we confirm to ourselves his dietary practices as choices – his enactment of 
power, not simple hunger. When the Templar mentions this threat, he only secondarily 
references the being as a “giaunt” (842). Initially, the Templar introduces him as “a 
tyraunt beside that tormentes thy pople” (843).70 Similarly, as Arthur first observes the 
giant, the poet comments that the king’s heart bleeds with pain “because of his pople” 
(1053). This giant is presented as a threat to a whole nation, and the way we understand 
his consumptive choices reflects this. His choice of a young aristocratic woman of 
presumably childbearing age as a sexual victim, and young boys who could presumably 
mature to protect and repopulate Brittany, signals the giant’s desire to take over not only 
his space atop Mont St Michel, but Brittany as well. He is effectively preventing human 
production of future generations by sustaining himself, and therefore strengthening and 
prolonging his life while destroying his human victims.71  
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 As I will discuss later in my examination of nouns used to reference the giant, this primary identification 
as a tyrant rather than a giant or a monster plays into the impossibility of confining him to just one 
category.  
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 Conversely, even while he eliminates threats to his “rule,” he is also ensuring the eventual elimination of 
his own food supply: this is not a sustainable tyranny. The gender division evident in the giant’s 
consumptive habits – sexually consuming females and digestively consuming males – seems to play into 
Sanday’s idea of “positive” cannibalism. If affects of food can be assumed by the eater, the giant would not 
want to eat women, as he would not want to be physically affected by their femaleness. Consuming young 
males, however, would allow him to unite himself with the potentialities of youth and maleness, 
contributing to his gross hypermasculinity. 
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The idea that the giant might be interested in, if not formal rule, at least fear-
driven tyranny or take-over, is supported mainly by his grotesque kirtle of beards, which 
Arthur is demanded to contribute to, and then takes with him after defeating the giant. In 
previous versions of the Mont St Michel giant, Arthur comments upon defeating his rival 
that he remembers no fight so difficult since his defeat of Retho/Ritho, a barbarous king 
who possessed a cloak of beards and demanded tribute from Arthur. Capitalizing on 
cannibalism’s implications of power, the AMA poet collapses Retho into this giant and 
makes the cloak of beards just another one of the giant’s possessions that pushes him at 
once toward and away from the human and the civilized. The nursemaid tells Arthur the 
giant cares little for wealth or the fate of nations, but his prize possession is a cloak spun 
in Spain and decorated in Greece, which is “borderd with the berdes of burlich kinges, / 
Crisped and combed that kempes may know / Ich king by his colour, in kith there he 
lenges. / Here the fermes he fanges of fifteen rewmes” (1002-1005). This presents the 
giant as concerned with the impressive appearance of his prized possession and gives his 
desire to consume territory a very human urge.72 He requires status markers of his 
conquests that threaten the masculinity of his victims. The giant’s decision to “hurdes he 
here to outraye his pople / Til the Britones king have burnisht his lippes / and sent his 
berde to that bold with his best bernes” requires Arthur to relinquish part of himself in a 
tithing ceremony and to sacrifice a physical indicator of manhood and contribute to the 
giant’s project of dominion (1010-12).  
The eeriness of this garment, and of the giant’s desire, is enhanced in at least three 
instances. As Arthur leaves Mont St Michel victorious, he claims the giant’s club and 
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 Particularly unsettling is the description of the beards being “crisped and combed”: the giant takes 
conscious care of his prized possession, either grooming the beards himself or having the ability to 
communicate this desire to one of the maidens who tends to him. 
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kirtle for himself, as though he has gained mastery over these fifteen kings by defeating 
their defeater. Later in the poem, Arthur captures and spares the lives of a group of 
Roman senators. To mark and punish them, he orders his barbers to “shoven these 
shalkes shapely thereafter / To reckon these Romanes recreant and yelden / Forthy shove 
they them to shew for skomfit of Rome” (2333-2335). As Valerie Krishna has pointed 
out, this repetition in treatment of conquered people links Arthur and the giant 
uncomfortably (22). Similarly, when Arthur’s victims are embalmed and prepared for 
burial, “With their banners aboven, their badges there-under, / In what countree they 
kaire, that knightes might know / Ech king by his colours, in kith where he lenged” 
(2303-05). Like the repeated mentions of wine and spices in Arthur’s feast and the giant’s 
feast, the near identical language here to the description of the giant’s kirtle demands 
comparison. While these parallels certainly suggest Arthur’s descent into dangerous 
potential for tyranny, they also display the giant’s thought processes as human-like, since 
he and Arthur are represented similarly in their conquest behaviors.  
The weirdly civilized way the giant keeps and cares for the beard-kirtle is 
contrasted against the nurse’s description of his lawlessness to Arthur. In warning the 
king of the giant’s barbarousness, she tells him that the giant “will lenge out of law, as 
himself thinkes, / Withouten license of lede, as lord in his owen” (996-97). He is lawless 
– literally outside the laws of men – and yet by living as his own lord, he is placing his 
territory under his own system of governance, barbarous as it might be. The law he 
establishes for this territory, and for the kingdom he terrorizes, is a law of relentless 
consumption but also of barrenness. Not only does the giant eat young men and rape a 
young woman, both of whom had reproductive potential, he notably does not rape the old 
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nursemaid. Because the giant vaunts his frustration on her in Geoffrey and Layamon’s 
versions, it is significant that the AMA-poet has chosen to alter this detail. Perhaps, given 
his focus on taking control of the land by preventing reproduction, the nursemaid is not 
victimized because she is no longer capable of bearing children. If she cannot contribute 
to the human population of Brittany, she is not a threat to the giant’s conquest, and 
therefore not of interest to him. Given her advanced age and the trauma she has 
experienced by observing her charge’s violation and death, she will also presumably not 
live much longer, making her even less worthy of the giant’s murderous intentions.  
Though the nurse claims the giant is not interested in lands or nations, he is 
connected with the land he occupies. His excessive, inappropriate consumption extends 
out from his literal digestion practices to geographical conquest, and the description of 
the environment he occupies links him to the land. There is marked contrast between the 
terrain of the mount where the giant is camped, and the fertile, peaceful landscape Arthur 
rides through on his way to Mont St Michel. As Arthur rides past a river and under trees 
with stately boughs, the poet provides a detailed passage on the area’s prolific flora and 
fauna.73 As Arthur begins to climb the mount to the giant’s camp, however, the landscape 
changes drastically. In direct contrast to the locus amoenus he has just traversed,74 he 
now “covers the crag with cloughes full high, / To the crest of the cliff he climbes on loft, 
/ Cast up his umbrere and keenly he lookes, / Caught of the cold wind to comfort 
himselven” (941-44). Now, climbing against a chill wind, Arthur is surrounded by bare, 
rocky cliffs and ravines. Reaching the old woman, he finds a grave “new merked on 
molde,” which has been “Deep dolven” (952, 975). Unlike the episode in Layamon, 
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 See lines 920-32. 
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 See Jean Ritzke-Rutherford 86.  
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where Bedevere encounters the old woman “under ane treo,” the terrain here is empty 
(12888). Where Arthur crossed a contained river on the way to the giant’s mount, here he 
is faced with “wild lakes” and “well-strandes” to match the giant’s wildness (AMA 960, 
947). Following so soon after the depiction of riotous vitality in the locus amoenus, this 
craggy cliff with its newly dug grave is a place of death and infertility. The giant’s 
consumption not only endangers human victims, but extends to the land itself to sap it of 
productive potential.  
When Arthur explains his mission to the old woman, he further cements the 
giant’s connection to the land on Mont St Michel. Arthur says he comes “To mele with 
this master man that here this mount yemes, / To trete with this tyraunt for tresure of 
landes” (990-91). The giant is not just camping out on Mont St Michel, he is possessing 
the land. “Yemen” indicates rule or governance; the giant is the lord of this promontory, 
not just a squatter using the mount as a base of operations (“y men” [v.] MED). Rather 
than protecting his position with troops or walls, however, the giant has the wasted land 
itself and markers of nonproduction: the old widow long past childbearing years, and the 
grave of the woman who could have borne children, but whose body has been so 
completely destroyed that any capacity for productivity is gone. She too has become part 
of the earth in the way the old woman describes her grave, making the earth contain 
barrenness as well as being barren itself. The duchess becomes one with her grave, as she 
is “Deep dolven and dede, diked in moldes” (975). The grave is deep and dug into the 
earth, but the duchess is also deeply buried. The giant shows no “mercy on molde” when 
he rapes the duchess, and the old woman, assuming she will die where she sits, tells 
Arthur she will “here be founden on feld til I be fey leved” (977, 985). Finally, when 
  
 
 
80 
Arthur confronts the giant, he promises to avenge “this fair lady that thou has fey leved / 
And thus forced on folde for filth of thyselven” (1070-71). Though “mercy on molde” 
and “forced on folde” could simply be stock alliterating phrases, the repetition of 
“molde” and “folde” or “feld” in the relationship between the giant, the duchess, and the 
land itself, suggests a deeper connection. In his desire to conquer and possess through 
consumption, the giant’s sexual conquest over the duchess is a territorial conquest as 
well.75 His repeated acts of violation on or in the earth work to cement his lordship over 
the land he is slowly consuming. This environmental connection further complicates the 
giant, as it stretches his becoming in yet another direction. He is now not only caught 
between human, animal, and monster but also vegetable and, in the case of the barrenness 
of his camp, perhaps mineral as well.  
Thus when Arthur fights the giant, it is not just the people of Brittany he is 
defending, but the land itself. Though he admits the giant’s governance over the mount to 
the old woman, when he confronts the giant, Arthur promises to punish him “Through 
might of Saint Michel that this mount yemes,” asserting a verbal reclamation of the land 
to its spiritual possessor (1069). As the duchess’s rape took place on and was firmly tied 
to the land, Arthur’s battle with the giant also takes on elements of both sexual and 
territorial conquest.76 As conqueror, Arthur becomes a Crusader, working to rid the 
peninsula of this foreign tyrant and restore the land and its people to righteous Christian 
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 Here the duchess’s status as a royal social body emphasizes the giant’s territorial conquest: by 
“conquering” or “consuming” her, he has also gained the part of Howell’s kingdom she represented. Her 
link to the royal line through Gaynor also perhaps puts Arthur’s territory in danger.  
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 As Heng has argued, this fight with the giant, as with other encounters with cannibals in both the 
chronicle and romance traditions, recalls and acts as a coping mechanism to combat the deep revulsion 
resulting from Crusade-related cannibalism (28).   
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rule.77 Arthur’s first blow to the giant, which shatters through his skull and penetrates into 
his brain, causes the giant only to wipe the blood from his face and redouble his efforts 
(1113-15). The king’s second attack is “High up on the haunch… Even into the in-mete 
the giaunt he hittes / Just to the genitals and jagged them in sunder” (1119, 1122-23). 
When Arthur hits again, he “Swappes in with the sword that it the swang bristed” (1129). 
Clearly this focus on the giant’s nether regions points to a vulnerable area of the body, 
but it also serves to remind the audience of how the duchess died: by dismembering the 
giant’s sexual organs and striking so violently that his loins burst apart, Arthur enacts on 
the giant the same excessive rending the giant enacted on the duchess’s body. Both have 
now had their lower bodies split virtually in half.  
Though the focus of Arthur’s most effective strikes seems primarily to avenge the 
duchess’s death through mirroring its form, it is also unquestionably sexualized. After 
placing our attention on the giant’s groin, as the battle continues Arthur and the giant 
engage in a tumbling wrestling match against the earth of Mont St Michel, their bodies 
pressed together in a mockery of intercourse. The combatants “writhen and wrestle 
togeders, / Welters and wallows over within those buskes, / Tumbelles and turnes fast and 
teres their weedes, / Untenderly fro the top they tilten togeders, / Whilom Arthur over and 
other while under” (1141-45). As the giant’s meal scene was only separated from a 
courtly feast by a few disturbing details, for the poem’s audience this struggle is 
uncomfortably close to a scene of intercourse. Undoubtedly soaked with blood and sweat, 
Arthur and the giant tear their clothing and roll over each other across the landscape of 
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 This urge for dominion resonates not only with the Crusades, but with Arthur’s history and fictional 
project of dominion over Britain and Rome. The giant’s conquest though negation – images of 
nonproductivity and barrenness – provides a perverse reflection of Arthur’s own inability to establish a 
dynasty. He may be able to extend his rule through military and territorial conquest, but his lack of 
(legitimate) heirs limits whatever dominion he establishes to his lifetime.  
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Mont St Michel. This uncomfortable parody of intercourse strengthens the giant’s extra-
sentient, environmental connections as well as reminding us of his excessive sexuality. 
As evidenced by the duchess’s maimed body, the giant’s sex drive only brings death. 
Conversely, it seems productivity, both literal and figurative, can only be restored 
through the giant’s death. His death will permit the people of Brittany to resume 
procreation, as their sons will no longer be eaten and their women no longer stolen and 
raped. Simultaneously, as the land itself shows through two significant appearances of 
vegetation, the giant’s death and consequent relinquishing of the land will permit the 
Mont itself to “come back to life.” As the giant’s life and consumption ensured 
barrenness, his death constitutes a reestablishment of fertility both on the land, and for the 
people of Brittany.  
The giant’s negative alliance with the vegetable and mineral kingdoms is 
emphasized in two mentions of foliage on Mont St Michel. As Arthur and the giant roll 
down the hill, they tumble “within those buskes” (1142). It is true that these could simply 
be brush or dead bushes, but in the same area of the landscape, when Arthur guts the 
giant his innards “englaimes the grass on ground there he standes” (1131).  After the 
barrenness of the giant’s encampment and the fallow gravesite on Arthur’s approach, it is 
significant that these mentions of vegetal life occur during the descent from the mount, as 
Arthur is gaining the upper hand. Only after the giant is genitally wounded, marking a 
form of consumption he will not be able to undertake again, do we learn that the ground 
beneath him is now covered in grass. Whereas the giant’s territorial conquest was marked 
by bare rock, Arthur’s reclamation of the land makes it fertile again: a confirmation by 
nature that the giant’s conquest is over and right has been restored. The mention of grass 
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could also be a reminder that all flesh returns to the earth after death, but in either case, 
we are now seeing fertile nature as it was intended – unlike the giant’s tyranny of 
barrenness, now life, fertility, and death can cycle in the expected and “natural” way.  
As Arthur eviscerates the giant, his blood and organs seep into the grass of the 
mount. Just as the duchess’s body was linked to the land through her barren grave, so is 
the giant’s body connected again with both the earth his blood seeps into, and the woman 
he sexually consumed and destroyed. Like so many of the giant’s actions and 
characteristics in the AMA, this picture of his blood moistening and permeating the 
ground beneath him is ambivalent. The earth receives his blood as it receives the 
duchess’s body, marking the land as a consumptive power: it drinks in the giant’s blood 
and, as his corpse breaks down, will seem to eat his body as well. Land as consumer 
resonates with numerous ideas: Biblically, readers would be reminded of Ecclesiastes 
3:20-21 – mankind is born from and returns to dust. The idea of earth as a mother figure 
also lingers here, suggesting a positive reincorporation into a place of origin, which could 
be an image of return to the womb or regeneration.78 The giant will become part of the 
earth, and his decomposing body will enrich and fertilize the ground for future plant-life, 
like the grass already springing up beneath Arthur’s feet. Simultaneously, however, being 
physically consumed by the earth calls to mind medieval illuminations of the Hellmouth, 
a consuming opening, often canine or reptilian in design, into which damned souls fell – 
eaten and ingested into the belly of Satan just as the giant has ingested his victims. Earth 
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 In literary references, we might recall the old man in Chaucer’s Pardoner’s Tale, whose attempts to 
achieve death are thwarted as he knocks on the earth with his staff, asking his mother to let him in. His 
reference to a maternal power as he implies his longing to be buried brings to mind both a desire to rest in 
death and a desire to return to the womb.  
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as consumer seems to pull the giant in even more directions: consumption may be 
negative, but reincorporation seems positive.   
The positive aspect of the giant’s incorporation into the earth – if not for the giant 
himself at least for the poem’s audience – is linked to Arthur’s seizure of Mont St 
Michel. Arthur’s last action on the Mont is to order a church built, which shows his 
reclamation of the land and moves the area directly from profane to sacred. This is 
presumably a re-historicization of the establishment of Mont St Michel’s abbey, making 
Arthur the founding figure and connected to the Archangel Michael rather than the 
historical Bishop Aubert of Avranches (Smith 348-49). Arthur’s explanation of the 
church and its purpose invites ambivalence. He tells Howell “To make a kirk on that 
crag, there the corse ligges / And a covent there-in, Crist for to serve, / In mind of that 
martyr that in the mount restes” (1219-21). The body or bodies he refers to could be read 
in multiple ways. Though at first glance it is tempting to assume the martyr Arthur 
references is the duchess, he seems to be ordering that the church be erected at the site of 
the giant’s dead body. As mentioned above, the giant’s blood and innards have flowed 
onto the grass beneath him, and by this time it has surely seeped into the earth where his 
corpse lies, making him not only on the mount, but also in it and part of it. Further, when 
Arthur first goes in search of the giant he tells Bedevere and Kay he “will seek this saint 
by myselve one / And mele with this master man that this mount yemes” (937-38). After 
the battle Arthur says “This saint have I sought, so help me our Lord” (1171). Though 
these references to the giant as a saint are usually read as a joke between Arthur and his 
knights,79 the connection between saints and martyrs is a strong one, and it could be that 
the martyr Arthur builds the church in mind of is another tongue-in-cheek reference to the 
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 See Mary Hamel’s note to lines 896-899 (287) and Manfred Markus 64.  
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giant. If the church serves to remind us of the giant, this also entails remembering 
Arthur’s conquest of him and therefore memorializes Arthur’s role as rightful claimant 
and just avenger of the land and its people.80 In addition, it recalls the practice of building 
churches on pagan temple sites; erecting a church over the giant’s body marks a spiritual 
incorporation of both the giant and his land into Arthur’s Christianity as well as a 
political and geographic conquest.  
Arthur’s conquest of the giant not only returns the land to its rightful ownership 
and restores its capacity for human reproduction; it also reminds us of how close the giant 
is to humans in his physical make-up. In addition to revealing the giant’s vulnerability, 
the language the poet chooses to describe how Arthur dismembers the giant is significant, 
as the way this huge body bursts apart is equivalent to how human bodies are wounded 
and die. Though the poet has charged our first full view of the giant with animal imagery, 
none of this bestial reference invades the battle scene with Arthur. Instead, as we are 
given a blow-by-blow description that slowly reveals the giant’s insides, we receive a 
grisly reminder of just how close he is to us. When Arthur hacks at the giant’s skull, we 
see “the burnisht blade to the brain runnes” (1113). In Arthur’s strike to the giant’s 
genitals, “the hot blood of the hulk unto the hilt runnes; / Even into the in-mete… Just to 
the genitals” (1121-23). Finally, in the swipe of the sword that disembowels the giant, 
“Both the guttes and the gore gushes out at ones. / That all englaimes the grass on ground 
there he standes” (1130-31). Just like ours, the giant’s guts are vulnerable to Arthur’s 
weapon, and they reveal themselves as identical to what lies hidden inside every human 
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 This ambiguity does not exist in either Geoffrey or Layamon. Both of the AMA’s predecessors present 
the church as clearly dedicated to the murdered duchess, even naming the area where the church is built 
after her (see Geoffrey X.107-109 and Layamon 13041-13049).  
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being.81 In these inner parts – these parts of the giant that are essentially human – he is 
mortal and vulnerable. Interestingly, if we are reading quite literally, the giant’s insides 
not only are human, but contain humans, as within these inner delicate organs he is 
presumably digesting the people he has eaten, which pulls him away from humanness, 
again enacting this constant tug-of-war and marking the hyperbolic quality of becoming- 
as a never-completed action.  
This movement toward and away from humanness seems to fall into the 
dichotomy or binary the rhizome strives to uproot. However, just as the giant’s behaviors 
and interactions with his environment stretch him into extra-sentient links to the 
vegetable and mineral, his very positioning on top of Mont St Michel pulls him in a 
superhuman direction as well. By occupying the mount and “ruling” it, he is perversely 
linked to the Mont’s namesake: the Archangel Michael. This correspondence, as well as 
Arthur’s joke with his knights about seeking a saint on Mont St Michel, requires us to 
connect the giant also to saints and angels. His placement on the mount forces a 
comparison with Michael – a disturbing link to a positive, Christian force. His excessive 
sexuality and violence, however, simultaneously conjure a negative comparison: they 
recall and parody the giants in Genesis, the sinful product of angels mating with human 
women. In both positive and negative directions, the giant stretches beyond his 
vacillation between human and monster to resonate also with the extra- or super-human. 
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 The anatomical similarities between how this giant dies and how humans die are represented 
linguistically in other battle scenes in the AMA. See lines 3684, 2781-83, 1071, 1114, and 1130. Nothing 
distinguishes the giant linguistically from us as he is dismantled before us. Heng explains “If most of the 
outside of the giant’s body had seemed grotesquely inhuman and bestial, the opening up of his body – the 
spilling of the giant’s insides – has shown that secreted within the hulking carapace of a visible menagerie 
of body parts are the soft, invisible insides of a man… the giant has revealed that he is a man within, as he 
is a monster without” (126).  
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Despite this acknowledgment of super-human resonances, the proximity the poet 
creates in the revelation of the giant’s insides is to humans, not to angels. To assuage this 
discomfort, the poet makes one small linguistic attempt at distancing in this crucial 
moment of sameness. As Arthur delivers the critical, disemboweling blow, the poet calls 
his foe a “giaunt” (1122). Other references are made to the giant’s size in the Mont St 
Michel episode, and he is described as a “warlaw,” but this can mean a traitor, infidel, 
sinner, or damned soul as well as a monstrous being (1140).82 The giant is only clearly 
designated as such twice in the poem: here and when the Templar first mentions him to 
Arthur (843). Aside from these two references, the giant’s status – his ambiguous 
becoming – is troubled and uncertain, as the poet chooses words to “name” him that 
indicate the supernatural, the demonic, but also ordinary humanity.83  
Some of the AMA poet’s word choices to name the giant are laced with negative 
connotations; Arthur does call himself a “Messenger to this mix” and accuses the giant of 
being both a “tyraunt” and a “dog-son,” but not all of the words the poet chooses to refer 
to the giant indicate negativity (989, 991, 1072).84 The nursemaid calls the giant a “lede” 
but also a “fend,” indicating the slipperiness and uncertainty of his status between 
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 Benson glosses “thurse” in line 1100 as “giant,” which would seem to be another instance of directly 
naming this giant as such, but the MED defines “thurse” first as a devil or evil spirit, and second as a 
monster or giant (“thurs[e” [n.] MED). Again, there is ambiguity in meaning surrounding the word used to 
describe this figure. 
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 As Cohen has noted, only in Wace’s incarnation is the giant given a proper name. In all other versions he 
remains nameless (70). Thus when I speak of his “name” or “title” I am referring to the nouns used to 
indicate him, not a formal individualizing marker of his identity, as aside from the single mention of 
“giaunt of Gene” he does not seem to have one (AMA 843).  
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 “Mix” is negative and refers to filth or evil, but Arthur’s designation of himself as a “messenger” recalls 
angelic duties: as he pushes the giant lower, Arthur elevates his own status to resonate with the 
superhuman.  
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humanness and demonic or Satanic alliance within only thirty lines (854, 881).85 Arthur 
also calls the giant a “master man” and a “carl” which, though it is indicative of low or 
derogatory status, does not indicate questionable humanness (938, 990, 1063). That 
Arthur marks his opponent as essentially human, if excessive and horrible, may simply 
signal his desire to make the giant less intimidating – a kind of exercise in bolstering 
himself for the approaching battle by downplaying the threat this monster poses.86 
However, even the poet as narrator participates in this terminological confusion. As 
Arthur approaches the giant’s fire, he “Sained him sekerly with certain wordes, / And 
sidlings of the segge the sight had he reched” (1042-43). In the only definition related to 
bodies or animate beings in the MED, “segge” means a man, person, or human people 
(“s e” [n.(2)] MED). Similarly, Benson glosses “segge” unambiguously as “man” 
(163). The question becomes, how are we supposed to think of this being if the poet 
himself cannot rest firmly on what to call him?  
This unsettled, constant reassigning of category through naming is unique to the 
AMA. Geoffrey of Monmouth focuses on the giant’s monstrosity, calling him “gigantem,” 
“monstrum,” and even an “inhumanus” (X.33, 57, 74). Layamon titlȝes his giant 
similarly, calling him “feonden,” “eotend,” and “ueond,” all of which indicate either a 
giant or an ogre (12864, 12891, 13013). He does allow his giant to encroach on 
supernatural territory, as he also calls him “wald-scaðe” and “scucke,” which are both 
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 The MED defines “lede” as a person or man, and while it can refer to an inferior, it clearly indicates a 
member of the human race (“l d(e” [n.(2)] MED). “Fend,” on the other hand, can refer to a foe or enemy, 
but also carries Satanic or demonic meanings, which places the giant potentially in the realm of the 
supernatural (“f nd” [n.] MED). 
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 Arthur also calls the giant a “freke,” which can mean a being other than human such as an angel, demon, 
or giant, but its first several definitions in the MED simply indicate a human man (1061, 1174, “fr ke” [n.] 
MED).   
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glossed as “demon” by W. R. J. Barron and S. C. Weinberg, but even these have 
connotations of monstrosity, rather than simply an evil human being (12906, 13009). It is 
the AMA poet alone who pushes the giant back and forth, ever pointing to his shifting 
status and his uncomfortable proximity to what is human from both sides: bestial 
monstrosity and the supernatural.87  
To determine why this renaming marks discomfort, and reveals the insufficiency 
of fixed boundaries of humanness, it is helpful to employ Judith Butler’s arguments about 
language, naming, and performativity. Butler explains that “naming is at once the setting 
of a boundary, and also the repeated inculcation of a norm” (Bodies That Matter 8). 
Calling the giant a “giaunt” acts as a linguistic attempt to firmly tie him down, defining 
him by the same definition as the cultural understanding of “giaunt” for the poem’s 
audience.88 Butler’s problem with language, like Deleuze and Guattari’s, is its 
essentialism and insufficiency. The shifting names for the giant throughout his episode 
make his status confusing because we are continually directed to new ways of thinking 
about him. Some of the noun choices the poet employs permit multiple potential 
understandings for the giant, but they still assign various culturally specific definitions 
and therefore tell us what and how to think about him. This issue with language plays 
into Butler’s main theses about sex and gender.89 Clearly the giant’s sex is involved in his 
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 Göller has noted this as well, commenting that the giant “is designated by a new synonym almost every 
time he is mentioned, the function of the synonyms thus being contrastive characterization” (58).  
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 I refer here to the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century audience(s) of the poem, though Butler would agree 
that for every audience, definitions will shift as cultural norms and values shift, making language mean 
differently to each new generation, if not each individual within it.  
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 Butler argues in Gender Trouble that sex is ultimately just as socially constructed as gender: as soon as 
we assign maleness or femaleness to a human body, the expected gender norms are always already present. 
When, however, “the constructed status of gender is theorized as radically independent of sex, gender itself 
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status, with his excessive rape of the duchess and the maidens who turn his spits marked 
as his future sexual victims. Cohen posits that the giant’s clear and exaggerated maleness 
is a feature of the “race” in medieval literature – giants are almost always male, and their 
sex is part of what makes them threatening figures (xii). Making assumptions about his 
gender identity, however, would be difficult given the absolute third-person perspective 
of him, the different construction of gender identity in the fourteenth century, and the 
poem’s clear indecision about how the giant should be categorized, marked by his body’s 
basic humanoid form but non-human attributes. To fully and responsibly undertake a 
study of the giant’s gender and sexuality according to Butler’s arguments would require a 
larger or perhaps a separate project.90   
Rather than plumb the depths of the giant’s gender as Butler explains the term, I 
will presume to use the concept of humanness as Butler uses gender: a constantly 
performed reaffirmation of a socially constructed idea. In Gender Trouble, Butler asks “Is 
there ‘a’ gender which persons are said to have, or is it an essential attribute that a person 
is said to be, as implied in the question ‘What gender are you?’” (10). Positing that 
gender would be better construed as a verb rather than a noun – we do our genders rather 
than being them – Butler explains “Within the inherited discourse of the metaphysics of 
substance, gender proves to be performative – that is, constituting the identity it is 
purported to be. In this sense, gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject 
who might be said to preexist the deed” (34). Like Deleuze and Guattari’s explanation of 
                                                                                                                                                 
becomes a free-floating artifice, with the consequence that man and masculine might just as easily signify a 
female body as a male one, and woman and feminine a male body as easily as a female one” (9).  
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 Scholars like Carolyn Dinshaw and John Boswell have undertaken book-length explorations of medieval 
sexuality which engage directly or indirectly with some of Butler’s ideas – theirs would be excellent 
starting places for such a study of this giant. 
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becomings, the idea of performing one’s gender, or, in the case of the giant, performing 
one’s extracategorical status, makes the process constant and unstable. Indeed, Butler 
affirms that “performativity must be understood not as a singular or deliberate ‘act,’ but, 
rather, as the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects 
that it names” (Bodies That Matter 2).  
Butler’s understanding of gender, and the importance of reformulating our 
understanding to include what we might consider “alternate gender identities” and 
“alternate sexualities” carries clear implications of social justice. She is concerned with 
inclusion in the realm of personhood, claiming “It would be wrong to think that the 
discussion of ‘identity’ ought to proceed prior to a discussion of gender identity for the 
simple reason that ‘persons’ only become intelligible through becoming gendered in 
conformity with recognizable standards of gender intelligibility” (Gender Trouble 22). 
Further, “Discrete genders are part of what ‘humanizes’ individuals within contemporary 
culture; indeed, we regularly punish those who fail to do their gender right,” and this 
punishment can take the form of exclusion from personhood, or at the very least having 
one’s personhood called into question (Gender Trouble 190, Bodies That Matter 8). 
Butler would like to stabilize and assure personhood for all human beings, regardless of 
how they perform their gender. As I have shown, however, the giant’s personhood, or 
what I have been calling “humanness,” is not a stable status. Humanness, for both the 
giant and for a medieval understanding, is fluid and its boundaries can be permeated 
relatively easily. Bodies can fall into and out of this category and into unclear territory 
through activities that do not necessarily carry gendered meanings. For the giant, this 
fluid, ever-changing status – this becoming-human and simultaneous becoming-
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monstrous, becoming-animal, and becoming-supernatural that he occupies – is marked by 
the names and titles the text assigns him, his eating and sexual behaviors, and his ties to 
Arthur and the landscape of Mont St Michel.  
The idea of performativity for the giant is important in assessing his block of 
becoming because its movement is regulated by the giant’s behavior as well as his 
physicality. As we can see through the titles he is given, the poem pushes the giant 
toward human status, but pushes him away at crucial moments of proximity, never 
allowing simple exclusion or assimilation. In depicting the giant’s sexual and gustatory 
behaviors, however, the poem disrupts this familiarity, shocking and horrifying us with 
its depictions of the giant’s grotesque, inhuman behaviors. Thus it is not humanness that 
the giant performs, but a becoming-human constantly interrupted and pushed away in 
multiple directions by the very materiality and activity of his own body. Restricting him 
to a single category, and not recognizing his constant vacillation toward and away from 
pre-established categorizations, approaching but never fully inhabiting any of them, 
would cause us to lose aspects of him. Requiring his “being” rather than attending to his 
“doing” damages his multiplicitous becoming as a figure. As Deleuze and Guattari 
remind us, becomings are multiplicities, and multiplicities cannot be restricted or divided 
without irreparable change to their nature (249). Lest we change the giant’s nature, and 
thereby lose aspects of him and limit his capacity for meaning-making, he must be 
understood not as a complete, unitary, categorizable being, but as a multiplicitous, 
performative block of becoming which is always between, and always bigger than the 
constructed categories that surround him.    
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CHAPTER III  
“ÞE FYLÞ OF ÞE FLESCH”: FLESHLY ORDERING IN CLEANNESS  
Whereas the Alliterative Morte Arthure depicts the giant of Mont St. Michel as 
fluid and amorphous – resisting and escaping categorization through multiplicitous 
performative existence – the anonymous late fourteenth-century Cleanness91 seems 
dedicated to exploring and defining a new category in which to contain disorderly bodies: 
a subhuman status of undifferentiated corporeality resulting from sexual and digestive 
transgression.92 The three main biblical homilies in the poem are each introduced with a 
mantra: God hates “fylþ of þe flesch” (Cleanness 202). Most critics concentrate on the 
“fylþ” portion of this phrase, pointing out that filthy or unclean behavior is the impetus 
for punishment in the poem. However, analyzing the importance of “flesch” is necessary 
for understanding how the poem presents and classifies bodies. “Filthy” behavior seems 
clearly defined by instances of sexual and alimentary sin, but the consequence of these 
behaviors is movement into an interstitial space: fleshliness. The “fylþ of the flesch” is 
more than a warning against impurity; it establishes a category of being.93  
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 The poem is also sometimes entitled Purity, but given the poet’s choice to use “Clannesse” as the first 
word of the poem and my focus on the links between the disorder of “the flesch” in contrast to orderly 
cleanness, Cleanness seems the more appropriate title for my purposes.  
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 Cleanness is probably the Gawain-poet’s least acclaimed work. Among other allegations, it has been 
called homophobic, overly didactic, and episodically disconnected. For claims of formal failure, see 
Burrow; Menner; Gollancz; and Spearing.  
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 In the previous chapter I argued against “being” as a mode of existence, preferring a performative 
“doing” instead. However, I believe Cleanness attempts to impose a more rigid framework of being on 
bodies where it cannot be sustained, showing us through its insufficiency how categories cause problems 
for multiplicitous bodies.  
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I will read this new category of Flesch94 alongside Julia Kristeva’s conception of 
abjection: a conscious “othering” of the repulsive products or aspects of bodily existence 
that remind us of our own mortality (1-5). The Abject consists (in part) of most bodily, 
animalistic or gross parts of existence, which we are always working to repudiate or 
escape from. But because human beings possess these mortal, animal elements, the 
Abject is always part of the self and thus it can never be absolutely expelled.95 Food and 
sex provide bases for repulsion, so the Fleschly seem to be those who let the abject parts 
of the human self take over.96 As we shall see, the poem’s ordering with the category 
Flesch is ultimately an unsuccessful attempt for two reasons. First, like the Abject, flesh 
and bodily desires are part of being human. Thus designating transgressors Flesch – a 
new category separate from humanness – creates a false binary. Fleschliness shares so 
much with normal embodied human life that it can barely be suppressed even by the 
cleanest of examples. Secondly, the multiple resonances of the word itself make the 
category amorphous and artificial: insufficient to contain all that it attempts to bracket.  
Abjection is caused by “what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not 
respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite” (4). As 
we shall see, Fleschliness is all of these things: in between human and animal, ambiguous 
and composite because it carries multiple meanings in itself. Though we think of “flesh” 
most commonly as a body’s meaty material, the Middle English word has additional, 
complicating resonances instrumental to its use in Cleanness. According to the MED, 
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 I will use the capitalized word Flesch as the title of and the name for individuals occupying this new 
category.  
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 See Chapter V for an expanded explanation and application of Kristeva’s theories.  
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 Kristeva asserts “Food loathing is perhaps the most elementary and most archaic form of abjection… ‘I’ 
do not assimilate it, ‘I’ expel it. But since the food is not an ‘other’ for ‘me’… I expel myself, I spit myself 
out, I abject myself within the same motion through which ‘I’ claim to establish ‘myself’” (3).  
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“flesch” or “flesh” can mean the muscular, gristly, or glandular parts of the human body. 
However, it can also refer to the corresponding parts of an animal body, especially a 
mammal, meat intended for food, wounded or bleeding body material, the sexual urge, or 
even carrion (“fl sh” [n.] MED). Thus “flesch” is not simply a body’s corporeal make-up. 
It is also not simply human or animal, but both and more simultaneously. Its 
correspondence with any of these meanings suggests it refers to undifferentiated 
corporeality: something lacking spirituality; something below humanness but perhaps not 
fully animal, because the bodies represented as “flesch” in Cleanness do not seem to 
change in form, only in status.  
This change in status but not in form is important. It seems to respond to the 
implicit question of what happens when a human being loses the rationality by which 
many medieval theologians and hierarchies define us. Succumbing to fleshly desires 
marks an irrational move, and yet the characters in the poem do not transform physically 
into animals. With human shape but no rational behavior (though they may retain the 
capacity for it), they are neither fully human nor fully animal. Rather than illustrating 
complex monstrosity as did the AMA giant, the characters in Cleanness begin as human 
beings and, as a result of unclean behavior, become something new. “Flesch” is an 
indication that a character has crossed a boundary to become something other-than-
human for which there is no definite name, pushed away by disorder and failing or 
compromised rationality: the embodiment of an abjected being. This hazy area of 
Fleschliness is frightening because it encompasses so many states of being, and so the 
poem presents a rigorous orderliness to control the characters that enter this category. 
Failure to capitulate to that order results in furt
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consequences of obedience to this new order, the Flesch always threatens its human 
border, always pushing back against it thanks to its proximity and its multiple resonances.  
Even as the designation Flesch attempts to establish firm order, each individual 
body denominated as such is also a multiplicity. Each character, in his or her move into 
Fleschliness, gains a multiplicity of meanings provided not only by preexisting Biblical 
characterization, but by the numerous resonances of the word “flesch” itself. Each must 
be considered from a standpoint of rhizomatic connections with his or her environment: 
other humans, animals, food products, and, perhaps most interestingly, carrion. How each 
of these operates with the idea of abjection must also be considered to see how they push 
back against and threaten new and existing categorization. If “flesch” can be human, 
animal, meat, or cadaver, and the word in itself does not differentiate, to preserve order 
the poem must work to organize this assemblage. The poem’s conservatism and 
heteronormative didacticism, for which it is often castigated, are attempts to control its 
occupants with the only means that seem possible to attend to such a wide range of 
meanings: eradicate them completely.97 The poem itself becomes an exercise in order: 
not only must the characters that have descended into this disorganized mass of 
fleshliness be punished for their misdeeds through reordering by God, but the text 
questions the human capacity for orderliness in behavior and in language, extending the 
desire for order onto the poem’s form. The multiple definitions of “flesch” reveal the true 
indeterminacy of the category it seeks to designate. The choice of word itself signals 
awareness of the inevitable failure of human language and authorship to firmly establish 
order: what is “flesch” – what is abject – can never be completely expelled because it is 
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Treating the sick and the dead as one large, undifferentiated mass became a mechanism of control and 
organization in a confusing, traumatic time. 
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part of what makes us human. Perfect order cannot be achieved by a human being or a 
human text. 
Many critics have, of course, pointed to sexual sin as the impetus for eradication 
in Cleanness, most frequently centering their analyses on the Sodom and Flood episodes: 
Michael W. Twomey cites the Sodomites’ punishment as proof that their homosexual 
behavior disobeys God’s command to procreate (117). Michael Calabrese and Eric 
Eliason evaluate a dual rhetoric of condemned homosexuality and celebrated 
heterosexual pleasure (248). Edward Wilson simply avers that the frequently repeated 
phrase “fylþ of þe flesch” refers specifically to sexual sin (87). Though the poem 
certainly does concentrate on sexual misconduct and this seems instrumental in the move 
from human to fleshly, the poem also presents transgressive interactions with food (not 
only eating, but also preparation and service) as punishable activities – another form of 
filth that leads to becoming Flesch.98  
The most obvious connection between sex and eating lies in the necessity for 
humans to engage in both activities. Both activities are necessary for maintaining life, the 
species at large and the individual body, respectively. If God expresses distaste for 
fleshly filth, it is worth asking how sins relating to these behaviors might indicate “fylþ of 
þe flesch.” St. Augustine cites intention as the wellspring for sin (Confessions 29).99 Both 
mental virtue and physical purity control the body’s moral standing, and only when the 
mind weakens or is desirous of committing wrongs does a person fall into sin (City of 
God I.18-19). Because Augustine considers rationality central to human status, free will 
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 Augustine asserts in The Confessions that there are two parts to sin: the act itself and the desire for that 
act. Even wanting to commit a sexual misdeed, for example, would constitute sinful behavior (29).   
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and the understanding of what constitutes virtuous behavior are located in the rational 
mind. He explains “no one is punished for faults of nature but for faults of will,” and “the 
failure to adhere to God must be a perversion in this rational nature” (XII.2, XII.1). This 
perversion is often present in the pursuit of physical pleasure, which is most frequently 
attained through satisfying the appetite.100 The difference between attaining bodily peace 
for an irrational and a rational soul, respectively, lies in attending to the appetites and 
attending to balanced intention. Augustine explains “the peace of the irrational soul is a 
duly ordered repose of the appetites; the peace of the rational soul is the duly ordered 
agreement of cognition and action. The peace of body and soul is the duly ordered life 
and health of a living creature; peace between mortal man and God is an ordered 
obedience” (XIX.13). Further, he claims, “If man comes near to God in proportion as he 
grows more like him, then unlikeness to God is the only separation from him, and the 
soul of man is estranged from that immaterial, eternal and unchangeable being in 
proportion as it craves for things that are temporal and changeable” (IX.17). Because 
irrational beings are driven by a need to satisfy their appetites, and because bodies are 
temporal and changeable since they age and die, when humans crave for bodily 
subsistence we become separated from God and fall into irrationality. Choosing to 
succumb to the desire to please ourselves bodily and intending toward physical pleasure 
instead of toward the pleasure of faith in God results in sinful behavior.  
Interestingly, Augustine defines peace for a rational being as “ordered obedience” 
to God’s laws. In Cleanness, this issue of order is directly connected to the fixation on 
filth and cleanness as well as the issue of controlling or containing the Flesch. For the 
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purposes of this poem, the idea of “order” refers not only to the existence of a social or 
natural order, but also to following and giving orders.101 In her examination of the impact 
of dirt, order and pollution on cultural taboo, anthropologist Mary Douglas explains: “as 
we know it, dirt is essentially disorder. There is no such thing as absolute dirt: it exists in 
the eye of the beholder. Dirt offends against order” (2). Douglas dichotomizes the ideas 
of dirt and cleanness (or disorder and order) to claim that “if uncleanness is matter out of 
place, we must approach it through order. Uncleanness or dirt is that which must not be 
included if a pattern is to be maintained,” and specifies further: “Where there is dirt there 
is system. Dirt is the by-product of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, in 
so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements. This idea of dirt takes us 
straight into the field of symbolism and promises a link-up with more obviously symbolic 
systems of purity” (50, 44). Filth, then, or “dirty” bodily behavior, offends God because it 
is essentially disorderly sex and/or eating. To maintain the system God established when 
creating the world and to keep the universe in proper order, the Cleanness-poet depicts a 
God who eradicates the disordered to maintain cleanness, within a poem that works to 
establish order by creating a new level of categorization. Dirt is abjected from the system 
even as the system is reordered in an attempt at sterile containment.  
As bodies can tend toward order or filth, sex and eating and their implications can 
also incline in either direction. Both intercourse and digestion involve a transgression of 
or movement across bodily margins: a mixing or blending of the outside world with the 
inside of the body through the ingestion of external materials. Cleanness is a poem in 
which outward appearance or behavior reflects inner being or morality, so each 
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restaurant.  
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movement it depicts from exterior to interior must consider the potential consequences of 
those movements. Douglas asserts: “all margins are dangerous… Any structure of ideas 
is vulnerable at the margins. We should expect the orifices of the body to symbolize its 
especially vulnerable points” (150). Though she refers primarily to expelled matter, her 
statements about margins are also applicable to ingested materials in Cleanness. 
Dependence upon an exterior force to change bodily composition indicates 
incompleteness, and because outside materials can permeate and enact change upon the 
bodies whose borders are transgressed, they always carry the potential to disrupt 
established bodily or social order if they are engaged in improperly.102  
Despite their polluting potential, sex and eating are necessary evils. To keep them 
as orderly and clean as possible, they must be enacted in the proper way. Augustine 
asserts that physical pleasures like sex and eating can be ordered correctly. When they are 
brought into the service of virtue, they are subordinated to virtue and therefore intended 
for good (City of God XIX.1). Since sex (as a source of procreation) and eating (as a 
method of subsistence) can both serve God’s purposes, they have the potential for virtue. 
It is when pleasures are sought for their own sakes and believed to be virtuous simply 
because they are pleasurable that they become disorderly. Anything which deviates from 
the proper system is, as Douglas notes, disordered and therefore polluted. For Cleanness, 
this means any desire for, or act of, sexual or consumptive behavior that is disorderly or 
falls outside God’s laws results in a fall into fleshliness, a multiplicity of confusion and 
contamination that must be brought back under control. This need for control operates in 
two ways in the poem: God’s response pulls the transgression into an ordered narrative, 
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and the consequences of the transgression are depicted in extreme detail to guide the 
poem’s audience toward orderly behavior as well.103 As David Wallace argues, this 
guidance operates through fear (93-104). This is a lower order response on the level of 
flesh and appetite: the poem cautions us against animalistic behavior by appealing to our 
emotions and instincts, using the very elements we are cautioned against to prove the 
need for that caution, thus hinting at the same futility of rigid categorization introduced 
by the multiple resonances of Flesch.   
The poem’s didactic thrust seems to warn that attending to the body’s physical 
appetites rather than controlling them in service to God results in compromised 
rationality (City of God I.25). Humans who are reduced to Flesch through succumbing to 
their appetites are equated in the poem to animal bodies or dead bodies. As Augustine 
asserts, human rationality is achieved through a balance of body and soul, so tipping the 
balance toward the body through fleshly activities results in a loss of rationality and 
therefore change in status (V.11). They have moved into the foggy area of Fleschliness – 
not quite animal but not fully human any more. The idea of carrion as a form of “flesch” 
is perhaps the most dangerous resonance of the word, and significant for Cleanness 
because God’s actions in restoring order generally involve stopping these improper 
sexual or comestible processes by killing the individuals committing them. Because 
eating and intercourse are necessary for individual and species survival, respectively, 
God’s actions to stop the disorder of the Flesch could result in the complete eradication 
of physical life. If, as Douglas claims, dirt – or filth – is disorder, and bodily disorder 
results from the inappropriate transgression of bodily margins through intercourse or 
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eating, filth is the consequence of mixing of inside and outside. 104 In the poem’s episodes 
of Noah’s flood, Sodom, and Belshazzar’s feast, each instance of fleshly mixing results in 
the guilty characters’ representation not as human beings, but as a new category: they 
become no more than Flesch, with all its resonances, and must therefore be subjected to 
God’s reordering. 
Perhaps because the poem is so often read as a condemnation of sexual sin, many 
readings concentrate specifically on these three episodes, which serve as negative 
examples: “what not to do” in desire and deed. The first section of this chapter analyzes 
these negative examples, showing how sexual and alimentary transgressions result in 
classification in a new category: Flesch. The second section focuses on the characters that 
retain their human status, responding in part to David Wallace’s claim that the poem does 
not provide examples of clean behavior. In his analysis of terror as a didactic principle in 
the poem, Wallace asks “How do we secure cleanness? The poet offers no answer to this 
question, but pours his formidable energies into three negative exempla which convince 
us more deeply of our need to be clean. For this poet… our hope of salvation resides in 
this ceaseless forward movement, this continuous effort of interpreting” (100). However, 
if we compare the instances of sexual contact and food preparation practices in these 
three exempla with the positive exempla simultaneously provided – Noah, Abraham, and 
the birth and cleanness of Christ – the poem does demonstrate clean behavior. 
Degradation to Fleschliness results from disorderly or inappropriate sex and eating. The 
poet’s answer to how to maintain cleanness, therefore, seems to be practicing sexual and 
digestive behaviors in as properly and orderly a fashion as possible, according to God’s 
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laws. But because the abject parts of humanness can never be fully eradicated, even the 
clean examples can only be as clean as human existence allows. In the final section, I 
argue that the poem depicts this shortcoming formally as well as in its narrative content. 
The structure of the poem attempts – and fails – to establish and uphold orderly control 
over its message through its language and poetics.  
Fleshly Filth   
Because the consequences for unclean behavior are so severe – loss of human 
status and movement into a barely classifiable realm of corporeality – the poem does 
concentrate on the penalties for misconduct. Though punishment arises from both 
inappropriate eating and sexual practices in the antediluvian and flood stories in 
Cleanness, the poem deals with dietary practices only after the floodwaters have abated. 
The initial focus in this section is on sexual behavior, and seems to emphasize the 
consequences of mixing or blending: falling away from humanness and becoming Flesch, 
a state that is itself a mixture of meanings. On the contrary, from a biblical and 
theological perspective as well as the perspective the poem seems to advocate, strict order 
and homogeneity in sexual behavior is preferable. Because sex involves a movement 
from outside to inside, crossing body margins on the way, it also constitutes a mixing of 
bodies and material, blending two formerly separate, contained bodies together in terms 
of physicality and, potentially, identity. This incorporating and blending carries the 
potential to disrupt order.105 For Charlotte Morse, sexual sin is the focus of the 
designation “sin against nature,” and therefore the obligation of sex as a procreative 
activity was central under natural law (28). Both Adam’s descendants and Noah’s 
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neighbors are governed by natural law, and so the focus in these sections on sins against 
nature is of paramount importance. The poet emphasizes that for Adam’s progeny, “Þer 
watz no law to hem layd bot loke to kynde, / And kepe to hit, and alle hit cors clanly 
fulfylle” (263-4). However, this blessed race quickly “founden þay fylþe in fleschlych 
dedez, / And controeued again kynde contraré werkez” (265-6). Because medieval 
Christianity taught that any form of non-procreative sexual behavior was a sin against 
nature, the idea that Adam’s descendants were asked only to uphold the law of nature but 
instead broke that law with fleshly sins suggests non-procreative sex, and therefore an act 
of disorder toward the established system.106   
While many critics assume the main sin against nature committed by the 
antediluvian population in Cleanness is male-male homosexual intercourse, this 
conclusion seems too hasty. A wide range of sexual acts were considered sodomitical or 
“unnatural” in the Middle Ages, and given the poet’s ability to create linguistic 
complexity and ambiguity, limiting the interpretation of an unnatural sin to homosexual 
intercourse is reductive. Because a sin against nature was any kind of non-procreative 
sex, and because sodomy as a category included not only what we would now call 
homosexual intercourse but also bestiality, oral intercourse, masturbation, fornication, or 
anything diverging from procreative heterosexual sex, multiple types of sexual sin could 
be occurring in these “werkez” “again kynde contraré” (266). No specific gender is 
provided for “hem” that commit unnatural acts, and so while sex between same-sex pairs 
is certainly possible, the “wrang wyse” these people are committing “als with oþer” could 
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be between men and women as well as solely between men (268).107 Further, because 
“kynde” can mean “fitting” or “appropriate” but can also refer to race or a class of 
species, humans committing sexual acts “again kynde” also means these acts are not 
necessarily performed between bodies of the same species (“k nde” [n.] MED). 
Suggestions of animality, among others, exist for those whose humanity is degraded to 
Fleschliness, which opens the possibility that interspecies intercourse could also be 
occurring.  
The ambiguity in identity of partners opened by the use of “kynde” is upheld and 
complicated further by the poet’s repetition of the word “oþer.” When describing their 
misdeeds, the poet claims the antediluvians “vsed hem vnþryftyly vchon oþer, / And als 
with oþer” (267-8). This repetition seems to suggest that each “oþer” being referred to in 
these subsequent lines constitutes a separate group. This could, therefore, suggest that 
more than one type of unnatural or disorderly intercourse is occurring across multiple 
groups, further diminishing the likelihood that the antediluvian population’s problems are 
caused solely by homosexual intercourse.  
When the poet does specify gender in relation to sexual activity, the act of mixing 
as a sin against nature becomes clear. The antediluvian population “So ferly fowled her 
flesch þat þe fende loked / How þe deȝter of þe douþe wern derelych fayre, / And fallen 
in felaȝschyp with hem on folken wyse, / And engendered on hem jeauntez with her japez 
ille” (269-72). Relations between human females and fallen angels result in a population 
of huge threatening giants who are clearly a blending: human-shaped but not actually 
human, perhaps existing entirely within this realm of fleshliness, driven only by their 
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appetites.108 In addition to the unnaturalness of this pairing, Allan J. Frantzen points out 
that the angels’ decision to copulate “on folken wyse” marks a change in their expected 
behavior (453). Angels behaving “in the ways of the people” indicates a disruption of 
usual behavior and a mixing of sexual methods resulting in monstrosity. The poet claims 
as a result of these giants’ birth, “þenne euelez on erþe earnestly grewen / And 
multyplyed monyfolde inmongez mankynde, / For þat þe maȝty on molde so marre þise 
oþer” (277-9). The sexualized language of this passage further emphasizes that the 
problem here involves inappropriate sexual practices – what we might call a mixing of 
species between human women and fallen angels. That the giants “grewen” and 
“multyplyed monyfolde” insinuates continued procreation and continued mixing – the 
giants are never specified to mate only with other giants – and therefore continued and 
extended acts against Nature’s law. Giants mixing and intermingling with mankind is 
also indicted as harmful, though the target of this harm is ambiguous thanks again to the 
word “oþer” used to describe the victims of this evil: humankind could be harmed thanks 
to their relations with the giants, or the giants could be harmed through their interaction 
with one another.  
Sex, whether procreative or not, remains a focus for the antediluvian population 
even when they are on the verge of drowning. Once they decide God will not save them, 
“Frendez fellen in fere and faþmed togeder, / To dryȝ her delful destyné and dyȝen alle 
samen; / Luf lokez to luf and his leue takez, / For to ende alle at onez and for euer 
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 This concentration on unkynde-ness and mixing of species or races seems to be a medieval addition to 
the story; though many medieval exegetical texts claim the giants to be the progeny of the fallen angels and 
human women, the Vulgate says only that “gigantes autem errant super terram in diebus illis” (Gen. 6.4). 
Augustine concurs, claiming that it is possible giants both preceded and followed this interspecies mating, 
but were not a product of it (City of God XV.23). Augustine does, however, confirm that this pairing is 
inappropriate, citing the human women as residents of the Earthly City and the fallen angels or “sons of 
God” as members of the City of God (XV.22).  
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twynne” (399-402). Rather than continuing to pray, and rather than accepting their fate, 
the people huddled on hilltops instead turn to one another for a last embrace, which could 
certainly imply sexual contact rather than simply a brotherly farewell. Similarly, though 
“twynne” infers parting, in its adverbial form it means “two,” and could be a pun on 
intercourse as well. Read this way, the antediluvians, rather than begging for forgiveness 
and striving for salvation until the end, choose to die in an orgiastic frenzy on the top of a 
mountain: they enact the reason why, according to the poem, they will be destroyed.109  
Clearly sexual transgression is the cause of the flood. God notices that “vch freke 
forloyned fro þe ryȝt wayez,” and “Felle temptande tene towched His hert” (282, 283). 
His regret for ever creating mankind and his subsequent decision to “delyuer and do away 
þat doten on þis molde, / And fleme out of þe folde al þat flesch werez” is a deliberate act 
to restore order (286-7). The “fylþe of þe flesch” angers God most of all, and in order to 
expunge sexual transgression and consequent disorder, it must be washed clean from the 
world (202). God’s decision wipes out nearly all life – human, Flesch and animal. God 
dooms “al þat flesch werez,” and rather than destroying only people, he clarifies “þe 
burne to þe best, fro bryddez to fyschez; / Al shal doun and be ded and dryuen oute of 
erþe” (287, 288-9). It seems the antediluvian animals are not simply innocent victims of 
God’s wrath, but are perhaps tainted by interaction with or proximity to the sinful human 
population. God’s careful naming of the different types of animals that will die alongside 
mankind and the repetition of animal groups indicates this was his deliberate choice.  
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 Though the antediluvians’ intent is never to procreate, most intercourse is fundamentally an act of 
species preservation. Thus their copulation might also be read as a subconscious attempt to circumvent 
God’s wishes and place themselves outside the divinely determined order. This sexual activity can be 
interpreted as prideful because God has determined they must die for their sins, but their impulse toward 
the activity that results in species preservation as well as pleasure marks an attempt to escape God’s 
judgment. 
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Animals’ sharing the watery consequences of human transgression is intriguing to 
consider not only because God involves them, but because the poet’s repeated 
confirmation of their complete annihilation is discordant with Augustine’s interpretation 
of the flood’s eradication. In the full force of the flood the poet specifies that “no flesch 
styryed,” indicating total decimation of life outside the ark (403). As the flood nears the 
end of its duration, the poet notes “Al watz wasted þat wonyed þe worlde withinne, / Þat 
euer flote, oþer flew, oþer on fote ȝede” (431-2). Contrary to this insistence, Augustine 
allows that fish, sea creatures, and some birds could conceivably have survived the flood 
outside the ark (City of God XV.27). That the poet chooses to eliminate the potential for 
survival, even among water-dwelling animals, signals a connection between humans and 
animals, enhanced by the use of the word “flesch” to indiscriminately describe both. 
The idea of animals dying alongside humans is further emphasized as the 
floodwaters begin to cover the earth. When the poet details the antediluvians’ reaction to 
the rising waters, he parallels mankind’s and animals’ attempts at preservation. Men, 
women and children “bowed to þe hyȝ bonk þer brentest hit wern, / And heterly to þe 
hyȝe hyllez þay haled on faste, / Bot al watz nedlez her note… Þe moste mountaynez on 
mor þenne watz no more dryȝe, / And þeron flocked þe folke, for ferde of þe wrake” 
(379-81, 385-6). Abandoning reason for the instinctual drive of bodily survival, the 
antediluvians seek out the highest places even though these too are threatened by the 
floodwaters. The poet next emphasizes that animals do the same thing. Though some 
beasts float or swim in the rising waters, “Summe styȝe to a stud and stared to þe heuen, / 
Rwly with a loud rurd rored for drede. / Harez, herttez also, to þe hyȝe runnen; / Bukkez, 
bausenez, and bulez to þe bonkkez hyȝed” (389-92). This identical reaction aligns man 
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and beast. Rather than praying, as might be expected, the Fleschly follow the impulse to 
protect their bodies and, like animals, seek out the highest ground possible in hopes that 
they might be spared.  
This parallel between mankind and animals intensifies when the poet explains 
that “alle cryed for care to þe Kyng of heuen, / Recouerer of þe Creator þay cryed 
vchone” (393-4). The lack of distinction between human and animal suggests that both 
cried out to God for aid, maintaining this correspondence with their mirrored reactions. 
Humans have become something else in God’s eyes – undistinguished from animals – as 
a result of their disordered behavior.110 After the flood takes its toll, the poet reveals “on 
folde no flesch styryed” (403). As God did not distinguish between mankind and animal 
when deciding to destroy all flesh, in death there is no differentiation between human and 
animal. Both were made from flesh, and both, when condemned, are simply categorized 
as Flesch. The sins of the flesh – transgressing the laws of nature – push humans down 
from their privileged position and leave them aligned with doomed animals. Rather than 
being defined by their capacity for salvation, humans reduced to Flesch are now defined 
by their corporeality.  
Ironically, though the antediluvian world’s sins are caused by mixing humans, 
angels, giants, and possibly animals in sexually deviant ways, this same world is cleansed 
in an act of extreme mixing, and by extension of severe disordering. The waters 
enveloping the earth “bolned þe abyme, and bonkez con ryse, / Waltes out vch walle-
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 Because animals are not subject to the same rules or orders as humankind, it seems odd to align 
disordered behavior with animality. However, animals signify ambivalently in many medieval texts. They 
are at once innocent – incapable of committing sin or behaving in an “unnatural” way because they lack the 
rational capacity to understand these concepts – but also carry a negative association: when human beings 
behave in inhuman ways, they are frequently represented with excessive or gross elements of animal life to 
mark their degradation.  
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heued in ful wode stremez; / Watz no brymme þat abod vnbrosten bylyue” (363-5). In 
human settlements, “Water wylger ay wax, wonez þat stryede, / Hurled into vch hous, 
hent þat þer dowelled” (375-6). Breaking boundaries, destroying structures created to 
maintain a specific social order, and allowing all of these elements to mingle together in a 
soupy blend of rubble and raging water seems like a strange way for a God aiming for 
order to proceed. However, in what can be read as an analogy for the whole boundary-
breaking world itself, the poet asserts “when þe water of þe welkyn with þe worlde mette, 
/ Alle þat deth moȝt dryȝe drowned þerinne” (371-2). When inappropriate mixing of 
elements happens, it must be stopped. The waters from Heaven have met and mixed with 
the earth, and therefore the whole world must drown.111 This is reminiscent of and could 
be a direct reference to the fallen angels mixing through intercourse with antediluvian 
women: material from the heavens meeting and blending with the world, a disorderly act 
that must be corrected. By enveloping the world in floodwaters, God is not only 
preventing further sins against nature, as the sinners are dead, but is reasserting control 
over and containment of his world. It is, as the poet makes clear, inside the floodwaters 
themselves that mortals perish, and therefore within the reaches of God’s order. The 
drowning becomes a washing – a cleansing.  
Only after the floodwaters have calmed and land is again visible do dietary 
practices become instrumental in defining filth and cleanness, which the poet achieves 
through one negative and one positive example.112 Though Noah remains inside the ark, 
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 The sinful antediluvians’ actions have affected their environment, producing giants and causing a flood, 
and so their surroundings must also be cleansed. The mixture God creates of heavens and earth mirrors the 
miscegenation that initially caused the flood, and the washing the floodwaters achieve wipes the earth clean 
of any lasting effects bodily sins have engendered upon it.   
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 I will return to the positive example in the next section of the chapter. 
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per God’s orders, until he and his family are called forth, he sends a raven out as a 
messenger to determine the state of the world after God rescinds the waters (498). Right 
away, the bird is called rebellious and untrue, but also “so renk,” foreshadowing the 
unclean meal he consumes (455). Forgetting – or ignoring – Noah’s request to return if 
dry land can be found, the raven “croukez for comfort when carayne he fyndez / Kast vp 
on a clyffe þer costese lay drye; / He hade þe smelle of þe smach and smoltes þeder sone, 
/ Fallez on þe foule flesch and fyllez his wombe” (459-62). He takes delight in the 
sensory, and therefore carnal, aspects of his meal, feeling comfort at the sight, smell, and 
taste of meat putrefied after drowning in the flood. His uncleanness in eating carrion may 
also extend to cannibalistic practice, as “foule” can mean foulness or uncleanliness, but 
its homophone “fowl” indicates a bird.113 Since “flesch” can indicate any number of types 
of meat, it could be that the raven is feasting on bird-flesh: happily eating his own kind.  
In a curious link between the transgressive sexual practices of the antediluvians 
and the poor eating practices the raven exemplifies, this unclean eating offers hints that 
the raven’s future could be non-procreative as a result of his appetite. He fills his 
“wombe” with carrion which clearly indicates a digestive act. However, because 
“wombe” is implicated in regeneration,114 the audience is reminded that the task of the 
animals on the ark is repopulation: to ensure species preservation now that their voyage 
in the ark has guaranteed their individual preservation. The raven’s actions illustrate a 
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 The oral tradition of Middle English poetry, still relatively recent at the time Cleanness was likely 
composed, makes homophones important alternate meanings to consider. Both because poetry was often 
performed, and because even when reading to themselves people pronounced the words aloud, the sounds 
of words always contributed to their meaning.  
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 In addition to its digestive definitions, “wombe” can also mean “(a) The human uterus, womb; also fig.; 
specif. the womb of the Virgin Mary; also, the vaginal canal, vagina [quot. a1450 Diseases Women(2)]; ~ 
gate, the vulva; fruit (wastme) of ~, offspring; (b) the uterus of an animal or a fowl; (c) fig. ?a progenitor” 
(MED, w mb(e [n.] 5a).  
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misinterpretation of the type of sustenance now required. Cementing his error, rather than 
returning to the ark where, presumably, a mate awaits him, he “raykez hym forth, þat 
reches ful lyttel / How alle fodez þer fare, ellez he fynde mete” (465-6). Striking off alone 
into a deserted world may allow him to find food, but it will not allow him to fulfill 
God’s requirement for the postdiluvian survivors: perpetuating his species.  
Like the raven, failure to understand God’s procreative requirement stands out 
strongly as the sin of the Sodomites as well. Charlotte Morse has pointed out that charges 
of sexual sin in the Middle Ages often went hand in hand with charges of heresy. By 
attempting to accost the angels God sends to observe them, the men of Sodom become 
sodomites and heretics, refusing to respect God’s order (Morse 24). Because nature was 
considered to be the second book of God, sinning against nature was also rejecting God. 
However, as with the antediluvians, the tendency by critics to bracket the Sodomites’ 
problem as ultimately “homosexual” seems limiting and incomplete. Rather, part of their 
heretical, disordered behavior is the problem of mixing in their sexual choices, instead of 
taking the “natural” path offered by Lot’s daughters. Frantzen suggests that not only do 
the Sodomites engage in sodomy; their actions confuse their genders. When God 
describes the Sodomites’ sin to Abraham, he says “þay han founden in her flesch of 
fautez þe werst: / Vch male matz his mach a man as hymseluen, / And fylter folyly in fere 
on femmalez wyse” (694-96). The specific sin here is carnal, since God cites “flesch” as 
the source of the fault, and marks a movement away from recognizable categories; the 
Sodomites have become Flesch, turning away from God and inward to their own bodies. 
Frantzen specifies that male-male intercourse requires men to couple “in the fashion of 
women,” by which he means that at least one of the pair has to defy his naturally given 
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gender behavior and take a passive sexual role conventionally ascribed to a woman (456). 
Lot’s offer of his daughters clarifies that women are supposed to be “manned,” not that 
men are supposed to take a female role, and this confusion of gender behavior clearly 
upsets the natural order by allowing constructed behaviors to slide and blend.  
The other form of inappropriate mixing the Sodomites attempt, however, which is 
not adequately addressed by existing criticism, is the same kind of interspecies mixing 
that occurs in the antediluvian episode.115 Though the angels have very attractive and 
perhaps even feminine features, in this poem the outside reflects the inside; they are 
described this way to emphasize their purity. Their “berdles chynnez, / Ryol rollande fax 
to raw sylk lyke, / Of ble as þe brere-flour whereso þe bare schewed… Of alle feturez ful 
fyn and fautlez boþe” are not necessarily intended to make them attractive to the audience 
or to the men of Sodom, but to show that their bodies match their essence (789-91, 794). 
After all, as the poet goes on to explain, “Watz non aucly in ouþer, for aungels hit wern” 
(795). They are not capable of being perverse in appearance or behavior because they are 
angels. Their features are faultless because their souls are faultless, and it seems 
important to consider this as the major reason the men of Sodom may not fornicate with 
them. Like the angels in the antediluvian episode, if Lot’s guests engaged in sexual 
relations with human beings it would disrupt God’s order. Though the angels in the 
antediluvian episode were both fallen and mated with women, it is clear that because the 
products of these unions were giants these were transgressive sexual encounters. 
Similarly, the problem for the Sodomites is not only their male-male sexual practice, but 
their desire for the angels. They explain to Lot their wish to “lere hym of lof, as oure lyst 
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biddez, / As is þe asyse of Sodomas to seggez þat passen,” and in their attempt to do so 
they attack God’s order by refusing the maidens Lot offers, and by literally trying to force 
their way inside Lot’s house (843-44).116  
Because the men of Sodom are not welcome in Lot’s house, when “In grete 
flokkez of folk þay fallen to his ȝatez; / As a scowte-wach scarred so þe asscry rysed; / 
With kene clobbez of þat clos þay clatrez on þe wowez,” their attempted forced entry 
mirrors their desired rape of the angels (837-39).117 The men of the city “Alle þat weppen 
myȝt welde, þe wakker and þe stronger, / To vmbelyȝe Lothez hous þe ledez to take” 
(835-36). Using their numbers to surround and their weapons to threaten violence upon 
Lot’s house, they are working to create a breach in the protection he has provided for the 
angels. Because their desire is access to what is on the inside, their goal is to cross Lot’s 
threshold, just as they wish to transgress the angels’ body margins. Even when it becomes 
clear that Lot, his family, and the angels are safe inside the house, the men of Sodom 
“lest of Lotez logging any lysoun to fynde” (887). Barred from physical entrance, they 
still try to transgress the privacy of the house by trying to catch a glimpse inside through 
the protective walls themselves. “Lysoun” resonates with the idea of a wound, 
anticipating the men’s violence. Theirs is so disturbing a desire – sodomy blended with 
cross-species mating and now attempted rape – even the natural world reflects how 
disordered they are. The “fylþe” the men spew at Lot’s gate is so foul “Þat ȝet þe wynd 
and þe weder and þe worlde stynkes / Of þe brych þat vpbraydez þose broþelych wordez” 
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 Calling the angels “seggez” here suggests the Sodomites do not recognize the angels for what they are: 
“seggez” are men, as I discussed in the previous chapter. Still, their desire for these particular bodies is 
disorderly because they are not of the same “kynde.”  
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 Though “flokkez” may be a necessary word choice to preserve the alliteration and can be used to 
indicate groups of human beings, its primary definition according to the MED is in reference to animals, 
reflecting the Sodomites’ categorization as Flesch and their animal impulse toward pleasure. 
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(847-48). The sin inside these men is so powerful it has the capacity to taint the outside; 
they throw off the normal order of nature by making it actually stink.  
Though she is not as violent in her attempt, Lot’s wife also transgresses 
boundaries to create an improper mixture when she leavens and salts the angels’ food. 
Though the angels themselves cannot be tainted by human food, this episode is a 
reminder of food’s contaminating potential. Upon ingestion, food is transferred but also 
translated: digestion, saliva, and internal fluids change its chemical makeup and it 
becomes, at least in part, integrated into the body. For Lot’s wife, the dangers in this 
transferal and translation are twofold: her food contains impurities, and she has purposely 
disregarded her husband’s orders. Lot tells her “with no sour ne no salt serues hym 
neuer,” but his wife “sayde softely to hirself: ‘Þis vnsaueré hyne / Louez no salt in her 
sauce; ȝet hit no skyl were / Þat oþer burne be boute, þaȝ boþe be nyse.’ / Þenne ho 
sauerez with salt her seuez vchone, / Agayne þe bone of þe burne þat hit forboden hade” 
(820, 822-26). Not only is this direct disobedience to an order, but because it involves 
food crossing body margins, it also involves an improper movement of material from 
exterior to interior. The inclusion of yeast is polluting because yeast is an element used in 
fermentation, and fermentation is a form of corruption (Gollancz xxvi). As an agent of 
corruption, yeast is not appropriate for the pure angels to consume. 
While the prohibition of salt is not as immediately obvious, it does carry 
connotations both of disobedience and of blending.118 When Adam and Eve are cast out 
of Eden, Adam is told he must work by the sweat of his brow. The salinity of sweat 
creates a connection between salt and toil as a result of disobedience. Furthermore, once a 
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omit salt or seasoning from the Mazzah” (90). 
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seasoning like salt has been added to food, it permeates the dish and cannot be separated 
or removed again. This blending of ingredients constitutes a mixing between inner and 
outer that cannot be undone, a process repeated by consumption of food and its 
translation into the body. Additionally, salt is a preservative. By adding it to food, Lot’s 
wife may subconsciously be expressing a wish to extend her physical life beyond what 
God might have allotted. This idea of inappropriate preservation is interesting to consider 
in relation to the word “vnsaueré” used to describe Lot’s wife’s reaction to her husband’s 
command. Though in its most obvious translation this word means “unsavory,” it also 
carries resonances of both saving and knowing. Saving oneself, as the idea of 
preservation suggests, could be an act of disobedience because it does not show trust in 
and dependence on God to do what is right. The accent on the final “e” suggests French 
language and pronunciation, which links “vnsaueré” to the French “savoire.” This 
reference to knowledge reminds us of Adam and Eve’s exile from Eden as a result of 
eating from the tree of knowledge, and Adam’s consequential requirement to expel salty 
sweat as he works to grow food and sustain life. Lot’s wife’s preference for savory food 
may indicate a subconscious desire for excess knowledge, another reference to 
disobedience and therefore disorderly behavior.  
Though her act of adding yeast and salt to the angels’ food constitutes 
inappropriate mixing, it is her continual disobedience which ultimately results in Lot’s 
wife’s unique form of punishment. She has already disobeyed her husband, and when she 
disobeys the angels directly she becomes truly disorderly and therefore in need of 
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correction.119 Though the angels hurry the family along and warn them not to look back 
at Sodom, Lot’s wife both dallies and “ouer her lyfte schulder / Ones ho bluschet to þe 
burȝe, bot bod ho no lenger / Þat ho nas stadde a stiffe ston, a stalwarth image, / An so 
salt as ani se – and so ho ȝet standez” (981-84).120 Her fate is an ironic reflection of the 
poem’s main themes. After admitting her desire for salt, and presumably her frequent 
consumption of it, her exterior has come to perfectly reflect her interior. Because salt, 
once it has been incorporated, cannot be removed, Lot’s wife’s humanness has dissolved 
into salinity, as if the briny liquid contained within her body evaporated, leaving behind 
only the salt she disobediently consumed.  
A salt statue is inarguably not human. However, Lot’s wife’s concentration on the 
fleshly and therefore her movement away from humanness is also reflected by her fate in 
another way. When the poet directs our view back to Lot’s wife, he explains that though 
Lot and his two daughters escaped, Lot’s wife:  
watz myst, þat on þe mount lenged  
In a stonen statue þat salt sauor habbes,  
For two fautes þat þe fol watz founde in mistrauþe: 
On, ho serued at þe soper salt bifore Dryȝtyn, 
And syþen, ho blusched hir bihynde, þaȝ hir forboden were;  
For on ho standes a ston, and salt for þat oþer,  
And alle lyst on hir lik þat arn on launde bestes. (994-1000)  
 
Because she has succumbed to her fleshly desire, she has ceased to be human and now 
serves as food for animals, one of the resonances of the Flesch she has become. Not only 
is her outside now reflective of her inside in the sense that both are salty, but just as she 
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 Lot’s orders presumably result from his ability to recognize the angels. That he has this ability seems to 
mark him as an approved and obedient servant of God, and therefore a part of God’s established order. 
Therefore disobeying an order from him is by extension ignoring an order from God.   
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 That it is her left shoulder she glances back over has interesting implications as well, as the Latin 
sinister, sinistra suggests negative connotations. Looking over her left shoulder rather than her right 
emphasizes again the wife’s inappropriate, disobedient behavior.   
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was inwardly interested only in consumption, she will now be eternally consumed. 
Though she is no longer made of human flesh, recalling the resonance of Flesch as 
carrion is helpful here, as she is now eaten by lowly animals, her saltiness incorporated 
into their bodies to help maintain them. 
Like Lot’s wife, the fate of the Sodomites left behind also reflects their insides, 
and like their effect on the weather as they assaulted Lot’s house, this reflection is 
enacted on the environment. As Twomey points out, scriptural tradition metaphorically 
represents Sodom’s unfaithfulness as spiritual sterility (121). The main sin the Sodomites 
committed was desire for and enactment of nonprocreative sex, whether between men or 
between men and angels. Therefore, to reflect this inner sterility, the formerly rich 
geographical area must be cleansed through sterilization. Sodom “euer hade ben an erde 
of erþe þe swettest, / As aparaunt to paradis, þat planted þe Dryȝtyn,” but the poet asserts 
that God’s punishment “watz a uengaunce violent þat voyded þise places, / Þat foundered 
hatz so fayr a folk and þe folde sonkken” (1006-7, 1013-14). With the fall of its formerly 
fair inhabitants, the Edenic land itself literally sinks.  
Because the city itself was not procreative, the Dead Sea, which Sodom becomes, 
supports no life. The poet describes the sea as “brod and boþemlez, and bitter as þe galle, 
/ And noȝt may lenge in þat lake þat any lyf berez, / And alle þe costez of kynde hit 
combrez vchone” (1022-24). Just as human and animal bodies were equated as simply 
flesh during the flood, here too the poet does not specify solely a lack of human life, but a 
lack of any life at all. This suggests that with their disorder and loss of rational behavior, 
the Sodomites, like the antediluvians, are equated with all undifferentiated mortal things. 
The Dead Sea is God’s environmental reaction to the Sodomites’ desire to mix with the 
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angels, like the flood was to the antediluvians’ sins “again kynde.” In each case, Fleschly 
status is understood not only by their interaction with other sentient beings, but also by 
their connection with the environment. While the flood destroyed life caught up in it, the 
Dead Sea corrupts the natural qualities of submerged objects. Lead floats, feathers sink, 
and waves that wash up on the shore kill any plant life they touch (1025-29).   
In a final sign of Sodom’s lack of productivity, the poet describes fruit trees 
growing on the shores of the Dead Sea. As the residents of Sodom have been “rostted and 
brenned” by the acid rain God sent, the soil these trees grow in “fel fretes þe flesch and 
festres bones” (958, 1040).121 The trees themselves bear beautiful, gem-like fruit, but 
“quen hit is brused oþer broken, oþer byten in twynne, / No worldez goud hit wythinne, 
bot wyndowande askes,” which the poet explains signifies “Þat oure Fader forþrede for 
fylþe of þose ledes” (1047-48, 1051). Here the consequences for transgressing boundaries 
seem quite clear: violently breaking into these fruits, whether by hand or in the act of 
eating, results not in exposing edible flesh and seeds with reproductive potential, but in 
dead ashes, emphasizing the sterility of the environment. Not only are the fruits incapable 
of creating new life; they are incapable of providing sustenance to anyone foolish enough 
to consume them. Any form of sustaining life – through individual digestion and through 
species reproduction – becomes impossible. God has again determined that the only way 
to halt sins of the Flesch is to eradicate entirely the Flesch guilty of those sins.122  
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 Interestingly the language used to describe the Sodomites’ deaths is food language: roasting and burning 
are often activities performed on meat, one of the definitions of “flesch.”  This emphasizes not only their 
degradation, but the need to treat Flesch as a multiplicitous category. 
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 This may be an explanation for the diminishing scope of punishment in the three homilies the poem 
presents: in the antediluvian episode, as I have argued, all mortal creatures become Flesch except Noah and 
his family, and therefore the entire earth is wiped clean. In the Sodom episode, only the sinful members of 
the four corrupt cities are decimated, and at Belshazzar’s feast, only Belshazzar and possibly his guests 
meet with their demise.  
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The poem’s final negative exemplum, which explicates the stories of Belshazzar’s 
feast and Nebuchadnezzar’s bestial transformation, examines the dangers of mixture 
between inside and outside through sexual and alimentary examples. The poet represents 
this polluting mixture with clean, pure temple vessels being used for unclean purposes. 
The consequences for this uncleanness are played out in Belshazzar, the perpetrator, and 
his fall from rationality into Flesch. The poet suggests, as in the case of the angles in 
Sodom, pure things should not be used in impure ways, perhaps because the danger of 
pollution through this interaction always exists. To create this juxtaposition, Belshazzar is 
presented as a creature of prideful greed, and his faults lie in his sexual and alimentary 
habits. He is introduced as a man who holds his kingdom “In lust and in lecherye and 
loþelych werkkes” (1350). To satisfy himself sexually, he not only has “a wyf for to 
welde, a worþelych quene,” but also “mony a lemman, neuer þe later, þat ladis wer 
called” (1351, 1352). Throughout the episode these “lemmans” are also referred to as 
concubines and wenches, and the poet emphasizes that they are “called” ladies, 
suggesting that this title is not reflective of their actual characters. The poet explains that 
Belshazzar’s motive for hosting his elaborate banquet is in part for visitors to “loke on his 
lemanes and ladis hem calle,” again emphasizing the discrepancy between inside and 
outside (1370). Whether they are lacking in honor because they have become 
Belshazzar’s adulterous lovers or because they are simply sinful by nature is unclear, but 
Belshazzar represents them as something they are not, and therefore their true identities 
are masked by a false exterior.123 Belshazzar is also described as dwelling on 
“misschapen þinges,” adding to the likelihood that his “ladis,” like many of his 
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 In this sense Belshazzar’s concubines are much like the idols he worships: heavily adorned on the 
outside but tainted on the inside.  
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possessions, are in some way flawed and do not match the outer glorification he attaches 
to them (1355). That he has a wife to satisfy his needs as well as multiple concubines 
suggests Belshazzar’s sexual proclivities are disorderly due to gluttony as well as lechery.  
Gluttonous in digestive habits as well, Belshazzar desires “new metes” and 
indulgences immoderately in wine (1354, 1421). He supplies excessive abundance to his 
guests, as “Burnes berande þe bredes vpon brode skeles / Þat here of sylueren syȝt, and 
served þerwyth” (1405-6). It is not enough for them to be served once, but “So watz 
served fele syþe þe sale alle aboute” (1417). Further, when the sacred vessels, taken from 
Israel’s holiest temple, are used as drinking cups, Belshazzar arranges that his servants 
“Kyppe kowpes in honde kyngez to serue; / In bryȝt bollez ful bayn birlen þise oþer, / 
And vche mon for his mayster machches alone” (1510-12). Bountiful wine, incredible 
quantities of food, and enough labor for each guest to have his own individual servant 
speaks to the excess of Belshazzar’s court. This is a king intent on gorging his animalistic 
desires; his interests lie above all in pleasurable sex and feasting. Sex and eating may be 
required to sustain life, but they must be done properly to maintain human status, rather 
than causing a descent into disorderly and undifferentiated flesh.  
The pleasure Belshazzar demands is the root of his move toward Fleschliness. In 
his examination of the psychology of human acts, Thomas Aquinas explains “There are 
degrees in being transformed by passion. It may go so far as to bind the reason 
completely, as happens when vehement rage or concupiscence makes a man beside 
himself or out of his mind… In this condition men become like beasts, driven of 
necessity by passion; they are without the motion of reason” (X.3). Aquinas claims 
physical pleasure can impede reason on three levels: distraction, disordering, and outright 
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fettering (Pleasure XXXIII.3). When Belshazzar, set on feeding physical pleasure, 
demands wine, “Þen þe dotel on dece drank þat he myȝt,” and his guests follow suit until 
all are drunkenly groveling on the floor (1517). Though the MED defines “dotel” as “a 
fool,” “an idiot” or adjectively as “silly,” the suggestion of compromised mental faculties 
also seems plausible (“d tel” [n.] MED). Aquinas deems psychological ailments 
unnatural because they are a disturbance of man’s natural properties. He explains that 
because rationality is part of man’s God-given nature, for a man to be rational is natural. 
Irrationality, therefore, is unnatural because it departs from the expected state for the 
species (Pleasure XXXI.7). In Belshazzar’s case, this unnatural irrational behavior 
constitutes disorder. Drinking too much wine – an act of disorderly consumption – is the 
catalyst in Belshazzar’s downward spiral away from rationality and into identification 
with Flesch.124 Belshazzar’s reason is impeded by his drunkenness, and only after the 
wine “breyþed vppe into his brayn and blemyst his mynde” does he decide to desecrate 
the sacred temple vessels and thereby incur God’s wrath for his uncleanness (1420).  
Belshazzar’s bodily reactions during the feast allude to his animalistic qualities. 
When he decides to use the temple vessels to serve wine, he tells his stewards to “Bryng 
hem now to my borde, of beuerage hem fylles, / Let þise ladyes of hem lape – I luf hem 
in hert” (1433-34). That the poet uses the word “lap” to describe how Belshazzar’s 
concubines will drink from the vessels signals a kind of animality about Belshazzar’s 
court on top of the already inappropriate behavior of drinking from sacred goblets at a 
secular feast. People do not lap liquids, animals do. As Edward Wilson has pointed out, 
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 For a comparison of drunkenness described as animalistic, see Chaucer’s Manciple’s Prologue: the 
Manciple tells the Cook “I trowe that ye drunken han wyn ape” (44). To be “ape drunk” was one of four 
stages of drunkenness or its effects compared to animals. In addition to an ape, one could be drunk like a 
lamb, a lion, or a sow (Benson 953).  
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“lapen” is a verb usually associated with animals rather than humans, particularly with 
dogs. This association has particular resonance for Cleanness, as Belshazzar is later 
described as a dog in a ditch after he is killed (Wilson 111). When he is beaten to death 
by the invading Medes, “boþe his blod and his brayn blende on þe cloþes,” marking 
another unclean transgression of body margins and mixing of inner with outer, and then 
“The kyng in his cortyn watz katȝ bi þe heles, / Feryed out bi þe fete and fowle dispysed. 
/ Þat watz so doȝty þat day and drank of þe vessayl / Now is a dogge also dere þat in a 
dych lygges” (1788, 1789-92). Though his physical shape has not changed, Belshazzar’s 
loss of rationality results in animalistic representation by the text. Michael Twomey notes 
that in the Old Testament, dogs are considered the most unclean animals because they are 
scavengers and dwell on the margins of camps (131). Not only are they marginal and 
therefore capable of polluting the areas they frequent, per Douglas, but they are widely 
known as animals which “return to their own vomit,” a disgusting and twice disordered 
alimentary act. The multiplicitous resonances of “flesch” include not only human and 
animal meat but also carrion, so equating Belshazzar’s worth to that of a dead dog – an 
unclean, despised animal – speaks to the seriousness of his degradation. By reducing 
himself to simply Flesch, Belshazzar is now likened to an animal Biblically relegated to 
the edges of society, reveling in death and impurity.125  
Even before his death, Belshazzar’s fear aligns him more closely with the animal 
world than the human. When the supernatural writing on his palace wall frightens him, he 
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 Though Belshazzar’s death is the most noticeable, God does seem to exact judgment on his sinful 
courtiers as well. As the Medes enter the city, they disturb no one. Only inside the palace “Segges slepende 
were slayne er þay slyppe myȝt” (1785). It seems only those who attended that gluttonous banquet are 
slaughtered, upholding the idea that God only punishes those contaminated by fleshly sin. Since 
Belshazzar’s feast takes place in a closed palace, his sins do not instigate the same kind of environmental 
pollution as in the Flood and Sodom episodes. 
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“with plattyng his paumes dispyses his leres, / And roymes as a rad ryth þat rorez for 
drede” (1542-43). As if anticipating the story of his father King Nebuchadnezzar’s 
punishment, Belshazzar emits animal noises and tears at his clothing, as though rejecting 
this civilizing human practice. Finally, Belshazzar himself not only reminds the audience 
of his animalistic desires and reactions, but evokes his own degradation by referring to 
himself as Flesch. When he finally regains speech and describes his reaction to the 
writing on the wall, he says the event “al hit frayes my flesche” (1553). Though it is true 
that all living beings are made of flesh, and thus Belshazzar could be commenting on his 
trembling fear, the way the poet has used the term throughout Cleanness seems to imply 
something more than muscular bodily composition. Belshazzar is not referring to spiritual 
concern, but physicality. His “flesch” is frightened, not his soul, presumably because it is 
lost to him. Belshazzar’s admission of Fleschliness confirms not only his entry into 
disorganized Flesch but, given the king’s interests in fornication and gluttonous 
consumption, his embrace of that fleshly filth in all his activities.  
Belshazzar’s composition as tainted Flesch is an example of the type of mixing 
the poet introduces in this episode: impure bodies soiling pure material. The vessels made 
to serve God must be clean, and should not be used to serve a fallen human being for his 
own gluttonous, prideful purposes, especially if those purposes are to ensure a more 
pleasurable physical life, rather than spiritual afterlife. The poem emphasizes the purity 
and cleanness of the vessels and clearly contrasts them against Belshazzar’s impurity and 
animality. The vessels are matchless, made with God-given skill “For to compass and 
kest to haf hem clene wroȝt” (1455). They are carefully and precisely manufactured in 
order to be pure, and they are described as clean (or with synonyms meaning “clean” or 
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“pure”) throughout the episode. Belshazzar drunkenly “comaundes [his marshal] cofly 
coferes to lauce, / And fech forþ þe vessel þat his fader broȝt, / Nabugodenozar, noble in 
his strenþe, / Conquerd with his knȝtes and of kyrk rafte” (1428-31). Here we should note 
both the folly of Belshazzar’s actions and the holy origin of the vessels: objects from a 
temple are pure items meant to serve God, not to bring pleasure to a gluttonous, 
animalistic pagan.   
The vessels themselves, as if providing a visual warning about the consequences 
of unclean usage, further the descent into Fleschliness Belshazzar’s behavior displays. As 
they are described, an impression of jungle-like wildness is created in the hall. The 
candlestick Belshazzar lights has  
boȝes bryȝt þerabof, brayden of golde,  
Braynches bredande þeron, and bryddes þer seten  
Of mony koynt kyndes, of fele kyn hues, 
As þay with wynge vpon wynde hade waged her fyþeres. 
Inmong þe leues of þe lyndes lampes wer grayþed, 
And oþer louflych lyȝt þat lemed ful fayre. 
As mony morteres of wax merkked withoute 
With mony a borlych best al of brende golde. (1481-88) 
 
Though these are descriptions of the candlestick and the altar carrying it, the flickering 
light and the natural images give the impression that Belshazzar’s hall is suddenly full of 
wind and flapping birds, bordered at the ceiling by tree branches, and lit between the 
leaves of these boughs by lamps as well as the candles. That the altar and lamps are 
decorated with carved beasts and birds rather than faithful followers suggests the 
increasing animality of Belshazzar’s hall, pushed on by his loss of reason and submission 
to a pursuit of pleasure.  
The prophet Daniel cements the problem of irrational, disorderly mixing in this 
episode when he explains Belshazzar is guilty of “hofen þy hert agaynes þe hyȝe Dryȝtyn, 
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/ With bobaunce and with flasfamye bost and Hym kest, / And now His vessayles avyled 
in vanyté vnclene” (1711-13). Daniel cites vanity as Belshazzar’s polluting feature, but 
“vanyté” can also be translated as “folly,” which in this case seems equally appropriate; 
most of Belshazzar’s choices seem to be made by animal instinct or passing desire rather 
than the considered reason of a rational human or the pious faith of a clean Christian. The 
poet closes the episode by commenting: “þe fylþe of þe freke þat defowled hade / Þe 
ornementes of Goddez hous þat holy were maked. / He watz corsed for his vnclannes, 
and cached þerinne” (1798-1800). Belshazzar’s filth has actually affected the purity of 
the vessels, making what was clean tainted by using them in a way other than what God 
intended: serving wine to concubines in sacred goblets disrupts their intended use and 
thereby pollutes them.126  
Belshazzar’s behavior, both profane toward the vessels and animalistic in its 
pursuit of pleasure, is interestingly contrasted against his father Nebuchadnezzar. 
Whereas Belshazzar misuses and therefore pollutes the vessels, Nebuchadnezzar treats 
them correctly. The poet explains that even though Nebuchadnezzar takes them from the 
temple, he “sesed hem with solemneté, þe Souerayn he praysed / Þat watz aþel ouver alle, 
Israel Dryȝtyn; / Such god, such gounes, such gay vesselles… He trussed hem in his 
treorye in a tryed place, / Rekenly, with reuerens, as he ryȝt hade” (1313-15, 1317-18). 
Not only does he treat the vessels as the sacred treasures they are, but he acts within 
God’s commands and therefore is part of the proper order of events. It is only when 
Nebuchadnezzar’s pride causes him to declare himself as powerful as God that he 
disrupts order and must be corrected. An attempt to become Godlike is an inappropriate 
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 Morse concurs, stating “Belshazzar draws upon himself the judgment of God by committing sacrilege 
on the holy vessels: polluted himself, he spreads his pollution to the vessels by touching them and drinking 
from them” (198).  
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act of mixing; by assuming he is approaching the divine, Nebuchadnezzar must be shown 
how truly imperfect and fallen he is.  
Though both Nebuchadnezzar and Belshazzar display a gustatory animalism, 
Nebuchadnezzar’s punishment, like his treatment of the vessels, serves as a contrast to 
Belshazzar’s disorderly behavior. To correct Nebuchadnezzar’s pride, God determines 
the king will “in asturne walk and with þe wylde dowelle, / As best, byte on þe bent of 
braken and erbes, / Wyth wroþe wolfes to won and with wylde asses” (1674-76). In the 
description the poet’s Daniel provides, the former king “fares forth on alle faure, fogge 
watz his mete, / And ete ay as a horce when erbes were fallen” (1683-84). Not only must 
he dwell with animals, but Nebuchadnezzar’s status falls to something like an irrational 
wild man. Unlike the irreversible degradations the other characters in Cleanness suffer, 
which feature unchanged physical form but altered textual representation, 
Nebuchadnezzar’s fall is marked by a change in stature. Augustine claims men walk 
upright with their faces turned toward the heavens, and this indicates their upright 
behavior (City of God XIV.11). Animals, conversely, walk on all fours with their faces 
turned to the earth, indicating their inability to transcend worldly matters of sustenance. 
Nebuchadnezzar forages on all fours and his “hert heldet vnhole; he hoped non oþer / Bot 
a best þat he be” (1681-82). He has even forgotten his former humanness in his loss of 
reason. For Nebuchadnezzar, this new stature is marked by his survival-level 
concentration on food, which is detailed in the descriptions of his punishment, both from 
the poet’s Daniel’s point of view as the storyteller and from God.  
Consumption, as a permeation of body margins from outside to inside, is an 
animal behavior. However, Nebuchadnezzar’s change in stature makes him different 
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from the other Fleschly characters in Cleanness: his condition is reversible. Because his 
animalistic consumption occurs as a result of God’s punishment, not as the cause, 
Nebuchadnezzar is not reduced to Fleschliness the same way his son Belshazzar is. Most 
of the problems suffered in Cleanness involve improper or disorderly acts of sex or 
eating, but these disorderly acts themselves are the reason behind the fall away from 
humanness, which results in either textual alignment with “lesser” beings or in death. 
Because Nebuchadnezzar is physically altered to teach him a lesson, his animality is 
more certain than the characters caught in irrational behavior but human form. “Flesch” 
as a category brought on by disorderly sex and eating is an attempt to name and define 
these confusing figures. The very multiplicity within the category, however, troubles its 
borders and its incorporation of necessary activities keeps the Fleschly close to the 
human. The abject always lurks on the edges of humanness, because it is part of 
embodied human life no matter how firmly we attempt to repudiate it. The poem seems to 
infer that while sex and eating are required to sustain life, in order to maintain human 
status in this life, these acts of incorporation must be done properly: according to God’s 
order, and without unclean mixing. Human status is thus perched on a precarious 
behavior-based margin, trying to keep Fleschliness at bay.  
Orderly Service  
While the category of “flesch” in Cleanness results from disorderly behavior in 
the form of disobedient mixing, the characters who maintain human status avoid disorder 
in a slightly different way: they remain pure because they obey direct orders from God. 
Noah provides a perfect example of this obedience, as his orders are provided in the form 
of rigorous, detailed instructions. Because the problems God sees with the antediluvian 
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world involve sexual transgression in the form of mixing, his instructions for Noah 
clearly prevent this kind of blending from happening to the family he plans to save. The 
directions God gives Noah for the ark do not permit any kind of boundary transgression. 
He commands Noah: “make to þe a mancioun, and þat is My wylle, / A cofer closed of 
tres, clanlych planed. / Wyrk wonez þerinne for wylde and for tame, / And þenne cleme 
hit with clay comly withinne, / And alle þe endentur dryuen daube withouten” (309-13). 
Aside from the obvious practical need to caulk the ark securely against leaks, God seems 
set on Noah creating an absolutely chaste vessel, one that will prevent its occupants from 
being harmed or contaminated by the tainted condition of the world outside. When he has 
built the ark according to God’s directions, Noah is to “styfly stekez yow þerinne” while 
God will “sende out” the floodwaters over the sinful earth (352, 353, my emphasis).  
Not only does God want to prevent the contents of Noah’s perfectly caulked 
“cofer” from mixing with the water on the outside of the ark itself, but inside everything 
must also be perfectly ordered. The animals will be contained in their separate pens, and 
each will be perfectly and appropriately matched. God explains that he will only save 
eight human beings, and these eight in Noah’s family are perfectly paired off in 
heterosexual and presumably procreative couples.127 After explaining how many of each 
type of animal will be permitted, and that thus each species will be saved, God continues: 
“ay þou meng with þe malez þe mette ho-bestez, / Vche payre by payre to plese ayþer 
oþer” (337-8). Clearly within the ark there will be no disorderly sexual mixing; each 
animal will have only its predetermined mate to couple with, and no others. This 
linguistic concentration on mingling and mixing is absent from the Cleanness-poet’s 
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 God’s command for them to “Multeplyez on þis molde, and menske yow bytyde,” verifies both that they 
have the capacity to reproduce and that their appropriate and proper reproduction is required (523).   
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source; the Bible specifies keeping the animals on the ark in mated pairs, but the 
emphasis on only proper mixing is the poet’s own, part of his project of cleanness 
through ordering in the poem.128 Thus those who will rebuild the world, both human and 
animal, will be contained in proper order within the chastity and safety of the ark, 
prevented from the hybridity of cross-species mating inside and protected from the 
consequences of the transgressive behavior outside. Noah and his family’s status is 
confirmed when God reflects on the flood: the waters have “fourferde alle þe flesch þat 
He formed hade” (561). Since Noah and his family survive, they are clearly not Flesch as 
the other antediluvians are; they are safe because they have remained within God’s order.  
When Noah is finally permitted to exit the ark, obedience becomes not simply 
about obeying orders, but about providing service. His immediate action upon 
disembarking is to offer sacrifice to God. Rather than allowing all of the animals to roam 
free, Noah remembers God’s charge and “of vch honest kynde nem out an odde, / And 
heuened vp an auter and halȝed hit fayre, / And sette a sakerfyse þeron on vch a ser kynde 
/ Þat watz comly and clene: God kepez non oþer” (505-8). Each step of Noah’s process, 
from specially chosen animals to proper sacrificial procedure, is orderly and clean. 
Interestingly we do not see God receive the sacrifice in an embodied way. Roasting meat 
over a fire, as Noah does here, is easily interpreted as food preparation. However, God 
does not need to eat. His lack of physical interaction with the divine feast is indicative of 
the completeness humans lack; no outside materials are necessary for his continued 
existence. The poet instead offers an environmental reaction, noting that Noah’s 
sacrificial fire “bremly brened þose bestez, and þe breþe rysed” (509). God’s delight at 
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this pure feast is clear from the covenant he strikes with Noah, promising never again to 
destroy the world through flood, and his command for Noah, his family, and the animals 
they have preserved to “waxez now and wendez forth and worþez to monye, / Multyplyez 
on þis molde, and menske yow bytyde. / Sesounez shal yow neuer sese of sede ne of 
heruest” (521-3). Noah’s sacrifice is an instance of perfect consumption because it is 
divine eating and therefore not achievable by humans, whose intake of food designates 
imperfection. However, “serving” God provides an opportunity for absolute order, and 
allows for a positive form of consumption and incorporation. God’s order for procreation 
is linked to food production, as multiplication and harvest are mentioned in close 
proximity, which indicates that sex and consumption can be acceptable, even if they are 
not perfect.  
The metaphor of orderly service to God in the form of literally serving food 
continues in the Abraham episode, the second of the positive exempla the poet offers. 
When God in the form of the three travelers nears his house, Abraham immediately takes 
on the role of host but also willing servant. He approaches them immediately and says 
they should “vnder boȝe restted, / and I schal wynne Yow wyȝt of water a lyttel, / and fast 
aboute schal I fare Your fette wer waschene. / Resttez here on þis rote and I schal rachche 
after / And brynge a morsel of bred to baume Your hertte” (616-20). His first concern is 
providing physical sustenance for his guests, and since he seems to recognize them as 
divine and therefore not in need of food, his insistence on providing them the best food 
his household has to offer is simply his method of service. That the poet chooses to 
concentrate on food in his positive examples as well as his negative ones suggests its 
importance in depicting orderly behavior: clearly Abraham is a virtuous example, and we 
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can learn clean behavior from noticing how he interacts with food. Like Lot, Abraham 
issues orders to his wife regarding preparation. He commands her to act quickly and “Þre 
mettez of mele menge and ma kakez; / Vnder askez ful hote happe hem byliue” (625-26). 
Unlike Lot’s wife, Sarah follows directions and Abraham is able to serve his guests “þo 
þre þerue kakez” (635). Though he does not have to warn his wife to avoid salting or 
adding yeast to the meal, his ability to serve acceptable food indicates that Sarah follows 
his directions and thereby remains orderly in her behavior. Like Noah, Abraham’s 
dealings with food are marked by a lack of mixing. Sarah’s meal cakes are unleavened 
and therefore pure. Abraham spares no expense and chooses his best calf to serve, “Þat 
watz tender and not toȝe” (630). Lest the food he offers become dirtied through contact 
with the ground, he “Clechez to a clene cloþe and kestez on þe grene” on which to lay out 
the modest feast (634). He places “butter wythal and by þe bred settez,” allowing his 
guests to combine food products on their own (636). Everything he serves is appropriate 
and clean, from the “Mete messez of mylke he merkkez bytwene” to the “plater honest” 
on which he serves stew (637, 638).  
The link between clean consumption and chaste sexual activity is strengthened by 
Abraham’s reward for his excellent service. After he has attended to cleanness and 
obeyed orders, the men tell him “schal Saré consayue and a sun bere, / Þat schal be 
Abrahamez ayre and after hym wynne / Wyth wele and with worschyp þe worþely peple” 
(649-51). Since Sarah’s conception is a promise from God, the action required to produce 
this heir must by extension be acceptable and clean, even though it is sexual activity. To 
emphasize the capacity for cleanness with relation to sexual intercourse, the poet is 
careful to reveal that Abraham “wern of sadde elde, / Boþe þe wyȝe and his wyf, such 
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werk watz hem fayled / Fro mony a brod day byfore; ho barayn ay bydene, / Þat selue 
Saré, withouten sede into þat same tyme” (657-60). Knowing Sarah is barren and 
therefore their intercourse cannot be procreative, the couple remains celibate. Rather than 
succumbing to the physical pleasure of fornication, they live chastely because they are 
incapable of obeying the order to multiply God issued Noah’s descendants.  
Abraham’s divine guests confirm the possibility that intercourse can be positive 
in an enthusiastic description of the pleasures of married heterosexual sex.129 Moving 
toward Sodom, God declares that in heterosexual intercourse  
I compast [mankind] a kynde crafte and kende hit hem derne,  
And amed hit in Myn ordenaunce oddely dere,  
And dyȝt drwry þerinne, doole alþer-swettest, 
And þe play of paramorez I portrayed Myseluen,  
And made þerto a maner myriest of oþer: 
When two true togeder had tyȝed hemselven, 
Bytwene a male and his make such merþe schulde come, 
Welnyȝe pure paradys moȝt preue no better;  
Ellez þay moȝt honestly ayþer oþer welde, 
At a style stolen steuen, vnstered with syȝt,  
Luf-lowe hem bytwene lasched so hote 
Þat alle þe meschefez on mold moȝt hit not seke. (697-708) 
 
Notable in this description is not only the pleasure God affords appropriate sex but the 
explicit references to order and lack of pollution.130 Not only is sex a “kynde” activity, 
which indicates natural behavior as well as orderly practice within a single racial or 
species group, but it is honest, which carries connotations of propriety and fitting 
behavior. Finally, God declares heterosexual intercourse dear to him according to his 
ordinances. Though we now think of an ordinance as a rule or law provided by an 
authority, its primary definition in the MED is “order, regulated condition; spatial order, 
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 Frantzen considers the enthusiasm for intercourse to be a risky move in such a didactic poem (457). 
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 Calabrese and Eliason also draw attention to the enjoyment of heterosexual sex in this passage, citing it 
as a pedagogical tool to contrast the sin of sodomy (254-56).  
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proper arrangement,” highlighting the issue of organized propriety and therefore, for this 
poem, cleanness (“ordinaunce” [n.] MED). 
In addition to orderliness, God’s description of sex here emphasizes privacy and 
secrecy. It is both “derne” and “dere,” which indicates something intimate or private as 
well as something beloved (Andrews and Waldron 419). The insistence on privacy also 
carries connotations of containment. To remain unseen by others in a private place 
suggests a need to be closed off from the public. God emphasizes enclosure again in 
explaining how this gift was given: he gave love-making “þerinne,” which is the sweetest 
possible kind (699). As in the case of Noah’s ark, this insistence on containment and 
enclosure prevents against pollution. In a pleasurable act that sustains the body through 
procreation, guarding against pollution is particularly important, and here God explains 
exactly how to engage in this activity cleanly, in contrast to the single-sex public displays 
made by the residents of Sodom.  
Though humans are necessarily imperfect, the explanation of how to engage in 
clean sex and the examples Noah and Abraham provide of orderly service indicate that 
these activities, far from indicating animality, can be positive. Engaged in properly, sex 
can adhere to God’s orders, help sustain human life, and still not disrupt human status. 
No mention of “flesch” is made in describing either of these men’s activities. The poem’s 
best example of clean sexual and eating practices, however, deals not with the human but 
with the divine: the retelling of Christ’s birth and his ability to split bread without tools 
show the poem’s human audience true cleanness, which they should strive for even if 
they can never achieve it (1069-1109). The portrayals of the Nativity and Christ breaking 
bread are marked by a lack of the disorderly mixing that drives the negative examples in 
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the homilies of the Flood, Sodom, and Belshazzar’s feast. In a kind of intermission 
between the stories of Sodom and Belshazzar’s feast, the poet reminds the audience “He 
louyes clene layk þat is oure Lorde ryche” (1053). Translatable as “clean behavior” or 
“clean practice,” the idea that Christ loves “clene layk” in relation to the preceding 
negative exempla suggests clean behavior in sexual and alimentary matters. In opposition 
to the rape-like violence of the Sodomites, Christ’s conception and birth are both marked 
by the total lack of violence. When God “fro first þat He lyȝt withinne þe lel mayden, / 
By how comly a kest He watz clos þere, / When venkkyst watz no vergynyté, ne violence 
maked, / Bot much clener watz hir corse, God kynned þerinne” (1068-72). The complete 
lack of violence or blood involved in Mary’s impregnation suggests no penetration or 
transgression of body margins by outside material. With her body margins whole and not 
penetrated, Mary remains a virgin and is thus untainted by the act of sex.131 Because God 
has “kynned þerinne” without penetrating and therefore without transgressing Mary’s 
body margins, Christ can also be born completely cleanly, without being tainted by the 
violence and disorder of sex.132  
In the Nativity scene, the poet explains “þer watz seknesse al sounde þat sarrest is 
halden, / And þer watze rose relayr where rote hatz ben euer, / and þer watz solace and 
songe wher sorȝ hatz ay cryed… Þenne watz her blyþe Barne burnyst so clene… Þay 
knewe Hym by His clannes for Kyng of nature, / For non so clene of such a clos com 
neuer er þenne” (1078-80, 1085, 1087-88). Even if intercourse follows God’s ordinances, 
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 Michael Calabrese and Eric Eliason comment that the entire episode, from Mary’s impregnation through 
Christ’s birth, is “marked with a holy sanitation from beginning to end” (266). 
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 Because “kynned” can refer to the act of engendering as well as the more passive idea of someone being 
conceived, this word seems to artfully capture God’s simultaneous existence as Father and Son. Also, it 
suggests God’s ability to be inside and outside at once, allowing the poet to comment subtly on God’s 
omnipotence and omnipresence. 
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if it is human it is still imperfect. For Christ, however, conception can happen without the 
taint of sex, and therefore birth can be painless, odorless, and clean. In fact, it is Christ’s 
absolute cleanness which makes him recognizable even to the animals in the stable: his 
divinity is marked by an absence of filth. Born divinely clean, Christ lives completely 
clean: his exterior perfectly reflects his interior. Despite being born of a human woman, 
Christ is pure because he comes from Mary’s clean, unblemished womb. His exterior 
reflects both his own inner spiritual state, and Mary’s inner physical state.  
In life, as the poet describes, Christ is squeamish of filth and “By nobleye of His 
nurture He nolde neuer towche / Oȝt þat watz ungoderly oþer ordure watz inne” (1091-
92). Though this statement stresses that Christ will not touch filth, emphasizing that he 
particularly will not come in contact with something inwardly impure, the word “ordure” 
the poet has chosen has definite resonances with “order.”133 Even while explaining that 
Jesus Christ cannot bear to touch dirt, the poet reminds us this is because Christ, as a 
facet of the Trinity, requires order as an inner characteristic of his subjects. Rather than 
the multiplicity of Flesch, Christ and his followers seem defined by stricter boundaries: 
order and organization resulting in cleanness. It is interesting to consider that Christ’s 
unwillingness to touch filth might be a physical impossibility. When he comes in contact 
with lepers and other physically flawed people, “He heled hem with hynde speche of þat 
þay ask after, / for whatso He towched also tyd tourned to hele, / Wel clanner þen any 
crafte cowþe devyse” (1098-1100). Christ’s inner state affects these people’s exteriors, 
making their disordered bodies clean by his touch. As Belshazzar’s impurity taints the 
sacred goblets, it seems Christ’s absolute purity causes positive pollution: others can 
“catch” cleanness from him. Calabrese and Eliason concur, stating “The quality of 
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 The MED cites “ordre” as also referring to one’s position, rank, religious placement, or proper custom. 
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Christ’s cleanness is such that it, rather than dirt, is communicated by touching” (267). 
Thus it may be not that he cannot touch impure bodies, but that at his touch they cease to 
be unclean.  
To exemplify clean eating, the poet explains that for Christ,  
þe groping so goud of God and Man boþe,  
Þat for fetys of His fyngeres fonded He neuer  
Nauþer to cout ne to kerue with knyf ne with egge;  
Forþy brek He þe bred blades wythouten,  
For hit ferde freloker in fete in His fayre honed,  
Displayed more pryuyly when He hit part shulde,  
Þenne alle þe toles of Tolowse moȝt hit to kerue. (1102-08) 
 
Though knives for cutting bread are tools of civilized humans, Christ’s ability to slice a 
loaf perfectly without help from a man-made object seems to exemplify his spotlessness. 
An animal or a barbarian might break bread with paws or hands, but Christ is able to 
divide a loaf more cleanly than a finely-made knife.134 While ordinary humans need 
assistance from tools to correct their imperfect physicality, Christ is so orderly, so ideally 
clean inside and out, that the need for tools is extraneous. He is perfect, and therefore his 
conception, birth, and eating are also clean: they show his divinity.  
Christ is a mixture of human and divine, yet even in a poem punishing mixture he 
is presented as an ideal. He seems to be unharmed by his mixed status because he is an 
appropriate type of mixture. As Augustine explains, Christ’s position as mediator 
between God and mankind requires that he become a mixture: “It was necessary that he 
should not fail to become mortal, equally necessary that he should not remain mortal. He 
was in truth made mortal, not by the weakening of the godhead of the Word but by the 
assumption of the weakness of the flesh… Thus it was necessary that the mediator 
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 Gollancz suggests the poet may have intended to reference Toledo in line 1108, which was known for its 
high quality blades, while Toulouse was not (xvii).  
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between God and man should have a transient mortality, and a permanent blessedness” 
(City of God IX.15). Christ’s divine nature was not corrupted and weakened, but added 
to, making him at once more than he was before, yet carefully confined in his definition: 
while on earth he is clearly two things contained within himself, not an undifferentiated 
multitude like the Flesch, and never mixing with others.135 As for assuming “flesh,” 
Augustine’s use of the word seems to differ from the poet’s, referring solely to the 
material make-up of a body, not the undifferentiated corporeality displayed by Fleschly 
characters in the poem. Indeed, since humankind itself is a mixture between animal and 
divine qualities – the rationality of the angels but the mortality of animals – including 
Christ as an example suggests that the body is not filthy in itself, but only behaviors of 
that body defined as such, which Cleanness chooses to designate as “fleshly.” Christ’s 
ability to be fully divine, fully human, and utterly clean confirms the potential for the 
positive examples – Noah, Abraham, and Lot – to maintain cleanness even while fettered 
by the mortal requirements of being human.  
Orderly Form  
Despite attempts to categorize and organize the sinful, embodied world, 
Cleanness struggles to maintain that order. This struggle for perfection and control 
permeates the language and form of the poem itself. Though speaking of later literature, 
Ian Frederick Moulton enunciates this idea of writing as ordering nicely:  
Putting things where they ‘belong’ – tidying up – is part of a universal 
project of creating meaning, of giving order to the disorder of experience. 
At least since the time of Aristotle, writing, especially literary writing, has 
been seen as part of the same project: like cleaning a house, telling a story 
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 Yet even by using Christ as an ideal, the poem cannot escape from the issue of mixture and the trouble 
with categories: when even the best example is a kind of mixture or multiplicity, rigid categorization like 
the kind the poem has been trying to put in place is troubled.  
  
 
 
139 
is a means of imposing order, of putting things where they belong, of 
making sense of confusing and contradictory realities. (114) 
 
By relating these homilies and carefully explaining the stakes of committing bodily sins 
through acts of unclean mixing, the poet uses Cleanness to suggest to his readers the 
importance of obeying God’s laws and remaining within the natural order. Even in the 
positive exempla, however, abjection is nearly unavoidable. The “tidying up” in 
Cleanness undermines itself: even as it establishes purity and order in its positive 
exempla, in some cases it pushes aside its source material, committing noticeable 
omissions of moments of abjection its audience would recognize and perhaps question.  
In Cleanness, Noah’s story concludes after God establishes a covenant with him. 
However, in Genesis Noah’s story continues through a moment of gluttonous 
uncleanness: Ham finds him drunk and naked in his tent after overindulging in wine from 
his vineyard.136 Lot’s story, too, is abridged in the poem: Cleanness excludes his 
incestuous interaction with his daughters after their escape from Sodom. Since Lot’s 
daughters are betrothed, Lot’s offer of them to the men of Sodom seems to advocate 
adultery. 137 This combined with the subsequent – though unmentioned – incest makes 
Lot a questionable model. However, the poem may offer a subtle foreshadowing of Lot’s 
daughters’ fall with the detail “Ferly ferde watz her flesch þat flowen ay ilyche” (974). 
By reminding the audience that Lot’s daughters are made of flesh, the poet might be 
insinuating that they are on their way toward the sin against nature they ultimately 
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 In City of God, Augustine suggests an allegorical reading for Noah’s drunkenness and nudity: it 
prefigures Christ’s passion (XVI.1). Though this is given a positive resonance by Church Fathers, its 
omission from Cleanness, and the negative connotations overindulgence carries in the remainder of the 
poem, suggest it casts a less-than-exemplary light on Noah that the poet wishes to avoid.  
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 Frantzen cites Lot’s offer of his daughters to the Sodomites as a transgression on Lot’s part similar to 
the incest that should follow, and claims “Like fornication between hostile people and one’s own daughters, 
incest is… kept in the dark by the poet because it contradicts the cleanness with which the poem is 
obsessed” (460). 
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commit, or perhaps anticipating their fall by already categorizing them as Flesch rather 
than as human.138 Despite efforts to maintain pristine order, the poem cannot fully 
extricate these characters from fleshly acts, since they are human and thus tied to their 
bodies as the abject is tied to all of us.  
As it excludes the sinful activities of its positive exemplars, Cleanness also tries 
to maintain order by depicting sinful acts in a pure and well-ordered way, an attempt to 
rectify the disorderly state of Fleschliness threatening humanity.139 My claim of 
orderliness in the poem’s form, however, is disputed. J. A. Burrow asserts in his 
examination of “Ricardian” poetry that a prominent feature of the period is to “enclose” 
poetic episodes within cellular structures: the Fitte in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight 
or the Passus in Piers Plowman, for example. In Cleanness, however, Burrow thinks the 
poet’s omission of this episodic enclosure “leaves the exterior form of his poem 
somewhat rambling and unsatisfactory; but the inner relations of its constituent parts 
show a master of the exemplary mode” (86). Alfred J. Menner is slightly more forgiving; 
he notes that during the three main negative exempla, “no definite arrangement [of lines] 
can be traced. For this reason the poem can certainly not be said to be written in four-line 
stanzas. The division is not organic, but an indication of a desire on the part of the poet to 
give greater stability of form to his lines where that is needed” (xliv). Israel Gollancz 
critiques Menner’s clemency, citing the poem’s undivided form as authorial or scribal 
oversight and artificially dividing the poem into quatrains in his edition, which he thinks 
was the poet’s original intention (xi). Though the poet is a master of content, these critics 
                                                 
138
 As with Belshazzar and Noah, it is through another bodily act – excessive consumption of wine – that 
Lot’s reason is damaged enough to submit to his daughters’ seduction.  
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 Lynn Staley Johnson specifies that the poet’s artistic unity in the poem works to offer a foil to what she 
terms the disunity – which could also be thought of as the disorder – resulting from sin (139). 
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see him as unconcerned with or unaware of structural formalities and therefore deem this 
poem less successful than other masterpieces of the period.  
What Burrow, Menner, and Gollancz see as shortcomings in form, however, I see 
as utterly effective. With themes of establishing and maintaining order, unalloyed purity, 
inside reflecting outside, and the necessary imperfection humans are burdened with, it 
makes sense for the poet to construct Cleanness in a form that reflects its content. By 
purposely destabilizing the form of the poem at points during which unclean mixing is 
occurring in the content, the poet provides a mirror for the disorder of the Flesch with 
looseness or undivided form. By pairing unclean subject matter with a lack of formal 
conventions, however, the poet puts himself in the same bind as the people in his poem. 
Though he tries, like his positive examples of Noah, Abraham, and Lot, to be clean and 
pure and well-ordered, he cannot escape the fact that he is human, and thus even the form 
used to describe his positive models is “disorganized” or unstable. Any kind of control 
developed by matching subject matter and form will ultimately still be flawed because 
language itself, being human, is inherently flawed. Like all of this poet’s work, Cleanness 
is written in alliterative verse and contains elements of Old French, Middle English, and 
Anglo-Saxon, among others. This blending of dialects, languages, and forms also relates 
to the mixing occurring within the poem. In relating the homilies at all, the poet is 
changing the sacred language of the Bible itself – translating The Word. This already 
constitutes a fall away from perfection, and as I have noted, the poet also alters the 
Scriptural origins of the stories. Emphasizing God’s desire to wipe out animals as well as 
humans in the flood, the raven’s carnal quest for food when the waters subside, and Lot’s 
wife salting the food create new hybrid versions of the stories: another impure mixture.  
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Apart from his mirroring of content and form – showing through imperfection the 
constant presence of the abject despite attempts to push it away – the poet provides a 
more direct acknowledgment that his language is deficient. On several occasions in 
Cleanness the poet discusses the act of writing, and in each he highlights imperfection. 
As if anticipating critics’ objections to his verse forms, the poet begins Cleanness with 
the claim that whoever seeks to accurately represent cleanness “Fayre formez myȝt he 
fynde in forþering his speche” (3). However, he then delves into a discussion of corrupt 
priests in a poem that does not adhere to expected formal conventions. Later, as he 
attempts to explain how the faithful might attain their desired vision of God he claims 
“Clerrer counseyl con I non bot þat þou clene worþe” (1056). Despite his attempts, he is 
incapable of providing any more instructive advice than what the poem offers: a warning 
and an insufficient attempt toward ordering to prevent the confusion and danger of 
undifferentiated mixture.140  
Images of writing as an inexact form appear within the narrative as well. The 
hand that materializes in Belshazzar’s court is “grisly and gret, and grimly he wrytes; / 
Non oþer forme bot a fust faylande þe wrytes; / Pared on þe parget, portrayed letters” 
(1534-36). Not only is the description of the hand itself crude and graceless, but it is only 
a rough clenched fist, and the words it writes are incomprehensible, scrawled “ful large 
vpon plaster” (1549). Though these are God’s words, the writing itself – a human form of 
communication – is flawed and incomplete. When he introduces the idea of penance just 
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 Pearl might be offered as a refutation of this argument: its scrupulously crafted structure does provide 
an example of “fayre formez” and almost perfect use of language. However, the subject matter and the 
main figure of Pearl – the narrator’s deceased daughter who has already become a bride of Christ – make 
this quasi-perfection appropriate to its content. The Pearl-maiden is no longer human, and thus no longer 
bound to the abject elements of the human condition. Thus she can be represented in “perfect” form at the 
level of her textual description and the verse form that “contains” her.   
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before the Belshazzar episode, the poet warns: “Bot war þe wel, if þou be waschen with 
water of schryfte, / And polysed als playn as parchmen schauen, / Sulp no more þenne in 
synne þy saule þerafter” (1133-35). Though penance can render cleanness, the poet’s use 
of parchment as an image again connotes writing; no matter how well-scraped a piece of 
parchment is it can always be written on again. The important thing is what the words 
say. If sin is based in desire as well as deed, as Augustine claims, every act of writing has 
the capacity to dirty a clean sheet of parchment. In his portrayal of this gruesome hand 
and the clean-shaven parchment, the poet seems to suggest that writing itself carries the 
threat of uncleanness. Because God is ineffable, all human attempts to comprehend him 
are necessarily imperfect.141 Thus even the poet’s best attempt will still be incomplete. 
Through our need for food and reproduction and their polluting potential, the Cleanness 
poet reminds us that even the best of us are still human, a condition always at the edge of 
Fleschliness, and thus we can never quite reach the pure, clean order of the divine.  
The disorder of “flesch” in Cleanness and the poem’s presentation of sexual and 
alimentary behaviors as its causes introduces a new category within the murky, 
indiscriminate “less-than-human” area between human and animal status. This category 
of Flesch is occupied by those bodies which, once human, have lost their rationality 
thanks largely to their alimentary or sexual behavior, yet retained their human shape. For 
Cleanness, this new category of being is an attempt to apply order to a disorderly jumble. 
The multiple resonances of “flesch” not only display the degradation in status these 
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 Indeed, all human creations seem to be imperfect. The idols Belshazzar worships are “formed with 
handes” and are clearly flawed, while the angels scorn Sarah’s doubt about conception in the Abraham 
episode by asking “Hopez ho oȝt may be harde My hondez to work?” (1341, 663). Like Christ’s hands 
splitting the bread, only creations made by God’s hands or under God’s express directions can be rightly 
ordered and approach cleanness. For more on hands – both human and divine – in the poem, see Blanch 
and Wasserman.  
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characters suffer, but provide lenses through which they may be examined to determine 
their meaning(s). Though intercourse and eating can be accomplished cleanly through 
careful attentiveness to order and enclosure, succumbing to carnal desires marks a 
descent from humanness into a state of undifferentiated Flesch, marked by alignment 
with animals and indiscriminate meat. The multiplicity within the category, however, and 
the proximity and necessity of abject elements to human existence, undermine the poem’s 
attempt at rigid categorization. Even if Flesch is undifferentiated, human form does not 
change, and even the best humans are bound by digestive and sexual requirements. Thus 
the border between what is human and what is Flesch is constantly troubled: to be human 
is to be a necessary melding of body and soul in which the soul’s survival depends upon 
bodily preservation, which can only be maintained through physical and potentially 
polluting acts. Changing the body by incorporating or expelling some element of it means 
a reorganization or alteration of the set order designated by God, and inappropriate 
attempts at this change constitute disobedience, which is disorder, and therefore filth. If 
God’s reordering of the world requires an eradication of the Flesch, the poet may be 
implicitly suggesting a look forward to Judgment Day. Once physical desires are 
eradicated, and the abjection attendant to sex and eating can be eliminated, humanity can 
leave our unclean bodies behind and obtain new, clean vessels for our souls: bodily 
permeability can disappear, leaving us clean, whole, and one step closer to attaining 
salvation.  
  
 
 
145 
CHAPTER IV 
SPIRIT AND FLESH, HUMAN AND FIGURE:  
DUAL NOURISHMENT IN PIERS PLOWMAN 
While both the Alliterative Morte Arthure and Cleanness take as their source 
material figures and events far in their own past, William Langland’s Piers Plowman 
addresses a landscape contemporary to the poet both temporally and geographically, and 
asks how ordinary man can attain salvation in fourteenth-century England. The AMA 
giant and the sinful populations of Cleanness suffered status degradations as a result of 
their transgressive bodily behaviors toward or connections with their environment, food, 
and other living creatures. Langland’s topics of truth, redemption, and the search for 
Dowel, Dobet, and Dobest mean most of his characters strive in the opposite direction: 
amidst a world of hunger, poverty and sin, they try to leave the physicality of humanness 
behind as they work toward spiritual salvation. One of Langland’s motifs is the struggle 
between concerns of the body and concerns of the spirit, which he presents as part of a 
dichotomy: his characters seem either too material – existing purely for pleasure and 
bodily satisfaction – or too abstractly spiritual – denying or repudiating human material 
necessities. This dichotomy is marked by competing notions of consumption. Langland’s 
characters’ spiritual goals include salvation through learning, which evokes the medieval 
idea of ruminatio: “chewing” over scripture to consume its knowledge. In the material 
category, hunger and food take a central place – as R. W. Frank accurately observes, 
“Masticating man is never long outside the range of Langland’s imaginative vision” and 
this focus seems central because it is so crucial for material survival (99). Thus on both 
sides of the dichotomy humans require a kind of nourishment from the knowledge or 
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material they consume. Despite the ever-looming physical concern of hunger, Langland 
chooses to present this imbalance in an allegory, which presents a new set of challenges 
and boundaries to physicality, materiality, representation, and categories. The bodies he 
depicts resist categorization through their actions and generic conventions, but 
Langland’s allegory itself also pushes against its genre. By its very nature as 
representational, allegory has already refused the physical world in some ways, yet 
Langland uses this genre populated by abstractions to discuss physical needs like eating 
and clothing, all while providing lessons and questions about salvation to his embodied, 
physically real fourteenth-century audience, addressing in form and content the human 
need for both kinds of nourishment.142  
Before moving into the specifics of Langland’s text, it is useful to consider how 
allegory differs from the other, still representational forms of literature I have been 
examining. While all literature provides a representation of reality, however far removed 
or lacking in extra-textual referents it might be, allegory depends upon sustained 
metaphor; it presents characters, objects and events that must signify on multiple levels. 
As Jon Whitman explains, allegory “seems to refer to something in the fiction, but 
actually refers to something else in fact. Allegory turns its head in one direction, but turns 
its eyes in another. In the traditional formula, it says one thing, and means another” (2). 
Though this is a simplified definition, Whitman captures the key symbolic signification 
allegory presents: each figure, event, or object means more than its literal, fictional 
designation. This correspondence, as Whitman notes, is made complex and problematic 
through its very insistence on multiple levels of signification. It is always “potentially on 
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 For the debate on the influence of Wynnere and Wastoure on Piers Plowman, see Salter; Bestul; Jacobs; 
Trigg; and Westphall. Though this debate is certainly relevant to the question of originality in how 
Langland manipulates the genre, it is not my main focus in this chapter.   
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a collision course with itself” because literal or physical actions undertaken by allegorical 
characters strain the correspondence between person and quality (4). John MacQueen 
cites classical mythology as largely allegorical: the narrative has more than one level at 
which it may be interpreted, and analysis of the basic plotline reveals divine messages or 
morals the story was intended to dispense (13-15, 18). Classical mythology offers a good 
example of the self-destructive tendencies Whitman sees inherent in allegory: a divine 
figure like Athena, who is the representation and embodiment of Wisdom, might act in 
anger. If we do not understand wisdom as potentially motivated by anger, the 
correspondence between her characterization and the quality she represents makes the 
allegory break down. Thus within its own designations allegory contains a subversive 
quality: “a tendency to disrupt philosophic and rhetorical norms that finally turns allegory 
even against itself” (Whitman 58).  
The early Middle Ages found differing levels of meaning in the Bible; early 
exegetes therefore read it allegorically. Biblical allegory depends on typology: reading 
events and figures from the Old Testament as prophetic foreshadowings of New 
Testament stories. Isaac, for example, was seen as a precursor to Christ as well as a 
worthy sacrifice in his own right. Thus the Old Testament is understood retrospectively, 
after its New Testament meaning has been revealed. Working in the fourth century, John 
Cassian was likely the first Latin writer to list four levels of allegory: “the literal: the 
allegorical strictly so called, applying the passage to Christ and the Church militant: the 
tropological or moral, understanding it of the soul and its virtues: and the anagogical, 
applying it to the heavenly realities and the Church triumphant” (MacQueen 49). 
However clear the spiritual or moral underlying message of an allegorical text may be, 
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the literal plot deals with material realities, for the Old Testament was understood as a 
historical record of actual men, women, and events. Tension thus arises between the 
concreteness of historical character and deed, and the abstract flatness of their allegorical 
counterparts. 
Masha Raskolnikov points to this tension in another way; she notes that allegory 
resists but also relies on the proximity between metaphorical and literal “reality.” She 
asserts “One of the crucial abilities of medieval allegory, as it turns out, is its capacity to 
literalize the relationship between the material and the nonmaterial in the making of 
persons, who are imagined as the combination of base flesh with spiritual spark” (202). 
This characterization resembles the project of literature in its requirement that we 
imagine disembodied words as verisimilar representations of material bodies, but 
allegory goes further. It requires us to suspend our disbelief enough to give concepts and 
ideas bodies, as if they physically existed. For Christians, perhaps the most important 
resonance for this system of embodiment was the Incarnation. Raskolnikov explains, “By 
making nonmaterial concepts appear as physical bodies, personification allegory was a 
way of thinking (in an acceptably nonblasphemous mode) about the complex 
implications of Christ’s incarnation as a man. After all, in the beginning of the Gospel of 
John, the Word was made flesh” (36). Because the divine word was embodied in human 
form, any time a word – a concept or characteristic – is given human shape, it echoes a 
relationship with Christ himself, and provides a basis for perhaps the most recognizable 
form of medieval allegory: personification. If Christ can be both fully human and fully 
divine as a result of embodiment of the Word, any concept embodied or “fleshed out” in 
a text could carry out material, physical activities.  
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Personification allegory was tremendously popular for medieval audiences: Truth, 
Justice, Patience, and Mercy “live” on the pages of allegorical texts as embodiments of 
the qualities their names suggest. Larry Scanlon defines this kind of personification as 
“the discursive transformation of a noun or other part of speech into a narrative 
viewpoint,” citing it as a convergence point for allegory and mimesis – the literal and the 
figurative are both filtered through the personified abstraction (24-25). This simultaneity 
– this constant slippage between literal and metaphorical – presents a challenge to a 
discussion of bodies within allegory. Mercy is a quality but also a character’s name. If 
“he” is an abstract quality but also a humanoid body, how “real” can that body and its 
actions be without causing the kind of genre breakdown Whitman notes? Any activities 
an allegorical figure undertakes that we might perceive as physical or material become 
difficult to interpret. How can gluttony eat? How can envy weep or soil its clothing, and 
more importantly, what do such actions mean? Should they be read literally or 
figuratively? Langland’s answer seems to be both: any action one of his figures 
undertakes must be read simultaneously as real (literal) and metaphorical: as a physical 
action done by a body in motion, but also as an act that represents the idea or quality it 
personifies. By advocating bothness, Langland breaks the dichotomy allegory presents by 
rejecting the “either/or” of literal versus metaphorical, and embraces a rhizomatic “and” 
which permits a multiplicity of interpretive strands.  
Though Piers Plowman would have been understood in many ways by its 
contemporary audience – as dream vision, satire, and moralizing call for reform – Anne 
Middleton suggests that its generic designation as “an allegory” (as opposed to a poem 
containing allegorical devices) is a twentieth-century understanding (8-9). However, I 
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would argue that Langland writes an allegory that purposely pushes the conventions and 
boundaries of the genre. His text seems to slide between the literalness of his characters 
and the figurative meaning of both people and events. Piers Plowman is a fluid and 
unstable allegory that grows out of and recedes back into Langland’s play of language 
(Spearing 235). Side by side with the flat, Plasticine-like embodiments of abstractions 
like Patience and Conscience common to medieval allegory, Langland places figures who 
transgress on the world of the “real,” displaying material, human traits and needs.143 As 
A. C. Spearing notes, the dividing line between character and figuration “is blurred by the 
insistent tendency of Langland’s poetic idiom towards momentary humanizations, and 
the coexistent rapidity and fluidity of movement that leaves them behind as soon as they 
are created” (226).  
This fluidity – the possibility for the text to flow almost seamlessly between 
literal and allegorical meanings – shows Langland’s play with the borders of allegorical 
representation. Medieval allegory had salvific relevance for the individual: understanding 
brought you closer to saving your soul. Thus much medieval allegory emphasized the 
internal rather than external world, as evidenced in particular by Prudentius’s 
Psychomachia where warring vices and virtues clearly occupy an interior battlefield 
within the human psyche. Yet Langland’s figures cross over into detailed and memorable 
physical settings and, in several cases, historical events.144 Further, as Larry Scanlon has 
pointed out, the desire in Langland’s characters to change or improve themselves 
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 For Larry Scanlon, personification brings together qualities of realism and metaphor (24-25). He notes 
that Piers Plowman’s “density of narrative detail often means that its personifications are personifications 
and characters at once” (22). 
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 Some of Langland’s most notable settings include the “fair field full of folk” and the “half-acre” Piers 
the Plowman sows, as well as the tower on the mountain and the dark valley the dreamer finds himself 
between in Passus I. Though all have metaphorical meaning, they are also visually rich landscapes on their 
own.  
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(whether they fulfill that desire or not) strains the limits of allegory. As Scanlon says of 
Gluton’s confession:  
this moment can be allegorical only at the expense of its own logic. We 
have here a third complication of the divide between spirit and flesh, one 
peculiar to Langland’s text and an animating principle of this part of the 
poem. For what is the point of sins confessing at all, even in the mediated 
form of personifications? If they perform the sacrament successfully and 
receive absolution, then surely they cease to be sins and lose the very 
essence they purport to personify. (26)  
 
If Gluton stops being gluttonous, how can the allegory hold? If embodied forms of 
attributes or qualities change themselves the way humans can, they cease to be the 
attributes they embody. Yet because his personifications encroach on the materiality of 
“real life,” Langland demands that we read them both within a signifying loop of 
doubleness: they mean simultaneously through literal and metaphorical lenses.  
This doubleness, I suggest, results from the materiality – the “Masticating man” 
always on the edges of Langland’s mind – that continually creeps into the text. Though 
spiritual perfection might be the goal, Langland knows that we exist as both bodies and 
souls; to attend to this bothness he suggests the need to embrace literal and metaphorical, 
spiritual and physical, learning and eating. Before human beings can achieve 
transcendence, they must come to an understanding of embodied life and the sins such a 
life entails. The kind of allegorical figures he presents engaged in the most physical of 
actions are not simple personified abstractions, but rounder, fuller characters who 
embody already embodied groups or types. Because they are bodies who represent 
bodies, their physicality does not break, but stretches the bounds of the genre: physical 
actions no longer diverge from the signifying correspondence because physical as well as 
metaphorical consequences are important. His characters misunderstand, misinterpret, 
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and slide between literal and figurative as they attempt to navigate their relationship 
between physical and spiritual, without seeing the need for both.  
Piers Plowman scholarship has claimed that balance is a hallmark of the poem; 
critics often point to the equilibrium Langland thinks is required between the living, 
material world occupied by the dreamer – and, by extension, Langland – and the spiritual 
world of God.145 Spearing’s assessment in particular is relevant for my exploration, since 
he also points to material excess and the problems it causes for Langland’s characters 
within the poem. Spearing notices a tension in the poem between the material importance 
of bread and the spiritual importance of the creed “man does not live by bread alone” 
(241-53). Rather than creating a simple balance between bread’s material and spiritual 
qualities, however, Langland advocates bothness. “Bread” as literal and metaphorical 
invokes the act and the metaphor of consumption again: material bread nourishes the 
body as the Eucharist nourishes the soul.146 “Consuming” the knowledge of this creed 
and understanding its spiritual importance provides another kind of eating, comparable to 
Ezekiel eating the scrolls, which Langland also asks us to incorporate.147 The need for all 
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 Gillian Rudd concludes that Langland’s exploration of both scientia and sapientia reveals the highlights 
and limitations of each mode of seeking knowledge, and shows the poet’s commitment to the idea of a 
balance or a middle road as the appropriate way for human beings to live a life worthy of salvation (99). 
Vincent Gillespie sees Will the dreamer as an admittedly flawed and unstable balance between Patience 
and Haukyn, and therefore between the contemplative and active life (107). Mary Clemente Davlin follows 
a more linguistic avenue, arguing that Langland’s word play draws the audience into intuitive knowing, 
allowing them to navigate the meanings on their own to create a balanced understanding (21).  
 
146
 In an allegory, physical eating requires us to consider the bodily consequences of intake: medieval 
theologians and physicians debated whether (or how much) any part of our food was retained in the body. 
If everything was expelled, they asked, how could we grow and develop, and what good would we gain 
from the Eucharist? If something was retained, it might weaken or adulterate the human form (Reynolds 
19). Further, if something was retained, an allegorical character who eats potentially instigates a breakdown 
of the genre: growth and change, even if it is physical, might suggest development beyond an abstraction’s 
capacity.  
 
147
 See Ezekiel 2.8-3.3.  
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of these methods of understanding at once resonates with Christ’s incarnation: his 
divinity permits him to be at once all human and all divine, just as allegorical figures can 
be concepts and people at the same time. But being “fully both” is impossible for real 
human beings, as Langland will show through his most “human” figurations, and so 
working to balance these kinds of consumption is our best option.   
The two characters who best exemplify this difficulty of balancing through their 
slip between literal and figurative are Haukyn – Activa Vita and a traveling minstrel and 
waferer148 – and the Doctor of Divinity – a gluttonous intellectual who does not practice 
what he preaches. With titles assigned to them, each is a figuration who plays an 
allegorical role. Both, however, also exhibit human qualities by which we must 
understand them; the most prevalent of these is their need and desire to eat. As 
sustenance is necessary for individual survival and allegory often focuses on instructions 
for individual salvation, it is not surprising that Langland chooses food as the focus for a 
recognizably-named human character.149 But just as Haukyn and the Doctor are both 
human and figural, Langland complicates the issue of survival by making it a project of 
physicality and spirituality. Survival for Haukyn and the Doctor consists of eating to 
preserve and nourish their bodies. Yet if Haukyn and the Doctor concentrate solely on 
their physical needs, Langland will suggest, their spiritual nourishment suffers. 
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 An occupation that might be understood both as maker of Communion wafers, and “wayfarer” or 
traveler. Both baking and traveling link him to the physical and spiritual worlds: baking produces physical 
food but communion wafers have a metaphorical religious purpose. Traveling or wandering entails physical 
movement as well as the metaphorical sense of “straying from the path.”  
 
149
 Unlike the AMA and Cleanness, sexual conduct is far less Langland’s focus than food and eating. 
Though lechery is mentioned and Will is distracted from his spiritual quest by Concupiscencia Carnis in 
Passus XI, the poem does not concentrate on episodes of sexual misconduct with the same intensity as it 
does on gluttonous or improper eating. The Concupiscencia Carnis episode, in fact, takes place during an 
inner dream, placing it even further from lived reality than the rest of the vision. It affects Will, but it is not 
described with the same level of detail as the consumption Haukyn and the Doctor undertake. In addition to 
his concentration on individual salvation and survival, Langland may also privilege eating due to its 
powerful role in the Last Supper and Holy Communion, as I will discuss later in the chapter.  
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Meanwhile, if they abandon physical requirements in favor of spiritual perfection, their 
bodies wither. The idea of physical versus spiritual nourishment implies a binary, not a 
multiplicity. However, because Langland has chosen to work within allegory, he is bound 
by certain genre conventions. His choice to emphasize the tension between spiritual and 
physical and to insist upon both is his move to resist this dichotomy: like a rhizomatic 
reading, at least both kinds of nourishment are required, privileging “and” rather than 
“or.” This is allegory inflected by a realism that acknowledges and depicts the physicality 
of human existence. For embodied human beings, participation in the world is necessary 
and sin is unavoidable. To attain salvation, a human being can survive neither “on bread 
alone” nor on no bread at all. In a genre in which even abstractions can be embodied, 
incorporation is at once literal and figurative; food and digestion are the perfect actions – 
and metaphors – to explain how the requirements of material sustenance and spiritual 
understanding work together and against each other.150  
The tension between the spiritual and the physical, and the need to let that tension 
flourish, is set up at the very beginning of the poem in Passus I.151 Though allegory 
generally deals with interior concerns, when Will the dreamer meets Lady Holy Church, 
she explains not spirituality, but physical survival. Langland pulls together allegory’s 
penchant for personified figures and elements of realism to establish the need for the 
same duality in his form that he presents in each episode: we must read on both a literal 
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 Thus for the audience, even as we read we are “feeding” ourselves with Langland’s text: absorbing its 
messages and gaining nourishment from what they have to teach us.  
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 For the purposes of this project, I look only at Langland’s B-text. In revising for publication, however, I 
recognize the value and necessity of including an assessment of these same characters in the C-text; 
Haukyn in particular plays a larger and very different role in Langland’s (possibly) later text.  
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and a figural level, as each can provide us with understanding.152 Holy Church explains to 
Will that Truth established three needs human beings must attend to for survival: “That 
oon is vesture from chele thee to save, / And mete at meel for mysese of thiselve, / And 
drynke whan thow driest – ac do noght out of reson” (I.20-25). Clothing, food, and drink 
are the only things needed for physical survival in the world. Yet, she warns, moderation 
in each of these needful things is necessary. She explains “It is nought al good to the 
goost that the gut asketh, / Ne liflode to the likame that leef is to the soule. / Leve nought 
thi likame, for a liere hym techeth – That is the wrecched world, wolde thee bitraye” 
(I.36-39). Obeying only one’s sensual desires, Holy Church seems to be saying, is 
detrimental to the soul, and indeed the world itself is out to pervert and corrupt through 
that body.153 Thus Will’s quest seems to be aimed at gaining an understanding of how to 
operate within the world and yet keep both his body and soul satisfied. This motif of 
nourishment in moderation appears significantly in Passus XIII and XIV, which present a 
series of misunderstandings by various characters about how to obtain both material and 
spiritual nourishment. Three episodes stand out: Will’s dinner with the Doctor of Divinity 
and Patience, the introduction of Haukyn the Active Man, and Patience’s sermon to 
Haukyn about nourishment, which includes assuaging his troubles by eating pieces of the 
Paternoster, so he can learn to depend on spiritual nourishment rather than physical 
wellbeing.  
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 In other literary examples, we might consider the Nun’s Priest’s warning in Chaucer’s Canterbury 
Tales. As a moral to his beast fable, he urges us to “Taketh the fruyt, and lat the chaf be stille,” but fails to 
clarify which aspects of his tale are fruit and which are chaff, and indeed whether there is truly any 
difference between the two, since “al that writen is / To oure doctrine it is ywrite” (3443, 3441-42).  
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 Langland’s terms – that the body is instructed by a liar – point to the relation between knowledge and 
faith as a central preoccupation of the poem.  
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In what follows, I will discuss the dinner scene and the interaction with Haukyn, 
concentrating on issues of nourishment: what happens when one side or the other of this 
balance between material and spiritual is neglected or indulged to excess? In the dinner 
scene, I will argue that the Doctor’s misunderstanding about how to consume the spiritual 
meats of Patience’s dinner – in essence, his inability to interpret allegorically – prohibits 
him from gaining spiritual nourishment from his meal. He serves as a slow movement 
into reading both sides of a physically oriented allegorical character – a kind of warm-up 
exercise for reading Haukyn, perhaps the most “real” of Langland’s characters. Haukyn 
not only represents the Active Life; he stands for the human condition. He shows us 
through his inability to transcend that we are unavoidably tied to this world, and that 
sustenance, for us, cannot be only a spiritual endeavor. Through his double signification 
and embodiment of an already embodied group, Haukyn resolves the tension of allegory 
Scanlon and Whitman point to: because he represents humankind, even his divergence 
from his allegorical figuration into physicality holds the allegory in place, because what 
he is representing is physical and flawed. Langland’s insistence on bothness rejects the 
either/or boundary between allegorical and “real” and invokes the “and” of the rhizome; 
he enacts a modified allegory that encompasses realism and figuralism to paint a picture 
of the boundaries, shortcomings, and challenges of being human in the medieval 
Christian world, which we as readers can consume to nurture our understanding.   
Dining with the Doctor 
The dinner scene in Passus XIII with the Doctor of Divinity and Patience provides 
an initial look into the slippage between literal and metaphorical that causes many of the 
misunderstandings the characters in the poem experience and helps us gain an 
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understanding of how material and spiritual nourishment work in Piers Plowman. 
Scholarship on the Doctor has focused on different aspects of the scene. Gillian Rudd 
calls the Doctor a representation of the faults of a completely academic life, one in which 
intellectual knowledge takes precedence while faith and true understanding of spiritual 
matters are ironically ignored (96, 98). The Doctor overemphasizes a singular aspect of 
knowledge rather than synthesizing intellectualism and worldly existence (xi). However, 
Rudd also views the Doctor as a literal character, not just an allegorical type: “it is 
refreshing to be presented with a figure who, while clearly a caricature in a dream, is 
nevertheless a recognisable type, part of the waking world” (96). Langland gives us the 
sense that the Doctor has a “real” life outside this dinner scene. He is not just a flat 
representation with a single meaning that is compromised through action or 
characterization. For John Alford, the doctor’s faults are more serious; he “knows the 
meaning of Truth and yet refuses to live it,” which confirms to the dreamer that 
intellectual pursuits and authoritative knowledge are no guarantee of redemption (49). 
Anne Savage argues that while food and scripture have the capacity to nourish both the 
body and the soul, the Doctor shows that without a complete understanding of scripture – 
both the letter and the sentence – there is only consumption, not actual nourishment. In 
this episode, Savage explains that Langland “is concerned with the way scripture and 
patristic texts are read, interpreted and understood: the texts are presented as spiritually 
nourishing eating for those who read scripture with the wisdom provided by experience, 
knowledge and discipline” (216).154 Though he is supposed to be an expert in scripture, 
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 Curiously, Savage does not extend this examination of consumption versus nourishment to Haukyn and 
his ingestion of the Paternoster, and indeed few critics concentrate on this episode though it carries many of 
the same themes. I will discuss this episode in depth later in the chapter.  
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the Doctor is unsuccessful in attaining nourishment from that doctrine because he does 
not truly understand it.  
But more than noting the Doctor’s spiritual understanding, we must also 
concentrate on the physical act of eating and how it is represented. The Doctor does not 
just misunderstand Patience’s message; he also consumes “real” food and suffers for it. 
His literal characterization also represents pure consumption, and his post-indulgence 
indigestion proves his malnourishment. The Doctor’s respect and love for his office are 
clear; when the dreamer first sees him, he explains he “merkede a maister – what man he 
was I nyste – / That lowe louted and loveliche to Scripture” (XIII.25-26). That is, he 
literally bowed to the character Scripture, but also seems to revere the doctrine this figure 
embodies. However, it quickly becomes clear that despite this reverence, the Doctor 
misunderstands his relationship with the holy words he is supposed to live by. The 
Doctor’s expert preaching gains him the money to purchase the feast he consumes during 
the dinner scene. His food is purely material – real ingredients, bought at the market, and 
cooked in the kitchen; it is not spiritual fare (Savage 214). If the Doctor truly understood 
what he was preaching, he would partake of the meal Scripture brings, consisting of 
“sundry metes manye – / Of Austyn, of Ambrose, of alle the foure Evaungelistes: / 
Edentes et bibentes que apud eos sunt” (XIII.38-39). This is the preaching the Doctor has 
been doing, providing spiritual sustenance for his parishioners, but he seems not to 
understand that this nourishment is also important for him to consume. He in fact 
disdains the spiritual nourishment Scripture provides: “Ac this maister ne his man no 
maner flessh eten” (XIII.40).  
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Not only does the doctor’s refusal of holy nourishment make clear his 
misunderstanding, it also exemplifies the complexity of reading food in allegory. 
Scripture tells the Doctor and his guests to eat the meat of Augustine, Ambrose, and the 
four Evangelists. Asking anyone, much less a theologian, to consume the bodies of long-
dead Church Fathers would be horrific sacrilege, and yet Langland calls the meal 
“flessh.” Thus he is asking us to interpret this feast figuratively: “flessh” here seems to 
connote something closer to our metaphorical “meat of the matter” than the actual meaty 
portions of these men’s bodies. But the message of eating operates in at least two 
additional ways, which reiterate the tension in Langland’s allegory. First, Scripture’s call 
for consumption seems to instruct the Doctor to engage not in feeding his belly, but in 
ruminatio. What Scripture serves constitutes not only a meal, but the key importance of 
the texts he proffers on which the “eater” should meditate. However, because ruminatio 
conjures in our minds the physical act of chewing, and because medieval people usually 
read aloud, the act of reading is a physical endeavor which, like eating, engages the lips, 
tongue and teeth. Second, the “meats” the Doctor is being asked to consume are recorded 
in manuscripts, the vellum or parchment pages of which were created from animal hide. 
Therefore the act of “chewing” on these texts, though the chewing itself is metaphorical, 
is also consuming part of an animal in another instance of metaphor that moves us even 
closer to the physical world.  
Rather than engage in any of these metaphorical forms of eating, the Doctor “eten 
mete of moore cost – mortrews and potages: / Of that men myswonne thei made hem wel 
at ese” (XIII.41-42). Interestingly, the Doctor’s choice castigates him figuratively, but at 
least initially has literal justification, again displaying the fluidity in Langland’s text. 
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Though he has refused spiritual guidance in the form of ingesting theological texts, he 
has also refused “flesh,” which usually indicates red meat or pork – as in the distinction 
between fish, flesh, and fowl. Typically, monks and priests renounced red meat and other 
rich food as a sign of humility, so until the contents of the Doctor’s meal are described, 
he looks to be literally following the tenets of his office, even as he figuratively 
misunderstands (Montanari 183). The Doctor and his actions cannot be considered just 
within the confines of one category – literal or metaphorical – but must be examined 
through both, allowing Langland to stretch and expand what constitutes allegory.  
What the Doctor chooses to eat belies any attempts at asceticism his initial refusal 
of flesh might suggest. Not only is his feast made up of material, “real” foods, but they 
are monetarily of higher cost than what Scripture provides, and include “manye sundry 
metes, mortrews and puddynges, / Wombe cloutes and wilde brawen and egges [with 
grece yfryed],” which he washes down when he “drank wyn so faste” (XIII. 62-63, 61). 
The richness and quantity of food – everything is presented as plural – as well as the 
descriptive, sensory form of presentation here suggests the Doctor’s meal is a literal 
one.155 Malcolm Godden claims that though the dinner with Clergie is a metaphor for 
communion, for the Doctor it is a literal feast, and “it is the reality of the doctor’s dining 
that frustrates its metaphorical function” (105). Savage agrees, confirming “The doctor’s 
food is real, maw-stuffing sausages, eggs fried in grease, tripes and brawn – he really is a 
glutton – while the dreamer’s and Patience’s food really is penitential – the two pilgrims 
really are being abstemious” (214). Within the world of the text, the Doctor’s table is 
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 Figuratively, the meal here could signify as gluttony or the pleasures of consumption, but the actual food 
products themselves are material, not metaphorical. They are real within the world of the text.  
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piled high with physically graspable food products, while Patience and Will have only 
metaphors.156  
The Doctor’s inability to fully grasp the implications of the scripture he teaches is 
clear from his physical reaction to this physical food. Not only is “hir sauce… over sour 
and unsavourly grounde,” but Patience reveals that after the meal the Doctor “shal have a 
penaunce in his paunche and puffe at ech a worde, / and thanne shullen his guttes gothele, 
and he shal galpen after” (XIII.43, 87-88). As a result of both his gluttony and his 
misreading, the Doctor’s body suffers. Thus Langland shows us the ways scripture can 
“feed” us but also the way the concrete physicality of feasting like the Doctor’s can 
metaphorically “starve” our souls. In both cases, though the Doctor’s food is material and 
his act of eating is physical, we have to read figuratively to deduce Langland’s message. 
The food the Doctor eats with such gusto does not even taste good, and his resulting 
indigestion proves its lack of real nourishing qualities. In John Trevisa’s translation of 
Bartholomaeus Anglicus’s examination of the human body, taste is explained as 
important to quality and quantity of nourishment.157 Trevisa translates from the Latin “If 
þe taast failleþ þe vertu of þe fedinge failleþ, and so þe substaunce of þe best faileþ som 
and som, litil and litel” (118). Further, sweet food is more nourishing than sour, so the 
Doctor’s “over sour” sauce may signify quality and flavor. That he will feel discomfort in 
his “guttes” corresponds with Bartholomaeus as well. As Trevisa translates, “þe guttis 
ben nedeful, for þey chaungiþ þe mete into feedinge, and fongiþ superfluytees in here 
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 The Doctor’s feast could be an example of a parodic transsubstatiation: he too turns spirit into flesh 
which he takes and eats. His method, however, is faulty: the spirit turned flesh is not supposed to consist of 
luxury food products, but of the body of Christ.  
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 Bartholomaeus Anglicus compiled De proprietatibus rerum in the mid-thirteenth century. Trevisa 
translated it into Middle English in the late fourteenth century.  
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holowȝnes to discharge kynde” (252). If the intestinal tract cannot do its job properly, 
material ingested will not be translated into nourishing food. The Doctor’s anticipated 
discomfort seems to gesture toward a failure in this kind of translation, again implying 
consumption without nourishment.158  
When Patience describes the consequences of the Doctor’s meal, which was fully 
physical, he does so in spiritual language; the Doctor, he says, will feel penance in his 
stomach. However, this penance is misplaced. The Doctor should be feeling penitent for 
his misunderstanding of how Scripture will nourish him. Instead his body shows regret 
for overeating through his belching and flatulence; again we see only the physical 
consequences of his gluttony. That Patience uses spiritual language to explain the 
Doctor’s physical discomfort suggests an ultimate spiritual consequence: the inability to 
correctly situate his penance may make the Doctor unable to access the understanding 
needed for spiritual nourishment and therefore salvation.  
This vacillation between spiritual and physical terms exists throughout the dinner 
episode. When Patience first encourages Will to wait for the Doctor to complete his meal 
before demanding answers, he claims “now he hath drunken so depe he wole devyne 
soone / And preven it by hir Pocalips and passion of Seint Avereys / That neither bacon 
ne braun ne blancmanger ne mortrews / Is neither fissh ne flessh but fode for penaunts” 
(XIII.89-92). It is clear from the way Patience knows the Doctor will bring theological 
references to a physical level that this “theologian” is not fully literate in the spiritual 
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 The idea of “translation” or translatio for the literal movement of food from place to place within the 
body is also the metaphorical transformation of a whole food item from its original form into the material 
that reaches each organ that requires it. “Translation” in this sense can also be applied to Scripture, since by 
hearing it we take it into our bodies, and by “translating” it or understanding it, we can apply it to ourselves 
and thereby benefit from it. Translation might also be figured as a kind of cooking: changing the original 
material into something edible or palatable to an audience or “eater” – a physical transformation of the food 
to prepare it for nourishing ingestion.  
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texts he is supposed to be living by as well as teaching. This same illiteracy seems 
marked in Will, who is still only capable of wishing the Doctor physical discomfort for 
his neglect of the other diners. The Doctor is not following his own definition of Dowel, 
Will protests: “ye had harmed us two in that ye eten the pudding, / Mortrews and oother 
mete – and we no morsel hadde” (XIII.107-08). For this oversight, Will hopes the 
“disshes and doublers [this ilke doctour before] / Were molten leed in his mawe, and 
Mahoun amyddes!” (XIII.82-83). Even the reference to Mohammed is placed physically, 
not spiritually: Will wishes not that Mohammed punish the Doctor’s soul, but that he act 
as an obstacle in his belly, all because his own belly’s needs were not met. Will’s use of 
spiritual terminology to refer to physical things indicates both an inability to understand 
and the difficulty for a human character to separate the spiritual from the physical, and 
the converse; even while Will wishes the Doctor a stomachache, his use of a non-
Christian religious figure reminds us of the Doctor’s perversion of spirit. This blurring 
extends to Langland’s audience thanks to his form: within the allegory, it is nearly 
impossible to fully separate the “real” from the figurative, because even those things that 
are physically real within the world of the text are presented such that we must also read 
them with a secondary or figurative meaning. This can lead to obstacles in our own 
metaphorical “bellies” – the minds in which we “cook” the information we have ingested 
from Langland’s text.  
While Will’s misunderstanding and focus on physicality in this episode makes 
sense – throughout the poem he is depicted as learning only slowly and requiring 
considerable aid to see past the material world – the Doctor’s is more surprising. As a 
master of divinity, he should have complete understanding of the messages he preaches to 
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the local laity. David Rollo’s discussion of Latin literacy proves helpful, therefore, in 
analyzing the Doctor’s position and in considering reasons for his misunderstanding. 
Rollo explains that even those people who were learned in Latin, who understood the 
grammatical forms, who were able to read and write fairly fluently, and therefore could 
comprehend the surface meaning of the texts in question, were not necessarily fully 
literate in the texts they studied (4-5). Applying Rollo’s analysis of the levels of Latin 
literacy to the Doctor, we can see the Doctor’s problem could be a failure to move 
beyond a surface-level, literal understanding of scripture into a comprehension of the 
figurative language, which Rollo claims is imperative for understanding theological 
concepts (6). Ironically enough, reading the Doctor – an allegorical character – as a literal 
reader means he misunderstands how to use the metaphorical profits of his job because he 
is not able to read allegorically; he stops at the literal feeding of his body rather than 
comprehending the intended figurative nourishment of his soul. In a sense his gluttony is 
dual: he is guilty both of overeating and of miserly retention, and fails to share his 
understanding that should be his primary concern. His sin of gluttony, Rudd confirms, is 
not simply overindulgence, but “an abuse of available resources” (103). The Doctor’s 
task, which he does not complete, is “to proclaim the Word of God, the Bread of Life, the 
food of the soul” (103). His is a solitary feast with no nourishing effects, when it should 
be distributed among his congregation to help them toward salvation. 
The linguistic slippage between figural and literal Langland uses to show the 
complex relationship between spiritual and physical nourishment is clear in the Doctor’s 
lecture to Will. Will’s inquiry about Dowel provokes a theological answer, as the 
Doctor’s office seems to promise it should. He tells the dreamer Dowel is to “Do noon 
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yvel to thyn evencristen – nought by thi power” (XIII.104). Here the Doctor sees Dowel 
as a concept or a process rather than an embodied person, but Will, whose concerns are 
on his empty stomach and the Doctor’s full plate, cannot move beyond his physical 
concerns. Though he does understand the Doctor should be sharing, Will does not see 
which type of nourishment should be distributed.159 He exclaims “And if ye fare so in 
youre fermerye, ferly me thynketh / But cheeste be ther charite sholde be, and yonge 
children dorste pleyne!” (XIII.109-110). By referring to an infirmary in conjunction with 
plaintive children who might not understand the spiritual benefits a monastic hospital 
could provide, Will places the Doctor in the physical world of healing bodies, even 
though the Doctor understands himself to be concerned with spiritual learning.160 Though 
his misunderstanding differs from the Doctor’s, both are incapable of seeing how 
spiritual nourishment operates because they insist on reading arboreally.  
Haukyn’s Hunger 
The need for both physical and spiritual nourishment, conveyed by Langland’s 
material allegory, finds more explicit portrayal when Haukyn is introduced: with the 
Active Man’s appearance, themes of physicality, spirituality, and food again dominate 
and must be read literally and allegorically. Despite this doubleness, critics have tended 
to focus on either the figural or the literal aspects of Haukyn. Stella Maguire asserts, in an 
early examination, that the Active Man deserves critical attention because he is an 
embodiment of the world presented in the dreamer’s visio. She concludes he is an 
allegorical representation of the flawed and imperfect active life rather than a realistic 
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 Neither, given his resulting indigestion, does the Doctor. 
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 The Church and its infirmaries could and did perform spiritual healing. For Will, however, even 
theological aid comes in the form of attending to a physical body. 
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presentation of a fourteenth-century man (Maguire 97-109). While I agree Haukyn does 
not refer to any one actual person, eliminating his physicality is also a mistake. Nicholas 
Watson thinks Piers Plowman critiques both Haukyn and Patience, whom he views as 
extremes: sides of the same flawed theological coin; he again emphasizes the division of 
physical and spiritual (85). F. R. H. Du Boulay sees Haukyn as a partial and exaggerated 
sketch of the dreamer, intended to provide a contrast with Patience; he calls him “a man 
of the world, his coat stained with misdoings, his extravert voice loud with uncertainty” 
(11). Du Boulay acknowledges Haukyn’s materiality, but seems to neglect his allegorical 
dimensions. Vincent Gillespie, in his analysis of the phrase from the Pater Noster Haukyn 
is advised to eat, comes to a similar conclusion: for him, Haukyn and Patience are mirror 
opposites, while Will is constructed with aspects of both (107). Gillian Rudd reads 
Haukyn more metaphorically than Du Boulay and Gillespie; she sees him as all faith with 
no understanding (152). In her connection of Haukyn and the Doctor, she claims “both 
food and knowledge are essentials of life, but both must be presented in a way that will 
make them digestible” (99). For Rudd, Haukyn represents the Christian who must depend 
on God’s mercy alone to save him “because, despite following the commands and 
examples… he does not truly comprehend them, follows blindly, and so errs” (152).  
Rudd does recognize Haukyn’s complexity, however. She identifies him as 
“indeed a character rather than a figure – and as such [he] presents a more immediate 
picture of grievance” (158). Haukyn is an example of a personified figure who breaks 
away from his original signification and thereby becomes more complex, acting in ways 
his name neither indicates nor permits (224). But Haukyn is not intended to be read as a 
“real” human being with an extra-textual history, nor does he cease to be an allegorical 
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figuration of the Active Man. Nor, contrary to Rudd’s explanation, does he break from 
his original signification. Rather, Langland urges us to view Haukyn as both a literal man 
who suffers from a lack of understanding that prevents his salvation, and as a 
representation of a way of life: the Activa Vita he personifies. His behaviors, therefore, 
must be attended to from a literal and metaphorical perspective – a rhizomatic network of 
multiple interpretations and connections. Key among Haukyn’s actions is his literal 
consumption of the Pater Noster in Passus XIV – a physical action with extraordinary 
metaphorical ramifications – yet this episode is not often examined by critics. When it is, 
his eating is not usually connected to analyses of his materiality. However, as I argue, 
Haukyn’s consumption of scripture only as material food and his subsequent failure to 
become contemplative explains the need for both kinds of nourishment. The episode also 
provides another example of Langland’s resistance within allegory as he plays with the 
real and the figural in the same character.161 In the following analysis, I will look first at 
Haukyn’s characterization – his physical descriptions and worldly occupation – and then 
at his allegorical figuration – the personification his title assigns him.  
Haukyn, or Activa Vita, as he is first introduced, immediately claims two 
occupations: minstrelsy and wafering. The activities and culturally understood goals of 
these careers, along with the way Haukyn interprets them, further emphasize the complex 
and misunderstood relationship between earthly and heavenly nourishment. As a 
minstrel, Haukyn’s job is to make music, which provides listeners with a kind of comfort 
or stimulation not wholly physical. Du Boulay reads Haukyn as more than simply a 
physical man; he claims it is difficult not to see in the musician “the performance of a 
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 For excellent analyses of this scene which nevertheless do not attend to the materiality of Haukyn’s 
consumption, see Gillespie and Watson.  
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good minstrel who nourishes souls” (33). Making Haukyn a minstrel, however, subjects 
him to the possibility of the same kind of linguistic misunderstanding as the Doctor of 
Divinity. Minstrels, Rudd claims, “are seen to be abusers of words, who delight in their 
ability to play with language, rather than in the message it bears” (105). Yet the 
connotations of minstrelsy also imply physical pleasure, as minstrels are linked with 
actors, mimes, and jongleurs, who are sometimes presented as sexually deviant or 
promiscuous characters (“minstral” [n.] MED). Britton Harwood considers Haukyn 
differently; he faults other critics for assuming Haukyn “is one of the flea-bitten, obscene 
entertainers that the poem elsewhere deplores” (99). It “seems likelier that the poet is 
using ‘minstral’ in its old-fashioned sense of ‘servant’ or ‘functionary’” (99). Though 
Harwood wishes to apply a less deprecatory meaning to Haukyn’s minstrelsy, the fact 
that these negative connotations for minstrels exist suggests they may have resonated 
alongside more positive attributes for Langland’s audience. Yet Langland presents 
Haukyn in a poem self-consciously concerned with the use and misuse (and in some 
cases the insufficiency) of words. Haukyn’s minstrelsy reminds the audience that in Piers 
Plowman we must always actively attend to multiple interpretations.  
Despite his lofty goals, Haukyn’s career as a minstrel tangles him between 
spiritual and physical before we even hear his account of himself. He claims to have 
parishioners, who might be read as his audience, and thus his music may serve as an 
adjunct to preaching. The narrator notes Haukyn’s beliefs are so bold and so singular that 
“Was noon swich as himself, ne noon so pope holy; / Yhabited as a heremyte, an ordre by 
hymselve,” as if Haukyn had entered or invented some kind of bizarre order (XIII.283-
85). But Haukyn’s music does not help his parishioners save their souls, which should be 
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the result of spiritual nourishment. Indeed, his “gospel” is only directed toward 
entertaining his audience in their earthly lives, and even in this his material musical 
talents are questionable: 
 Couthe I lye and do men laughe, thane lacchen I sholde  
Outher mantel or moneie amonges lordes mynstrals.  
Ac for I kan neither taboure ne trompe ne telle no gestes,  
Farten ne fithelen at festes, ne harpen,  
Jape ne jogele ne gentilliche pipe,  
Ne neither saille ne saute ne synge with the gyterne. (XIII.229-234) 
 
Not only are his desires for performance skills based in the physical world – farting and 
juggling are not spiritual activities – but he does not seem to be very good at them. His 
job as an entertainer, therefore, buys him “no goode giftes of thise grete lordes / for no 
breed that I brynge forth – save a benison on the Sonday” (XIII.235-36). Not only does 
he gain no gifts for the material entertainment he attempts to provide, but his language 
reveals his misdirected goals; by calling his musical skills “breed,” he slips into spiritual 
language and alludes to the Eucharist and to his other job as a “waferer.”162  
While minstrelsy is a worldly job that Haukyn misinterprets as spiritual, his 
wafering seems at first to offer a more direct employment with spiritual things. Haukyn 
claims “alle trewe travaillours and tiliers of the erthe, / Fro Mighelmesse to Mighelmesse 
I funde hem with wafres. / Beggeris and bidderis of my breed craven, / Faitours and 
freres and folk with brode crouns. / I fynde payn for the Pope and provender for his 
palfrey” (XIII.239-243). Providing people – both laity and clergy – with communion 
wafers seems like an important job that nourishes their souls with a material but symbolic 
food. Watson argues that Haukyn has a right to associate himself with spirituality, 
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 His music as “breed” might also connote the idea of music as food: something from which his 
“parishioners” might gain secular nourishment as they enjoy the sound. His lack of skill, however, also 
seems relevant here; his sub-par fiddling could leave his audience still hungry, or even give them a kind of 
metaphorical indigestion.  
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because “he provides the processed ‘liflode’ from which the miracle of transubstantiation 
occurs each time Mass is celebrated; as a figure for the Christian community, indeed he is 
that ‘liflode’, the Body of Christ” (110). However, Haukyn’s interpretation of his duty is 
misapplied, and if we read his wafering only according to this spiritual definition we miss 
the complexity of his character.  
As Malcolm Godden points out, though Haukyn is interested in providing food 
for the hungry populace, a waferer was not simply a person responsible for communion 
wafers; the title extended to bakers or confectioners, as well as a kind of itinerant peddler 
who also sold fruits, nuts, and other delicacies. Haukyn’s name, Godden suggests, was 
likely chosen as a pun: such a peddler would “hawk” his wares to the public (111). For 
Godden Haukyn’s “breed” is not even communion wafers, but a kind of biscuit; his food 
is entirely material (110). James Simpson concurs, defining “waferer” as “a seller of 
flour-based snacks,” rather than the wafers into which Christ’s body transubstantiates 
(157). Haukyn himself seems to confirm these readings; he explains “thane I wolde be 
prest to the peple, paast for to make, / And buxom and busy aboute breed and drynke” 
(XIII.250-51). A. V. C. Schmidt glosses “paast” as a pastry, perhaps suggesting a sweet 
confection, though it could also indicate something like a Cornish pastie – a more savory 
but still undeniably material offering (217). Pastries or pasties, the type of nourishment 
Haukyn’s food provides is physical. However, because he interprets his provender as 
reason enough to be considered a priest – and, in fact, recasts the important aspects of 
priestly work to revolve around food and drink – Haukyn shows his confusion about the 
relationship between material and spiritual nourishment. Further, his assertion that he 
provides food for animals as well as people belies the spiritual nature of his wares; 
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though the pope’s palfrey may be a noble animal with an important task, it would not be 
expected to need spiritual food in the same way the Christian populace would.  
Langland continues to emphasize the material as Haukyn elaborates on his tasks 
as waferer. He claims:  
er I have breed of mele, ofte moot I swete, 
And er the commune have corn ynough many a cold morwenyng; 
So, er my wafres be ywroght, muche wo I tholye. 
Al Londoun, I leve, liketh wel my wafre, 
And louren whan thei lakken hem; it is noght longe ypassed 
There was a careful commune whan no cart com to towne 
With bake breed fro Stratford; tho gonnen beggeris wepe,  
And werkmen were agast a lite. (XIII.260-67)  
 
Schmidt confirms the “bake breed fro Stratford” refers to Stratford-atte-Bowe, whose 
bakers provided bread for London (341). The idea that common people would starve 
without Haukyn’s wares has physical rather than spiritual connotations: the bread comes 
from an actual bakery, and those who need Haukyn’s bread to survive are beggars and 
laborers, whose concerns are typically worldly food. Further, in detailing this lack of 
bread Haukyn cites specific historical information, which is comparatively rare in this 
poem. He says “In the date of Oure Drighte, in a drye Aprill, / A thousand and thre 
hundred, twies thritty and tene, / My wafres there were gesene, whan Chichestre was 
maire” (XIII.269-71). This extreme specificity in a poem rife with abstractions is 
startling. It is as if Langland wishes to emphasize Haukyn’s status as in the physical 
world, rather than simply representative of character attributes. Historically there was a 
dearth of food in 1370 when John de Chichester was mayor of London.163 Haukyn now 
has a very physical, almost “real” place in the world to which Langland’s readers 
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 John de Chichestre was a wealthy goldsmith and served as mayor of London from October 1369-
October 1370. In A Chronicle of London his entry reads: “John Chichestre, mayor, goldsmith. In this yere 
was so gret derthe of corne in Engelond that a busshell of whete was worth xld” (qtd. in Skeat 204).   
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belonged (Schmidt 462). By imagining real, extra-textual consequences caused by a 
figural character, Langland enfleshes Haukyn, positioning him not as a historically real 
person, but certainly as more than simply the representation of a style of life. He is, in 
fact, important because his place in the world is secured by his interconnectivity with it. 
His existence and actions affect other people: without his bread, the populace really does 
go hungry.  
Haukyn’s emphasis on physicality rather than spirituality shows the same 
confusion he displayed in interpreting his minstrelsy: though both are needed, Haukyn 
does not understand the importance of this balance. Though he began his speech by 
referencing the Eucharist in the form of his profession as a producer of communion 
wafers, Haukyn’s discussion of wafers quickly reveals that he considers them primarily 
food created to sustain the human body, rather than attain salvation. The strife and 
hardship he endures in making his wafers includes sweating at the mill and chilly 
conditions, which affect the body but not the soul (XIII.261-63). Further, when he 
explains the consequences of a dearth of wafers, the hungry commoners “louren” 
(XIII.265). An angry scowl seems a reasonable reaction to a lack of food, but not the 
expected response to spiritual danger. If Haukyn’s wafers truly fulfilled a spiritual 
purpose, his “parishioners” might do more than glower at their lack.164  
Furthermore, despite Haukyn’s supposed attempts at reform and his concern over 
his filthy attire (the figural importance of which I will discuss at length later in the 
chapter), he seems fundamentally concerned only with bodily preservation. He discusses 
his desire for a literate clerk, who could “caste [the pope] a bille / That he sente me under 
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 And perhaps they do, but Haukyn’s inability to see the spiritual side of his duties means his observations 
filter through a physical lens.  
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his seel a salve for the pestilence, / And that his blessynge and hise bulles bocches 
myghte destruye: / In nomine meo demonia eicient et super egros manus imponent et 
bene habebunt” (XIII.249-51). Though the Latin Haukyn quotes here does reference a 
physical laying on of hands, the implication seems to be healing spiritual faults in the 
form of casting out devils. Like the Doctor, Haukyn identifies only a surface meaning. He 
interprets the words to mean physical healing, as he declares he wants the Pope to send 
him a salve to heal plague-sores.165 When he suffers from physical ailments, Haukyn 
abandons any hope of spiritual intercession. He declares that at the end of a year of 
sickness, he despises  
Lechecraft of Oure Lord and leve on a wicche,  
And say that no clerc ne kan – ne Crist, as I leve –  
To the Soutere of Southwerk, or of Shordych Dame Emme,  
And seye that [God ne] Goddes word gaf me nevere boote,  
But thorugh a charme hadde I chaunce and my chief heele. (XIII.338-42) 
 
Like his desire for the Pope to send salve for boils, Haukyn expects physical results from 
God to heal his physical ailments; for him, God is a physician of the body, not the soul. 
When this spiritual medicine results in no material healing, he turns to witchcraft and 
charms – depending on physical objects to obtain physical results. He is smitten with 
despair, and yet “penaunce that the preest enjoyneth parfourneth yvele, / Dooth non 
almesdede, dred hym of no synne, / Lyveth ayein the bileve and no lawe holdeth. / Ech 
day his halyday with hym of an heigh ferye” (XIII.412-14). Rather than accept and 
complete his penance, committing himself to the nourishment of spiritual healing, 
Haukyn depends upon physical food. He remains within the language and the realm of 
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 This may be another injection of historical information into the poem, though admittedly less explicit 
than the date and mayor’s name in the famine reference above: in the second half of the fourteenth century 
the Black Plague swept through England multiple times. Haukyn’s reference to sickness could be 
interpreted metaphorically as spiritual illness, but also literally as an instance of the plague.  
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the literal and material. Godden agrees, calling the active life – the category Haukyn’s 
title claims he represents – “fundamentally the pursuit of ‘belly-joy’, to use Piers’ term” 
(112).  
Because Haukyn is unable to break from his need for physical sustenance and 
move into an understanding of spiritual nourishment, just as the Doctor was unable to 
move beyond the physical into the figurative when translating the meaning of scripture, 
Patience must offer him spiritual food in a way that he can understand. In explaining the 
idea and importance of spiritual nourishment instead of physical consumption to Haukyn, 
Patience promises “I shal purveie thee paast… though no plough erye, / And flour to fede 
folk with as best be for the soule; / Though nevere greyn growed, ne grape upon vyne, / 
Alle that lyveth and loketh liflode wolde I fynde, / And that ynogh – shal noon faille of 
thing that hem nedeth” (XIV.29-33). Patience explains spiritual nourishment in terms of 
material food, just as Haukyn described his communion wafers in terms of their capacity 
to physically sustain bodies. He even uses the same word “paast” that Haukyn has 
previously applied to his “priesthood.” Pasties without a plough, flour or grain, and wine 
without grapes is food that one eats with a spiritual mouth. For Patience, however, 
dependence on God is sufficient, and therefore food can be understood as both figurative 
and literal. Because Haukyn may manufacture wafers used for communion, however, he 
should be familiar with the miracle of transubstantiation and therefore recognize the 
figurative capacities of Eucharistic food: communion wafers become the body of Christ – 
the word is made flesh and the flesh is made food.  
Despite Haukyn’s presumed familiarity with the Eucharist, his responsibility for 
the production of the physical wafer reduces it to something to eat. Although he claims to 
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have parishioners, he is not responsible for enacting the miracle of transubstantiation. 
Only a priest can do that and Haukyn, without ordination, sees only that his wafers are 
supposed to provide a kind of nourishment he does not fully understand. Because his 
knowledge rests on what can be materially produced in the physical world, Haukyn sees 
the physical ingestion of the wafer as the key element in Patience’s analogy. He takes 
Patience’s instructions literally, and therefore does not comprehend how a person can 
survive without eating. Tellingly, he laughs at Patience’s explanation, saying “Whoso 
leveth yow [either], by Oure Lord, I leve noght he be blessed!” (XIV.36). For him, 
blessing is based on physical activity: food that can be produced without a plough, and 
wine that can be made without grapes will have no physical effect on a body; Haukyn 
therefore doubts their efficacy on any level.  
Patience then endeavors to explain the idea that spiritual nourishment is just as 
important as, if not more than, physical consumption by offering the Pater Noster to 
Haukyn and to the watching dreamer. Patience pulls from his traveling bag “Vitailles of 
grete virtues” and exclaims “Lo! Here liflode ynogh, if oure belive be trewe. / For lent 
nevere was there lif but liflode were shapen” (XIV.38, 39-40). This is language in which 
food means more than comestibles. “Liflode” can mean food and drink, but also the 
necessities of life including shelter and clothing, calling to mind the “three needful 
things” so important to those of Langland’s characters hampered by physical embodiment 
(“liflode” [n.] MED). It also indicates the means of procuring such necessities, and 
crucially, as Patience seems to intend it, a moral code of behavior or a way of life. Thus 
while remaining within the food-related language Haukyn understands, Patience attempts 
to expand his definition of nourishment by suggesting that the moral means of living are 
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important in addition to the physical products that sustain the body. He then advances his 
key argument: “Non in solo pane vivit homo, se in omni verbo quod procedit de ore Dei” 
(XIV.47a). As he has throughout, Langland chooses for Patience to recite scripture in 
Latin. While man’s spiritual existence certainly depends on more than bread alone, as 
Patience explains, his method of explanation is literally and figuratively unclear to 
Haukyn, and perhaps to the dreamer as well. Not only is he reiterating the idea of 
spiritual nourishment – that the word of God will provide all sustenance required for 
salvation – but he is doing so literally in a foreign language.166 This is another 
opportunity for mistranslation, as in the dinner scene with the Doctor. While Haukyn and 
Will may recognize some Latin phrases, they are far from fluent, and therefore Patience’s 
words provide the opportunity for misunderstanding on multiple levels.167  
Because Will and Haukyn have similarities to Langland’s audience – both are 
physically embodied, both struggle to understand how to live well, and both are notably 
imperfect – this moment of potential misunderstanding seems to extend to Langland’s 
readers as well. Recalling ruminatio – envisioning reading and contemplation as 
consumption – it is intriguing to consider the implications of reading a language partially 
or completely foreign, as Latin may have been for many in Langland’s audience.168 
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 Fiona Somerset has noted the multilinguality of medieval Latin. Rather than a monolith, institution-
specific forms of training rendered it a language with a plurality of sub-spheres: different professions would 
require different areas of expertise which, though Somerset suggests resulted in spoken variances 
recognizable even to non-Latin speakers, might produce some level of confusion even among those who 
spoke Latin at varying levels of fluency (107-136).  
 
167
 In fact, Haukyn attempts to use Latin, explaining early in Passus XIV the reason for his soiled coat as 
“Uxorem duxi, et ideo non possum venire” (XIV.3a). Though his reference to the Feast of Emmaus seems 
relevant, recalling one of the reasons given for not attending the feast, this does not necessarily mean he has 
a full understanding of Latin or scripture, as his responses to Patience make clear. 
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 For more on the Latin in Piers Plowman, see Raskolnikov; Somerset; Wesseling; and Sullivan. It is 
worth considering the effect of “foreign language” to a contemporary audience as well: without marginal 
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Though Biblical phrases would likely have been familiar, Rollo’s explanation of levels of 
Latin literacy seems particularly applicable here: hearing a phrase and understanding the 
translated meaning of each word does not necessarily mean understanding the figurative 
message of the passage. The possibility of mistranslation or incomplete translation 
always exists. If that happens, within the metaphor of readers as eaters of a text, does this 
result in some form of figurative indigestion, as with the Doctor, or does it just make the 
words not as nourishing as they could be with a complete understanding of all levels of 
meaning? Like Haukyn, Langland’s audience also runs the risk of missing part of 
Patience’s message thanks to a kind of partial digestion of its metaphors: an inability, one 
might say, to translate the literary food that is Langland’s poem. 
Recognizing Haukyn’s disbelief, Patience tries a new tactic. Rather than 
describing the physical in spiritual terms, as both the Doctor and Haukyn had previously 
done, Patience converts the spiritual to physical. He offers  
a pece of the Paternoster – Fiat voluntas tua.  
‘Have, Haukyn,’ quod Pacience, ‘and et this whan the hungreth,  
Or whan thow clomsest for cold or clyngest for droughte… 
Tharstow nevere care for corn ne lynnen cloth ne wollen, 
Ne for drynke, ne deeth drede, but deye as God liketh,  
Or thorugh hunger or thorugh hete – at his wille be it. (XIV.49-51, 56-58)  
 
By treating the Pater Noster as physical food, and further, by explaining how it takes the 
place of other physical items of necessity – food, drink, warm clothing – Patience gives 
Haukyn the nourishment he so desires in material form.169 The three needful things from 
Passus I now have a spiritual antidote: fiat voluntas tua. Haukyn can consume the words 
of the text because they come in physical form, even though they are meant for his soul’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
glosses and translation notes, a student or scholar without training in Latin or Middle English might also 
miss elements of Langland’s message, therefore not gaining the “nutrition” it offers.   
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 For a detailed explanation of fiat voluntas tua as the proffered phrase, see Gillespie. 
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wellbeing rather than his bodily health. Patience has successfully navigated the space 
between literal and figurative by translating the text itself as object into food; he now 
speaks a language that Haukyn understands. This simulates the miracle of the 
annunciation, as the Word takes physical form in the shape of Christ, and the 
transubstantiation of the Eucharist, which Christ inaugurated by offering himself as the 
bread and wine of the Last Supper. Asking his disciples to eat of his body and drink of 
his blood, embodying him because he is the food they consume, is the same kind of 
translation of spiritual to physical Patience makes here.  
Patience’s goal for the meal he offers is to show Haukyn that physical food is 
unnecessary because God will provide everything needed to sustain life and attain 
salvation. As Simpson explains it, Patience advocates “a rejection of earthly food, or at 
least of any conscious care about such food, in favour of essential human sustenance, 
which is the divine Word” (160). While Haukyn rests on the physical, Patience seems to 
understand life and survival solely through a spiritual lens. Patience tells Haukyn 
“thorugh his breeth mowen [bothe] men and beestes liven, / As Holy Writ witnesseth 
whan men seye hir graces: Aperis tu manem tuam, et imples omne animal benediccione. / 
It is founden that fourty winter folk lyvede withouten tulying, / And out of the flynt 
sprong the flood that folk and beestes drunken” (XIV.61-64). Maintaining his focus on 
food, Patience promises that those who take nourishment from a spiritual source will no 
longer have to worry about their physical sustenance, since God will provide all that is 
needed. Similarly, he says that “manye wyntres men lyveden and no mete ne tulieden”: 
they lived on God’s will alone (XIV.67).  
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Once Haukyn has fed upon the Pater Noster, Patience seems to think his pupil 
should be able to understand Patience’s sermon about Dowel as a form of nourishment, 
and transform from a flawed, fully physical being into someone more spiritual. However, 
the Passus ends with Haukyn despairing his unworthiness and inability to revert solely to 
God’s will. He is, he says, “noght worthi, woot God… to werien any clothes, / ne neither 
sherte ne shoon, save for shame one / To cover my careyne” (XIV.329-31). Despite his 
attempts, Haukyn as a character is not able to entirely shed the physicality his textual 
representation allots him: the Active Man, a man who moves in the material world. As 
Malcolm Godden points out, in a poem filled with allegorical figures whose qualities 
align with their names, if Activa Vita abandons the world, he would no longer be Activa 
Vita. Rather than turning over a new leaf and eating Patience’s food, Haukyn must 
continue to be who he is (Godden 114). His “realness” here bumps up against his 
standing as allegorized persona: though Langland’s audience can learn from allegory and 
change itself individually, Haukyn remains within the text and, despite his blend of 
material and metaphorical characteristics, he can only see that he should change. In his 
case, letter and concept combine to keep him from actually changing.  
To understand why Patience’s methods fail with Haukyn, we must examine the 
implications of his title. He introduces himself as “Activa Vita. / Al ydel ich hatie, for of 
Actif is my name,” and later, “And that am I, Actif, that ydelnesse hatie” (XIII.225-26, 
239). His concentration on activity simply to avoid any kind of idleness suggests, as 
Rudd has argued, that he misunderstands his own name; he assumes that “avoiding 
idleness entails great busyness and so he is involved in everything – but to the wrong end. 
Like the Doctor he has misdirected his energies and his skills, and so again the result is 
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hypocrisy” (157). Whether Haukyn misunderstands his name or not, it is his 
personification of a life characterized by action that prevents him from following 
Patience’s call for belief and faith as the way one should live.170  
Because Haukyn is, in a sense, the human body, the enfleshment of his figuration 
as Active Life differs from many of Langland’s personifications. Rather than an abstract 
concept vocalizing in a human form, Haukyn is bound by the same needs, requirements, 
and imperfections as ordinary human beings: he is physical, he needs food, he is tainted 
by original sin, and he is mortal. While Patience feasts on “a pitaunce, Pro hac orabit / 
Omnis sanctus in tempore oportuno” and seems to thrive on the nourishment the words 
alone bring him, neither Haukyn nor Will – nor the poem’s audience, for that matter – 
can physically sustain themselves on this kind of food (XIII.56-56a). In a sense Patience 
suggests this when he gives Haukyn the Pater Noster, saying “if thow lyvest after his 
lore, the shorter lif the bettre: Si quis amat Christum mundum non diligit istum” (XIV.58-
58a). What Patience does not acknowledge, however, is the unavoidable truth of his 
statement: living solely on faith may mean a more spiritual life, but it also means a 
hastened end to physical existence. Langland seems to use the limits of allegorical 
categorization to comment on the limits of the human condition: change, growth, and 
development are possible to a point, but if you don’t eat, you die, and there is no way 
around that.171   
                                                 
170
 The alternative to a life of action is a life of contemplation: removing oneself from the world and 
spending one’s time in reflection and meditation on God. However, like the Doctor, Haukyn, and the 
dreamer show, not everyone can take this path. In this, to generalize broadly, they stand for the laity: 
anyone not employed in ecclesiastical or intellectual pursuits. Of the three medieval estates, the secular are 
“those who work.” Haukyn, characterized by endless work of various kinds, seems to be representative of 
this entire estate.  
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 As Caroline Walker Bynum has shown in Holy Feast and Holy Fast, some medieval religious did try to 
go without food, or consumed only communion wafers. Their lives were typically short, however, and not 
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Part of Haukyn’s inability to comprehend the kind of nourishment Patience offers 
seems also to be Patience’s misunderstanding. His urging that Haukyn adopt a new 
“liflode” emphasizes his blinkered view of Haukyn’s existence. Despite the miracles 
Patience relates – the forty winters men lived without tilling their fields, the springs God 
provides to sustain both humans and animals – Haukyn sees a truth, gained from his lived 
experience, that Patience cannot explain away (XIV.63-64). That dry April in 1370 when 
Haukyn’s wafers were scarce, people were hungry (XIII.266-271). Contrary to Patience’s 
promises, God did not rain down manna from Heaven. The people in London went 
without. Further, as Holy Church revealed at the beginning of the poem, food and drink 
are requirements for bodily existence. Therefore, and in keeping with what the dreamer 
has learned from characters like the Doctor, abandoning an active existence seems not to 
be the complete answer.  
Some critics have suggested Haukyn does experience spiritual change – he not 
only learns the lesson Patience teaches, but puts it into action; he cries and despairs the 
difficulty of a life of patient poverty at the close of Passus XIV. Robert Adams argues for 
spiritual growth in Haukyn and Will, though he also claims Haukyn’s despair marks a fall 
back into sin (88, 90). Harwood argues for transformation as well: “Under the tuition of 
Conscience and Patience, Haukyn will turn from active to Patient also” (96). Frank 
interprets Haukyn’s tears and final speech as proof he has accepted Patience’s teachings, 
and concludes that patient poverty is the best way for a layman to live (76). However, this 
claim seems to forget that while Haukyn can see that he should alter his ways, as Active 
Life he will always be unable to do so. As Godden says, “For all the earlier hints at the 
                                                                                                                                                 
indicative of fourteenth-century norms. Haukyn, as representative of the common man, shares the common 
man’s appetite for material sustenance.  
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possibility of reforming Haukyn and the active life, what essentially is proposed by 
Conscience and Patience is a reformation which would change his very identity, as 
Haukyn’s disconsolate conclusion seems to acknowledge” (114). Watson concurs, calling 
Haukyn’s tears not conversion or even contrition, but need and self-knowledge: Haukyn 
recognizes who and what he is, and such recognition acknowledges his flaws (115). His 
representation of lay society is clearest in his coat, the garment, soiled literally and 
figuratively, of which he is at once proud and tormented.  
After Haukyn introduces himself, the dreamer makes his own observations. For 
Will, to see Haukyn is to see his coat: “I took greet kepe, by Crist, and conscience bothe, 
/ Of Haukyn the Actif Man, and how he was yclothed. / He hadde a cote of Cristendom as 
Holy Kirke bileveth; / Ac it was moled in many places with manye sundry plottes” 
(XIII.272-75). The dreamer goes on to describe, for the rest of the Passus, how this coat 
contains upon it the seven deadly sins in the form of spots and soiled patches. Haukyn’s 
actions – engaging in wrathful or lecherous behavior – are the cause of these patches, as 
Will concludes when he observes “Thus Haukyn the actif man hadde ysoiled his cote” 
(XIII.458). The wide range of activities required and the causal structure Haukyn 
employs remind us of his figuration as an allegorical persona rather than just an 
extremely flawed man. He claims “if my neghebore hadde an hyne, or any beest ellis, / 
Moore profitable than myn… at the laste I stale it,” or “if I hadde dedly synne doon, I 
dredde noght that so soore / As what I lened and leved it lost or longe er it were paied,” 
or “if I sente over see my servaunts to Brugges, / Or to Pruceland my prentis my profit to 
waiten… Mighte nevere me conforte in the mene tyme / Ne mass ne matynes, ne none 
maner sightes” (XIII.364-65, 367, 388-89, 392-93, 395-96). These diverse possibilities 
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suggest the livelihood of more than just one man; indeed, some of the activities Haukyn 
describes seem out of keeping with his own life. He represents all of humankind’s sins, 
not just his own. As Simpson says, “The range of stains on this coat reveal Haukyn to be 
representative of a much wider range of humanity than simply waferers and minstrels: 
it… includes the professional failings of a wide range of trades” (158). But if his coat 
generalizes Haukyn into a surrogate for everyone, it also makes him rounder, more 
embodied, more “real.” Haukyn cannot possibly do everything he says he has done, but 
he does hold down specific jobs and he seems to have traveled widely. Through him 
Langland suggests that for a medieval Christian humanness is complex and sometimes 
difficult to navigate; its figural embodiment must also be complex.  
Because Haukyn’s coat is besmirched with human sin, and because he is an 
embodiment of what it is to be an active human, his coat seems to be an extension of his 
body. This confluence becomes clearer in his response to Conscience’s question about 
why he has not brushed his coat clean. For Rudd this question individuates Haukyn: it 
“prefaces a return to Haukyn as a real person rather than the canvas for sins he has 
become by the end of Passus XIII” (160). Haukyn’s response, however, seems to belie 
this. He answers “I have but oon hater,” and explains “I am the lasse to blame / Though it 
be soiled and selde clene – I slepe therinne o nyghtes; / And also I have an houswif, 
hewen and children… That wollen bymolen it many tyme, maugree my chekes” (XIV.1-
4). Though the literal explanation that his coat is soiled because he wears it constantly 
makes sense, the immediate jump to his assertion that he has a wife and family seems a 
non sequitur, if we read it literally. If, however, the coat is also Haukyn’s body,172 the 
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shift to his carnal existence seems reasonable. He has both wife and children, and 
therefore he has not remained pure. This physical activity is reflected figuratively as 
stains on his coat. Thus Conscience’s question is one that troubles all people: why do we 
not remain clean? As Haukyn confirms, the actions of our bodies collect dirt on our 
“clothes” – our physical forms.173  
Haukyn goes on to explain that the coat “hath be laved in Lente and out of Lente 
bothe,” and that he (or it) “was shryven of the preest,” but yet “kouthe I nevere, by Crist! 
Kepen it clene an houre, / That I ne soiled it with sighte or som ydel speche, / Or thorugh 
werk or thorugh word, or wille of myn herte, / That I ne flobre it foule fro morwe til 
even” (XIV.5, 9, 12-15). Despite his attempts to live free from sin, that is, Haukyn cannot 
help soiling himself by his actions, whose effects appear on the coat that represents his 
body. His activity – interactions with other people and his environment – recalls the 
interconnectivity an ecocritical reading requires: bodily existence in a world inclined 
toward sin implicates him because his physical connections bind him to that world. As 
Haukyn says, “So hard it is… to lyve and to do synne. / Synne seweth us evere” 
(XIV.322-23). For him, living and sinning cannot be separated because he has this body – 
this coat – he cannot remove. Try as he might, he cannot remain pure.  
Yet Haukyn cannot abandon his worldly existence either. His final statement 
makes clear his understanding of his inability to access the life Patience recommends. He 
again references clothing, crying, “I were noght worthi, woot God… to werien any 
clothes, / No neither sherte ne shoon, save for shame one / To cover my careyne” 
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 John A. Alford offers another explanation, claiming equating the coat with Haukyn is too simplistic 
(133). Rather, Alford suggests, Haukyn’s coat has no constant meaning, but provides “a complex image of 
man’s spiritual history,” while the wife he mentions is representative of the flesh he is bound to while in 
this world (136). I suggest we not bind ourselves to one reading or the other, but embrace a rhizomatic 
system to see the multiple interpretations the coat might have.  
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(XIV.329-31). E. Talbot Donaldson translates Haukyn’s desire as “I would not be 
worthy, God knows,” which expresses the optative context of desire: Haukyn wishes he 
were unworthy of clothing (Donaldson Translation 241). Worth or worthiness implies 
sufficient standing or status, but it also indicates deserving or merit (“worth ” [adj.] 
MED). Haukyn’s exclamation could mean he wishes he did not deserve clothing, which 
would indicate a desire to divest himself of the sinful body he wears, and must wear, 
because he is human: he is his coat. He wishes instead for only shame to cover his corpse, 
marking again his desire to renounce the body he has been born into.174  
This desire for renunciation makes clear Haukyn’s problem. Because he is a 
representation and member of the laity, he is therefore a human being bound by his body 
with the need to eat, which entails living an active life tainted by sin. To cast off his 
embodied existence would be to reject the physical form that was God’s gift and choice 
for him. Returning to the idea that personification allegory mirrors the Incarnation 
through the translation of word into flesh, Haukyn not only reflects an enfleshed idea, but 
reminds us of Christ’s humanity. A desire to renounce the human form as unclean and 
undesirable, therefore, also entails renouncing the crucial theological tenet of the 
Incarnation: Christ was fully human as well as divine. Haukyn’s desire itself is 
problematic not only because it is not possible, but because it signals contempt toward 
Christ’s body and calls into question God’s plan. Haukyn’s interconnectedness with the 
world around him – his need to eat and drink in order to maintain his physical body – 
requires activity and participation. To overcome his humanness Haukyn would need not 
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 This line could be translated to mean that Haukyn considers himself unworthy to wear clothes, but such 
a translation obscures the equation of clothing with the body established by Haukyn’s coat, and the verb 
“were” as a plural: because it takes a plural subject in the active mood, “were” does not seem appropriate to 
translate into the “to be” verb here.  
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to act, but to remain passive and allow God to act upon him – a choice that would result 
in his literal and metaphorical death.  
The food-related movement in Passus XIII and XIV from the Doctor’s 
misapplication of learning to his physical wellbeing to Haukyn’s inability to shift from 
material to spiritual indicates a complex relationship between physical and spiritual 
nourishment. By offering the Doctor of Divinity, Haukyn, and Patience and pointing out 
their flaws in understanding spiritual nourishment, Langland leaves us with the 
suggestion that mankind remains wandering within the signifying loop of the learned 
quest for divinity and the concentration on material survival. To present this idea, 
Langland complicates the relationship between allegory and realism, creating with the 
Doctor and Haukyn characters infused with individuality that are nevertheless still 
allegorical figurations. Because he represents not only abstract concepts but ways of life 
in his figurations, he problematizes and expands the category of allegory without 
breaking through it, resisting its flatness in his recognition and embrace of ordinary 
human needs. By presenting this complication in a genre intended to teach through its 
multiple levels of signification, Langland gives us – his readers – something to chew on: 
as humans with human needs, Scripture is perhaps not the only text from which we can 
learn, grow, and nourish ourselves.  
The restrained multiplicity that reading Piers Plowman demands, to understand 
Haukyn and the Doctor and to understand the way Langland modifies allegory as a genre, 
necessitates a rhizomatic reading. What is important in Langland’s presentation is 
plurality: spiritual and material, human and figural, realism and metaphor are all part of 
his construction of the Doctor and Haukyn. Because it addresses both sides of these 
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oppositions, Piers Plowman not only occupies the categories of allegory and “realism,” 
but exceeds each through language that insists we read them together, mapped onto one 
another and informing one another like lines of flight on a rhizome. As I hope I have 
demonstrated, simple categories are insufficient to contain Langland’s characters and too 
restrictive to contain his entire work: Piers Plowman is an allegory but it is a rhizomatic 
allegory, stretching out its boundaries to incorporate realism, figuralism, physicality and 
spirituality. These elements, all part of the textual body Langland creates, show us at 
once the complexity and flux as well as the limits of what it is to be a human being in the 
medieval Christian west.   
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CHAPTER V 
ESCAPING THE ABJECT: SAINTLY PARADOX  
IN CHAUCER’S HAGIOGRAPHIES 
If animality and monstrosity border humanness on one side, divinity borders it on 
another. While Christians are promised judgment and redemption after death, some 
medieval religious tried to reach the divine during life through denial and repudiation of 
their bodies. The problem with attempting transcendence in the flesh, however, is the 
issue of mortality and the potentially corrupting physical behaviors that sustain life.175 To 
reach divinity, human beings have to overstep that which in them can die: their bodies. 
To be human is to be a soul soldered to a corruptible, aging body that is subject to 
permeation, penetration, and decay. Mortality is flux, instability and change; the body 
signals its mortality through its need to ingest and exude material. How can the body, 
forever subject to rot and decomposition, have a part in the eternal, the unchanging, the 
impermeable? (Morrison 43). 
If humans must be mortal because their bodies corrupt and die, and God and other 
divine beings are immortal, living human transcendence seems paradoxical, if not 
impossible. Yet medieval literature depicts transcendent bodies that exceed the bounds of 
mortality and survive unsurvivable torture. In her examination of polemical 
representations of disgust, Alexandra Cuffel explains that in any religion’s exploration of 
the nature of God, “a primary concern was to separate divinity from the biological 
functioning of the human body. Distancing heavenly beings from the individual human 
was one aspect of this separation” (22). Christ himself seems the notable exception to this 
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 Haukyn’s nutritional deficit and despair suggest this problem in the previous chapter: the state of being 
human is the state of not being divine, so rising to the latter state means rejecting or abandoning the former.  
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rule – as an incarnated being who was also fully divine, his body was not impervious, as 
his torture and crucifixion make clear. Cuffel avers that Christ’s “juxtaposition of divinity 
and humanity caused consternation in some circles, all the more as the mundane and 
potentially polluting realities of Jesus’ human existence came to the fore” (108). The 
anxiety associated with the implications of the Incarnation seems telling here: Christ was 
divine, and therefore his body should not function like a regular human being’s, but he 
was also human, which meant he was subject to the corruptions and pollutions of the 
human condition.  
In Augustine’s City of God, the Western Christian desire for human immortality is 
evident in the representation of resurrected human beings. Augustine declares resurrected 
bodies perfect, freed of any earthly physical defects; regardless of the age or condition of 
the body at death, its resurrected form appears fully grown in a perfect young adulthood, 
and possesses the best health and physical condition possible (XXII.13-17). After 
resurrection the body needs no physical food, nor will it need to engage in corrupting 
intercourse. Susan Signe Morrison explains that in contrast to mortality’s changeability, 
most theologians saw heavenly existence as stasis. Though the body would rise whole 
and complete, meaning it was still capable of digestion and procreation, redemption made 
these activities superfluous (Morrison 43). To attain divinity was to rise above human 
urges.176 Yet as long as they were on earth, bodies remained corruptible because, as 
medieval medical tracts said, they were composed of changeable, malleable matter (44). 
Because one cannot transcend the body without dying, the boundary between human and 
divine seems absolute, far more impermeable, at any rate, than the boundary that 
separates humans and animals, as my previous chapters have shown.  
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Yet textual bodies populate this space between human and divine just as they 
populate the wide territory between human and animal. These extraordinary bodies are 
marked by miraculous abilities – among them the ability to survive “mortal” wounding 
and fragmentation. In this chapter, I examine Chaucer’s depiction of the superhuman in 
two tales: the Prioress’s Tale – a Miracle of the Virgin and secular saint’s life – and the 
Second Nun’s Tale – Chaucer’s translation of the hagiography of St. Cecelia. In both 
tales, bodies achieve transcendence through fragmentation, they remain mobile in stasis, 
and singular and unified in multiplicity. The Prioress uses a metaphor of digestion to 
depict her little clergeon’s move from human to divine even while his wounded body lies 
passive and immobile in a privy, alive yet dead, pure amid corruption. The Second Nun’s 
St. Cecelia, wife and virgin and spiritual “mother” in her community, sits motionless and 
partially decapitated in a bath of flames as her body is transmuted into a superhuman 
union with God. Each martyr exemplifies bothness and betweenness; they are wounded 
yet whole – one foot in our world, the other in the beyond. 
The genres Chaucer chooses for these tales allow for the preternatural. Miracles 
of the Virgin praise Mary by collecting her marvelous acts, and hagiography chronicles a 
saint’s extra-human deeds. The saint often imitates Christ in his or her miraculous birth, 
chaste life, tortured death, and posthumous miracle-working. Though saints enact 
faultless devotion and provide paradigms of Christianity, for Caroline Walker Bynum 
they were intended more to be marveled at and meditated on than imitated 
(Metamorphosis and Identity 43, Holy Feast and Holy Fast 7). These saints’ Christ-like 
actions (imitatio Christi) were too extraordinary and miraculous for ordinary human 
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beings to emulate. Both genres, then, present examples of religious devotion that border 
on or cross into more-than-human circumstances and abilities.  
Neither the Prioress’s Tale nor the Second Nun’s Tale is original to Chaucer. 
Both historical events and a literary tradition precede the Prioress’s Tale. Accounts of 
young Christian boys murdered by Jews were being recorded as early as the eleventh 
century. The martyrdom of Little St. Hugh, a particularly infamous libel which the 
Prioress’s Tale resembles and mentions, took place in 1255 (Patterson 507, 511).177 
Legends and sermons similar to the Prioress’s Tale began appearing in the twelfth 
century (507). The life of St. Cecelia is probably most famously recorded in Jacobus de 
Voragine’s thirteenth-century collection Legenda Aurea, but it also has earlier sources, 
including the Passio S. Caecilia, which may date as far back as the sixth century (Reams 
38).  
Both the Prioress’s Tale and the Second Nun’s Tale center around a faultlessly 
virginal protagonist who expresses total devotion to Mary, and both recount their hero’s 
martyrdom through bodily fragmentation.178 Both tales – in their choice of a child and a 
woman as their respective main figures – depict marginalized, socially powerless people. 
The excellent collection Chaucer’s Religious Tales, edited by C. David Benson and 
Elizabeth Robertson, was conceived and assembled to redress a perceived critical 
oversight by addressing the tales told by the religious members of the Canterbury 
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fragmented body, represented repeatedly in its vulnerability” (11). For the little clergeon and Cecelia, I will 
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wholeness.  
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pilgrimage, including the Prioress and the Second Nun.179 In the introduction, Benson 
cites changes in historical and cultural tastes as a primary reason why these “tales of 
transcendence” may have been ignored. He points particularly to the anti-Semitism of the 
Prioress’s Tale and the subservient imitation of the Second Nun’s Tale to its source in the 
Legenda Aurea; these elements make the tales less popular than some of the raucous, 
scandalous secular narratives (Benson 1, 3).  
When approached at all, the Prioress’s Tale and the Second Nun’s Tale have been 
treated in divergent but relatively consistent ways. Carolyn Collette attributes the 
differences in approach to the subject matter and to the respective visibility of their tellers 
(95). The Prioress, with a forty-four line portrait detailing her table manners, her vocal 
mannerisms, her delicate constitution, and her feminine appearance, emerges as a distinct 
personality; critics tend to link qualities in her tale to the character they find in her 
portrait. As a result, her critical history has either tried “to exonerate the Prioress and 
rehabilitate her tale by explaining the anti-Semitic elements in the tale as accepted 
attitudes in a culture fundamentally different from ours,” or it has condemned her on the 
grounds that cultural apology cannot account for the violence she visits on the Jews 
(96).180 The Second Nun, on the other hand, receives a line and a half in the General 
Prologue, which may be a scribal addition, in which we learn only that she is traveling 
with the Prioress and serves as her “chapeleyne” or secretarial assistant (GP 164). While 
I will return to the Second Nun’s limited portrait later, I will only note here that this near 
non-existent portrait requires us to understand the tale assigned to her less in relation to 
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her portrait than the Prioress’s. Most frequently, assessment of the Second Nun’s Tale 
involves how it replicates, exceeds, or oversteps its source material (Collette 95).  
The Second Nun and the Prioress, and their respective tales, have also been 
analyzed through a feminist lens. Anne Laskaya, for example, points to the tension – and 
paradox – of employing the Virgin Mary as the ideal of femininity during the Middle 
Ages: virgin and yet mother, her body was untouched but also the vessel of Christ’s 
incarnation (41-42). This created an ideal no human woman could imitate, and indeed, 
the Prioress’s vacillation between nun, lady, mother, and infant reflects the impossibility 
of her Virgin/mother model. Elizabeth Robertson suggests women and Christian 
spirituality occupy similar marginal spaces in the tales (146). Women, as the fourth 
estate, “are inherently marginal by virtue of their inferior status… and their social 
condition in conjunction with their faith provides a clear alternative to patriarchal values” 
(146). Women were assumed to be less rational than men, and since they were less 
rational they were also more aligned with and controlled by their bodies, and more 
permeable (Potkay and Evitt 18-19).181 Even Mary, the unachievable ideal, was marked 
by her body. In nativity plays, Mary’s visibly pregnant body  
acknowledges a breaching of boundaries. Yet it also insists on the self-
containing unity of that breach. Mary is, after all, absolutely inviolable 
according to doctrine: immaculately conceived as well as perpetually 
virgin before, during, and after her conception and birth of Christ. But in 
carrying a child she clearly demonstrates the elastic, movable boundaries 
of the female body. (119) 
  
Even while – and perhaps because – they are subjected to paradoxical ideals, women are 
also seen as victimized and subordinated, prohibited from assuming any kind of agency 
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 The idea of women as more permeable continues into the Renaissance: see Paster, Humoring the Body: 
Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage and The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame 
in Early Modern England. 
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or power. But by viewing Chaucer’s female characters as victims, as Robertson argues, 
we overlook the Christian perspective that worldly suffering leads to Heavenly reward 
(147). Rather than victims, Chaucer’s women are all but guaranteed salvation thanks to 
their earthly torment.  
By asking us to look at multiple perspectives of marginalization, Robertson posits 
that Chaucer challenges – among other ideas – classification. She explains that he 
“pushes his work to the borders thereby implicitly questioning a static hierarchical 
system” (Robertson 147). Further, “Chaucer finds in the investigation of marginality a 
position of maximum maneuverability… he threatens, disturbs, and unravels the 
assumption of the establishment and, unlike the cultural materialist critic, refuses to 
outline his boundaries because to do so would validate the categories of the ruling 
hierarchy” (147). Even Chaucer’s Christianity, Robertson claims, is ambiguous. But 
Chaucer’s resistance goes beyond disturbing cultural and social boundaries. He also, in 
his presentation of the little clergeon from the Prioress’s Tale and St. Cecelia from the 
Second Nun’s Tale, unravels and problematizes bodily borders and the margins of 
humanness. In his presentation of two bodies that not only attain sainthood through 
martyrdom, but also transgress the boundary between human and divine while alive, 
Chaucer shows through superhuman transcendence the power of Christianity to topple 
rigid hierarchies.182 
This chapter explores the paradox of the saintly superhuman in two 
interconnected ways. First, the bodies of the Prioress’s little clergeon and the Second 
Nun’s St. Cecelia are less permeable than those of ordinary human beings, as evidenced 
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 Laskaya remarks that of all Chaucer’s major characters within the pilgrims’ tales, only St. Cecelia and 
the clergeon attain sainthood (175).  
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by their virginity, spirituality, and eerily suspended and prolonged death scenes. Their 
sexual and digestive abstinence are the literal manifestations of their impermeability. The 
clergeon’s story is mapped onto a theme of digestion, framed by the Prioress’s taste for 
delicacies and the privy. Cecelia’s chaste marriage and earthly fasting keep her body 
closed against ingestion and expulsion. Their sanctity and ability to emit praise despite 
near decapitation demonstrate their transition to an extra-physical state. Second, Cecelia 
and the clergeon attain a status between mortal humans and immortal divine beings 
because transcendence liberates them from the abjectness of the human body. Julia 
Kristeva’s theory of “the abject” mapped alongside the clergeon and St. Cecelia shows 
the paradoxical circumstances of human transcendence: since the abject cannot be 
escaped, like the body, leaving it behind is impossible. Yet these characters rise above it 
with their assumption of divine qualities; they resist categories through multiplicity. 
Occupying multiple contradictory categories is just as impossible for a human being as 
escaping the confines and functions of the body. But the clergeon and St. Cecelia do both. 
For them, bodily categories are insufficient, and their very fragmentation and passivity 
paradoxically conjure an image of impermeability and wholeness. 
The Prioress’s Tale: Disrupted Digestion 
The Prioress’s Tale is a sustained metaphor of digestion as a human process. 
From the teller to the setting to the protagonist’s education to his violent and prolonged 
death, Chaucer depicts fragmented stages of digestion, disruptions, and cessations, which 
mark the clergeon’s transition to superhuman status.183 The metaphor begins with the 
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 Here too we can see the paradox of human transcendence: cessation of bodily processes is the necessary 
catalyst for a movement into immortality. Simultaneous movement and stasis are not possible, yet both are 
enacted on the clergeon.  
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Prioress herself, in the General Prologue portrait that emphasizes her mouth.184 Chaucer 
describes her smiling, swearing, singing, speaking French, and, significantly, eating: 
At mete wel ytaught was she with alle; 
She leet no morsel from her lippes falle,  
Ne wette her fyngres in hir sauce depe; 
Wel koude she carie a morsel and wel kepe 
That no drope ne fille upon hire brest. 
In curteisie was set ful muchel hir lest. 
Hir over-lippe wyped she so clene 
That in hir coppe ther was no ferthyng sene 
Of grece, whan she drunken hadde hir draughte. (GP 127-135) 
 
Here is a woman with faultless table manners. However, Chaucer creates this description 
using statements of negation. Rather than saying the Prioress always eats neatly, he 
claims she never let a morsel fall from her lips. Rather than confirming she sipped 
politely from her cup and blotted her lips well, he says she wiped her lip so cleanly that 
grease never leached into her wine. Description through negation creates a kind of 
occupatio: by mentioning what does not happen, Chaucer simultaneously affirms her 
tidiness and allows us to imagine the opposite. Rather than picturing the Prioress’s fork 
traveling unerringly to her mouth or her pristine fingers tidily handling dainty morsels, 
the passage conjures the possibility of a messy spray of food befouling her habit. Instead 
of a clean, pure cup of wine, we can picture the droplets of grease that would be left in 
her goblet were the Prioress only a little less fastidious. More than the comparisons to a 
romance heroine or to an unlearned ecclesiastic, this system of negatives undermines the 
Prioress’s religiosity and reveals a woman who is far from perfect. The description of her 
eating conveys imperfection and disgust in both the way we see what repulses us through 
its absence, and in the sense that eating begins digestion: we are reminded of her 
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 For more on the Prioress’s mouth, see Boenig.  
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embodiment because eating is the first step in a system that ends in defecation, widely 
considered one of the body’s more repulsive acts.185  
The repulsion aroused in us by imagining the slick of grease that could be in the 
Prioress’s cup is an example of abjection. A method of othering, “food loathing is 
perhaps the most elementary and most archaic form of abjection” (Kristeva 2). Julia 
Kristeva explains that the abject consists (in part) of bodily truths we deny or repudiate 
due to repulsion, discomfort, and especially fear of death. She says “as in true theater, 
without makeup or masks, refuse and corpses show me what I permanently thrust aside in 
order to live. These body fluids, this defilement, this shit are what life withstands, hardly 
and with difficulty, on the part of death. There, I am at the border of my condition as a 
human being” (3). Abjection “is not my correlative, which, providing me with someone 
or something else as support, would allow me to be more or less detached or autonomous. 
The abject has only one quality of the object – that of being opposed to I” (1). Because 
we feel disgust toward the products of our bodies, we resist and deny them; rejected 
waste or other abject material must be kept apart from what we – both as individuals and 
as a culture – consider the “self” in order to keep that “self” stable (Morrison 74). 
Kristeva clarifies, “It is… not lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what 
disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-
between, the ambiguous, the composite” (4). It’s as if the non-existent grease in the 
Prioress’s cup could spread, creating a slime over the whole surface of her wine. We 
work to deny the abject because we are discomfited by our lack of control over it and our 
inability to escape it: it is produced and spreads involuntarily. Kristeva asserts: “But since 
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 This digestion ends, as we shall see, within the tale the Prioress tells, with the clergeon mired in the 
contents of the privy into which his body is thrown.  
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food is not an ‘other’ for ‘me’… I expel myself, I spit myself out, I abject myself within 
the same motion through which ‘I’ claim to establish myself” (3). In identifying ourselves 
as human beings, we also implicitly accept our bodily products and functions. Because 
we are bodily, impurities caused by and produced by the body cannot be entirely 
alienated from us, despite how determinedly we try to push them aside (Kristeva 28). 
Therefore abjection constitutes a complex, contradictory cycle of disgusted self denial.  
Digestion and its accompanying disgust are central also to the space and urban 
geography of the Prioress’s Tale. In her recent article “The Abbey and the Privy: 
Rereading the Prioress’s Tale,” Kathy Lavezzo points to “flow” as a recognized motif in 
the tale. Citing critics such as Louise Fradenburg, Steven Kruger, and Lisa Lampert, 
Lavezzo explains, “at the heart of The Prioress’s Tale are images of flow, contact, and 
containment that oppose Christian purity and Jewish danger” (365). The clergeon’s body 
moves through the town, through the Jewry, and eventually from the privy to the abbey; 
his motion links these locations, making them not unlike the open tract that connects the 
sites of digestion in the human body. The Jewry in the clergeon’s city has one road, and 
“thurgh the strete men myghte ride or wende, / For it was free and open at eyther ende” 
(PrT 493-94). This emphasis on freedom of passage is played out, and restricted, in the 
clergeon’s actions.186 As the story unfolds, he “cam to and fro” on his way “thurghout the 
Juerie,” and as his body passes through the open street, the song he has learned to sing 
“Twies a day it passed thurgh his throte” (552, 551, 548). Ultimately the throat is the site 
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 Morrison calls the street in the Jewry open “just as the mouth and anus are simply the ends of one long 
tube” (83). Sarah Stanbury has also commented on the openness of the street in the Jewry, though she links 
it not to digestion but to pilgrimage: free passage from one site to another, as the Canterbury pilgrims 
themselves are enacting, presumably even while the Prioress is telling her tale (168). In Dante, this motif is 
translated into the idea that Hell is the Devil’s body, and Dante’s passage through it to a form of digestion 
that ends in pure materiality, shit, as a parody of Eucharistic digestion in Purgatory, and the feast of the 
saints in Heaven.  
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of danger for this boy: he is apprehended in the street because he is singing, and his throat 
is slit by an assassin. The crucial buildings for the clergeon – the school and the privy – 
create a structure likening the city’s layout to the human body.187 The school is located 
“doun at the ferther ende” of the street, and the clergeon’s body is ultimately thrown “in a 
pit” near “an aleye” that “hadde a privee place” (496, 571, 568). Since the students at the 
school learn doctrine and Latin song, and since the clergeon’s classmate teaches him the 
song he sings as a result of overhearing older pupils sing it, the school serves as the head 
and seat of the mouth.188 The privy, then, and the “privee place” of the alley nearby, is 
the nether end of this “body,” and the place the clergeon’s mortality is most (and least) 
apparent.189 He moves through this city like food in the body, but, paradoxically, as he is 
slowly digested, he is translated out of his humanity. By referencing this most mortal of 
processes to depict movement into the stasis of immortality, Chaucer highlights the abject 
exaltation of human transcendence.  
If the school is the head in this digestive cityscape, we must consider it not solely 
as the anatomical site of the mouth, but also as the seat of the mind, and therefore a 
figurative type of digestion. The children who attend this Christian school “lerned in that 
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 Morrison notes, drawing on John Scanlon’s On Garbage, that the body is a primary and original model 
for physical systems of organization, including cities and political structures (6). The clergeon’s home 
might be another point in this schema, since he receives his first lessons from his mother, but comparatively 
little of the tale’s action takes place there. He is mainly depicted in transit between one place and another – 
enmeshed in this system of “flow.”  
 
188
 Placement and description of the school allows for merging of upper and lower functions: “doun” and 
“ferther ende” connote an anatomical and defecatory end, making the privy always already in our minds. 
“Ferther,” however, can also mean front or forward, pushing it back up toward the top in this metaphor 
(“ferther” [adj.] MED). Even if it is at the top, however, the mind can be a seat of corruption, and impure 
elements can enter through the mouth and be carried back “doun” the body; the school is thus an 
ambivalent digestive space.  
 
189
 “Privee” carried implications of secrecy in Middle English – this is a private space hidden from plain 
sight. It also had genital connotations in the sense of “private parts,” and thus a “privee place” in an alley is 
also a place for “privates” and their business.  
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scole yeer by yere / Swich manere doctrine as men used there,” marking it as a place of 
mental development (498-99). However, the Prioress goes on to specify “That is to seyn, 
to syngen and to rede, / As smale children doon in hire childhede” (500-01). That the 
clergeon relies both on a “prymer” and “rote” learning of the Alma redemptoris means 
this is very early primary education (517, 522). Children began to learn Latin by 
memorizing songs; they would recite but not necessarily translate the material they sang 
(Patterson 514). Thus, as the clergeon learns the Alma redemptoris we hear twice that his 
method is “al by rote” and that he “herkned ay the wordes and the noote,” (PrT 522, 545, 
521). We do not hear what the song means, however.190  
The clergeon’s ignorance is bracketed by his schoolmate and the Prioress. When 
the boy asks his classmate “which that elder was than he” to translate the words of the 
song he has heard, the older boy admits that though he has heard the song is intended to 
greet and pray to Mary, “I kan namoore expounde on this mattere. / I lerne song; I kan 
but smal grammeere” (535-36). Thus while the clergeon is attracted to the sound of word 
and music, his older classmate, who is one step further along in his education, still does 
not understand the meaning of the song itself, though he understands its referent. The 
schoolboys’ ignorance of Latin can be linked to the Prioress herself: when in the General 
Prologue the narrator points to her singing, he highlights not the divine service she sings, 
but the stylish manner in which she sings it: “Ful weel she soong the service dyvyne, / 
Entuned in hir nose ful seemly” (GP 122-23). Again emphasis is on the sound, not on the 
meaning of the words.  
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 The clergeon’s treatment of the song proves he does not understand it: he “Noght wiste he what this 
Latyn was to seye, / For he so yong and tendre was of age” (523-24). When he asks his schoolmate about 
the song, he “gan… preye / T’expounden hym this song in his langage, / Or telle hym why this song was in 
usage” (525-27). 
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The Prioress asks the audience to excuse her ignorance when she introduces her 
tale, painting a picture of herself as an infant. She draws a connection between the youth 
and unknowing of the clergeon and herself when she says, in her invocation to Mary: 
“my konnyng is so wayk… That I ne may the weighte nat susteene; / But as a child of 
twelf month oold, or lesse, / That kan unnethes any word expresse, / Right so fare I” (PrP 
481, 483-85). By infantilizing herself and connecting youth to lack of knowledge, she 
also links ignorance with innocence: in her interpretation, neither she nor her clergeon 
should be faulted for their lack of knowledge. Youth or innocence – both real and 
imagined – is the reason for blamelessness. Indeed, when we learn the clergeon does not 
understand Latin, the narrator says it is because he is so young. He is not unable to learn, 
he simply has not yet gained enough experience or age to advance his knowledge.191  
Louise O. Fradenburg links the innocence and ignorance the Prioress and clergeon 
share with the tale’s phobia of learning as an instrument of change. To avoid learning 
anything new is to fortify the self against the outside world and its attempts to penetrate 
the body with external material (Fradenburg 95). Knowledge and the methods of 
controlling it can be dangerous; the tale suggests this by making the clergeon’s school a 
site of potential violence. By learning the Alma rather than his primer, the clergeon 
knowingly puts his body at risk: he will sing the Alma “Though that I for my prymer shal 
be shent / And shal be beten thries in an houre” (PrT 541-42). Though for the Prioress his 
innocence implies purity, his willed ignorance also becomes a source of danger (105).   
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 Elizabeth Robertson considers this question of Latin literacy a device used to highlight the clergeon’s 
similarities to women: because women were not often instructed in Latin, and in late medieval England 
nuns and prioresses were often discouraged or prevented from learning the language, ignorance of Latin is 
a feminizing characteristic (155). The clergeon’s relationship to Latin points to tender age, but also to his 
powerlessness in the patriarchy. 
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While his youth is emphasized, the clergeon’s exact age also marks him in a 
different way. He is “seven yeer of age,” far younger than his counterpart in earlier 
analogues (503). This not only makes him emphatically more innocent and his death 
more tragic, but it places him on a margin. In the Middle Ages, seven was a year of 
transition, commonly understood as the age at which a child advanced from infantia to 
pueritia, or from infanthood to childhood.192 According to Shulamith Shahar’s study of 
medieval childhood, at seven a boy should be able to express himself, discern the 
difference between good and evil, and choose for himself between them (16, 21-22, 24). 
Chaucer’s clergeon is therefore between absolute innocence and the beginnings of 
corruptible experience (Patterson 514). His placement on the margin is important, 
because marginal spaces are inherently dangerous.193 As Morrison remarks, margins 
present an opportunity for transgression and permeability. For Mary Douglas and Julia 
Kristeva, much of the danger of social or cultural margins is drawn from analogous 
bodily margins – the edges of society mirror the edges of the body. Morrison explains 
this succinctly: “in the case of the body, the ambiguity lies in its boundaries and orifices 
that constitute danger zones” because there corrupting material may enter or exit (74). 
For the clergeon, advancing to childhood even while lingering in infant-like innocence 
means he inhabits multiple categories, and while he is in this transitional space, he is open 
to danger.194 
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 Morrison points out that for medieval Jews, seven was the age past which boys must begin wearing 
identification markers: it is a year of transition for Christians and Jews alike (82).  
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 Paradoxically, because they can be loci of change and development, margins are also places of power.  
 
194
 The Prioress, too, can be shown to inhabit multiple categories. Her fastidious dining habits and delicate 
manners have led critics to compare her to a romance heroine, rather than a nun. Laskaya calls her a 
conglomerate of nun and lady, and says “Both as an imitation of a nun and as an imitation of a lady, [the 
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Though the clergeon is at the threshold of “experience,” he is still simultaneously 
defined by innocence: repeatedly called both “this innocent” and “This litel child,” we are 
encouraged to view him as diminutive and pure (PrT 516, 538, 552, 566). The Latin word 
for young children – puer – was etymologically associated with purity: children were in 
pueritia because they were still so pure (Shahar 21-22). As a pure young child, linked by 
teller and by affection for the Virgin Mary, the clergeon’s sexual purity through his youth 
and innocence is obvious. Purity and virginity predispose him to transcendence. When he 
is wounded, the Prioress exclaims “O martir, sowded to virginitee, / Now maystow 
syngen, folwynge evere in oon / The white Lamb celestial” (579-81). When applied to the 
body, the idea of purity conjures images of wholeness – we understand it metaphorically 
as completeness and by extension impermeability: nothing corrupting can enter. The 
clergeon’s virginity and martyrdom mark him as literally and metaphorically pure: he is a 
closed body, as yet umarred by his surroundings.  
The clergeon’s bodily closure encompasses any foreign or external “material.” 
We never see him eating, and even his learning is stopped short of permeation: because 
he is so young, he is not yet able to fully comprehend the Latin he hears and repeats. His 
incomplete understanding, despite his innocence and purity, advances the motif of 
disrupted digestion to a figural level, invoking the idea of ruminatio. When finally 
chewed to satisfaction, the material on which monks had meditated could be swallowed 
and fully digested. The clergeon, since he knows only that the Alma redemptoris is a song 
in praise of Mary, never fully digests it: though he knows the song’s topic, he does not 
know what the individual words mean. He mentally cannot, because the innocence and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Prioress] is ‘counterfeit,’ and the irony of the General Prologue condemns her for attempting to confound 
territories or cross the boundaries of ‘Lady’ or ‘Nun’” (174, 173).  
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inexperience connoted by his youth prevent it. This disruption, however, also manifests 
itself on his physical body. When the clergeon walks through the Jewry, his song “passed 
thurgh his throte” (548). The choice of his throat as a place to emphasize the song’s 
passage rather than his diaphragm or belly mirrors the idea of surface understanding: it 
creates the image of the song barely engaging with his body, matching the shallowness of 
his understanding.195  
The clergeon’s transition – between child and adult, and between innocence and 
experience – is also physically disrupted, and again his throat is the site of this violence. 
His life is halted, but not ended, by the hired assassin who “kitte his throte” (571).196 
Interestingly, the relationship between permeation and digestion is here reversed. For 
normal physical consumption, the body must be permeated for digestion to take place: 
food enters through an opening. For the clergeon’s pure body, this penetration disrupts 
his metaphorical digestion because it halts his maturation. What he is digesting, however, 
is not food in the usual sense. He has become a spiritual receptor – in fact, we even see 
Mary’s influence as a form of penetration prior to the assassin’s blade: “the swetnesse his 
herte perced so / Of Christes mooder that, to hire to preye, / he kan nat stynte of syngyng 
by the weye” (555-57). This extraphysical presence suggests the clergeon’s transition is 
not simply between childhood and maturity, but between the physical and the spiritual: 
that he “kan nat stynte of syngyng” implies his body is not fully under his control; it is 
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 As noted earlier, the clergeon’s recognition that learning the Alma instead of learning his primer will 
have bodily consequences could be offered as another kind of understanding he does have about the song: 
he sees one way it might cause him harm. Despite this form of comprehension, however, he still does not 
understand the literal translation of the words.  
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 Fradenburg notes that it is “impossible to pinpoint the moment at which the little clergeon might be said 
to have died, though it is not difficult to pinpoint the moment at which the Jew kills him” (89).  
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already being overtaken by spiritual forces – or, perhaps, he is already more spiritual than 
bodily, and thus is beginning the process of rising above the abjection of the body (557).  
After the physical permeation of the clergeon’s body he enters a state of 
suspension: arrested between life and death. In this state, the motif of passage and flow 
established by the city’s layout and the clergeon’s song ceases as well. The assassin 
snatches him “as the child gan forby for to pace” through the Jewry; he has only begun to 
pass by when his throat is cut, leaving his passage incomplete (569, emphasis mine). 
When his mother asks after him, she pleads the Jews “telle hire if hir child wente oght 
forby” but “They seyde ‘nay’” (602-03). Despite the condemnation of Jews in this tale, 
they tell the truth. The clergeon has not passed by, either literally on foot, or 
metaphorically through death. He has been arrested between states. The privy into which 
the assassin threw him is called a pit: a hole that cannot be climbed out of.197 The 
clergeon’s position emphasizes his stasis: rather than a crumpled, broken figure, “he with 
throte ykorven lay upright, / He Alma Redemptoris gan to synge / So loude that al the 
place gan to rynge” (611-13). His positioning places him half in and half out of the filth: 
lying with his face pointing toward the sky suggests he is partly immersed in the pit, but 
looking upward.198 
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 The Prioress also refers to the privy as a “wardrobe”; she insists on euphemistic terms and, at least in the 
case of a “wardrobe,” focuses our attention on the area above the pit in which the physical act of defecation 
would take place, but the product would be hidden below. “Wardrobe” most frequently refers to a place to 
store clothing, especially for the noble classes. This seems more evidence of the Prioress’s attempts to 
“cloak” the abject: by using a word that most commonly conjures an image of materials to cover and 
disguise the body, she tries to hide that body’s most abject behaviors. But because she pairs this euphemism 
with the much clearer “pit” her attempt is unsuccessful. Not only does the peripheral definition of 
“wardrobe” as a latrine seep through, but her narrative movement down into the pit itself makes it 
impossible for us to ignore or cover the bodily truth below.  
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 Though it seems most likely the clergeon’s position as “upright” refers to lying face up, the MED 
defines “upright” first as an erect or standing position, and only secondarily as lying supine on one’s back 
(“upright” [adv.] MED). Chaucer uses the same construction in the Monk’s Tale, when Judith decapitates 
Holofernes “as he lay upright / Slepynge” (MkT 2571-72). This suggests the clergeon is also in a supine 
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The clergeon’s static suspension between life and death is allegorical as well as 
literal. He lies in a privy, the most abject of places, full of the shit Kristeva claims we are 
always trying to deny and escape. As Lavezzo explains, our very anatomy suggests 
human beings’ constant attempts to escape our own waste: “If the privy hid its occupants 
and their excretions, bodies suggested to medieval people the need to sequester waste 
even from the defecators themselves” (374). Since it emerges from below and behind, we 
do not even have to see our own filth, which Lavezzo thinks encourages us further to hide 
and repudiate it.199 Despite this, defecation is inescapable and unstoppable. As such, it 
has been allegorized as sin and as the human body itself. Martha Bayless has noted that 
“As a staple of contemptus mundi literature, scholars characterized the human body in its 
sinful earthly existence as excrement” (147). At the same time, iconography uses 
excrement not simply as a marker of moral denegration, but “as an emblem of sin, a 
material embodiment of spiritual corruption” (147). To be trapped in sin – caught in 
earthly existence – was to be figuratively buried in excrement.  
Because the clergeon does not immediately die, as might be expected for a seven 
year old child whose throat has been slit, his suspension in the privy symbolizes his 
extracategorical status. If indeed excrement is representative of the sinful world, the 
Prioress’s Tale suggests the clergeon cannot leave the metaphorical sewer of the world – 
that is, cannot transcend – because he is literally in a sewer: his immediate environment 
                                                                                                                                                 
position, though the idea of being “upright” or erect may also color the image here, creating a 
contradiction: just as it is not possible to be alive and singing with their throats carved through to the bone, 
bodies cannot lie down and stand at the same time. Yet the clergeon’s body is all these things at once, 
showing again his resistance to normal categorization. 
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 Even while anatomy may encourage us to deny or repudiate our own waste, things unseen often also 
tantalize or draw us toward them. This dichotomy is evident in the word “privee” or “privitee,” which 
refers to secrets, private matters, and “private parts” – things which may intrigue or tempt us – as well as a 
physical privy where we deposit waste unseen.  
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represents the sins of the world he inhabits. He should rise above the physical world, but 
the collapse of literal and figurative in the privy leaves him trapped within the abjection 
of his own body.200 Thus he is left unable to even gasp for breath, yet also singing so 
loudly his voice makes the walls of the privy ring out the Alma. He is destined to be 
saved, marked by Mary herself, but while he remains sunk in the filth of the bodily and 
excremental, he is human and soldered to the world.  
Though one view might consider the clergeon degraded, befouled by the privy 
and thus not worthy of transcendence, the clergeon also has superhuman qualities which 
allow him to be viewed simultaneously as uncorrupted; as with his position half in and 
half out of filth, he is metaphorically both in and out of the corruption of the world. The 
clergeon qualifies the seriousness of his injury by explaining “My throte is kut unto my 
nekke boon… and as by way of kynde / I sholde have dyed, ye, longe tyme agon,” but he 
does not (649, 650-51). The choice of language here signals yet another kind of 
transitional state: the clergeon resides not only between infant and child, between 
innocence and experience, and between life and death, he also lies between human and 
Other.201 That he should be dead “by way of kynde” suggests he is no longer beholden to 
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 Bayless also points to the medieval Christian cultural association of Jews with excrement (144, 147). 
This association could support another allegorized reading of the Prioress’s Tale: that the Jews are 
metaphorically converting the boy. If he cannot transcend because he is trapped in the shit of the world, but 
he cannot live because his throat has been slit, then he cannot go on to Heaven, as Jews could not. Thus his 
death in the privy would link him both to the Judaism and to physical, worldly corruption. In Jewish 
mysticism, as Alexandra Cuffel notes, the ability to communicate with the divine necessitated an 
eradication of odor (36). Therefore the Jews’ actions in the Prioress’s Tale would prohibit the boy from 
accessing the divine, because he would be marked by the odor of the privy. In all senses, then, he is being 
prevented from moving on to a Christian afterlife.  
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 His speech to the abbot contrasts his previous innocence and unknowing – his movement toward 
transcendence also entails movement toward perfect knowledge. This is perhaps wish-fulfillment on the 
part of the Prioress.  
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natural law.202 He has become extra-kynde or extra-natural, moving beyond the laws of 
nature. The ability to stay alive despite a mortal injury through benediction from Christ or 
Mary suggests the clergeon has moved into the realm of supernatural or superhuman, 
rather than into the unnatural or monstrous.  
This superhuman status is marked by the clergeon’s paradoxical wholeness. 
Though the assassin’s blade penetrated his throat, his body remains unslain and 
uncorrupted. He is described as a “litel body sweete” in spite of the filth he is thrown 
into, which allows us to imagine his body as a surface onto which filth did not – and 
perhaps could not – adhere (682).203 The site of his wounding also emphasizes his 
relative wholeness in the way it differs from its sources and analogues.204 Elizabeth 
Robertson points out that the violence of the clergeon’s wounding is severely restricted. 
She notes that other versions of the tale depict the clergeon’s dismemberment or 
disembowelment and crucifixion before he is dropped into the privy, but the Prioress only 
mentions his throat being cut (156). The analogue of Little St. Hugh describes the child 
martyr having a cross cut into his stomach, his innards removed through it and thrown 
into a privy, before the rest of his body is tossed in (Cuffel 152). This reduced violence 
provides less opportunity for the privy’s contents to infiltrate his body. His insides could 
only be corrupted through the broken margin at his throat, rather than through his 
stomach, but his position of lying face up also prevents this. If he is fouled by his 
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 “Kynde” refers to a natural temperament or aggregation of qualities and to a class or race of creatures 
(“k nde” [n.] MED).   
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 Perhaps ironically the child’s body in filth is “sweeter” than the Prioress’s grease-free wine.  
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 It also indicates again the Prioress’s delicacy, as her use of “wardrobe” in place of “privy.”  
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surroundings, it is only on his back half, and only his exterior. His life may be disrupted 
and his outsides stained, but it is not completely lost.205  
The impermeability that permits the clergeon’s transcendence also marks his 
stasis: his immobility and inability to pass from one state to another suggest his gradual 
alignment with the unchanging divine (Morrison 43). As he ceaselessly repeats the Alma 
redemptoris, his body is taken from the privy and rushed to the nearest abbey (622-24). 
The abbey seems not located along the same open street as the song school and the privy, 
which means the clergeon’s body is extracted from the city’s network of digestion. 
Taking him from the Jewish ghetto into the abbey physically removes him from the space 
of defecation in which he has been hidden, but it also moves him symbolically toward 
blessedness: he is “Up taken” out of the privy, signaling ascension (622, my emphasis). 
Despite the physical transfer of his body, aside from his singing he remains completely 
passive. He is lifted, he is carried, he is laid before an altar, and, he reveals, at the 
moment he should have expired he was prevented from immediate death by Mary. He 
explains to the abbot that “whan that I my lyf sholde forlete, / To me she cam, and bad 
me for to synge / This anthem verraily in my deyynge” (658-60). At the point a normal 
human being should have died, the clergeon is instead repurposed by Mary – in a sense 
his singing is his dying, but since the song continues and as long as it continues, the 
clergeon cannot reach death, but remains both stuck in between and ever in process.  
As he is charged to sing “in [his] deyynge,” the clergeon is kept in this suspended 
state between life and death by a mysterious “greyn” Mary has laid “upon [his] tonge” 
(662). He explains that he sings because of the grain, and will “Til fro my tonge of taken 
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 We might also imagine this diminished violence as a marker of the clergeon’s body’s resistance to 
physical penetration. Though his throat can be cut, he is not fully decapitated and thus his body remains if 
not whole, at least in one piece. 
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is the greyn, / And after that thus seyde she to me: / ‘My litel child, now wol I fecche 
thee, / Whan that the greyn is fro thy tonge ytake’” (665-68). Here too the clergeon is 
passive. His transcendence will not be enacted through his own movements; Mary will 
come to fetch him when the grain – the last earthly thing attendant to the clergeon’s body 
– has been removed by someone else. Though the intended meaning of this grain is 
uncertain, it is notable that in a poem with no other explicit mentions of food, a particle 
of potential foodstuff is put into the main character’s mouth only after he has been 
mortally wounded.206 The grain has been variously interpreted as a seed, a grain of wheat, 
a communion wafer and a kernel of meaning, among others, but no definitive 
interpretation dominates.207 If the grain is intended to remind us of the communion wafer, 
it would be linked with spiritual as well as earthly food – Potkay and Evitt note that the 
Eucharist was wheat based, and Bynum specifies that from the ninth century on, women 
and laymen received the Eucharist directly on their tongues, rather than touching it with 
their fingers (Potkay and Evitt 103, Bynum HFHF 56). In the tale’s motif of digestion the 
clergeon has been spiritually nurtured to prepare him for his transcendence. Just as his 
placement in the privy signified his entrapment in the filth of the world, the presence of 
earthly food holds him back from the spiritual feast that awaits him. As Lee Patterson 
explains, “The grain in his mouth both enables the clergeon’s singing and keeps him in 
the world” (511). This is another form of disrupted digestion – the grain never fully 
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 Reading with a dominant medieval interpretation, if the grain represents the Eucharist this timing makes 
sense: the clergeon would have been given communion as part of his last rites.  
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 For numerous interpretations of the “greyn,” see Patterson 510; Robertson 157; Shoaf 24; Cooper 296; 
and Benson 916.  
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enters the clergeon’s body, but remains on his tongue as a sign of both materiality and 
transcendence: it reflects multiplicity and the extracategorical just as the clergeon does.  
Within the abbey, stasis and flow vacillate as the clergeon’s suspension is finally 
resolved. The abbot allows the boy to die by removing the grain: “His tonge out caughte, 
and took awey the greyn, / And he yaf up the goost ful softely” (671-72). As the assassin 
halted flow at the moment the clergeon’s throat was cut, here the abbot reinstates it. 
Instantly the clergeon “gives up the ghost,” finally leaving the state of passive half-life he 
has been occupying,208 and the abbot’s cheeks are immediately soaked by “salt teeris 
trikled doun as reyn,” marking another end of bodily stasis: flow resumes, and life and 
death may now continue as normal (674). Despite the restoration of flow, both the abbot 
and the clergeon experience another last instance of stasis. Even as his tears stream down, 
the abbot “gruff he fil al plat upon the grounde, / And stille he lay as he had ben 
ybounde” (675-76). Seeing his prostration, the entire company of monks in the abbey 
“eek lay on the pavement / Wepynge, and herying Christes mooder deere” (677-78). This 
moment of inactivity, with their limbs frozen but their tears flowing freely, marks their 
humanness. In hearing Mary, they have momentarily gained access to the divine, but their 
tears show they are still human. The liquid flow of the tears exposes the permeability of 
our margins. These monks’ bodies are not completely under their control, nor (or perhaps 
therefore), with their ability to weep, are they impermeable.  
The monks quickly recover from their weeping swoon, however, and movement 
begins again for them: “after that they ryse, and forth been went, / And token awey this 
martir from his beere; / And in a tombe of marbul stones cleere / Enclosen they his litel 
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 Kathy Lavezzo has called the clergeon “a sort of zombie,” but I would argue his ability to respond to the 
abbot’s questions shows he still possesses reason, and thus rather than being “undead” is in a different kind 
of life (377).  
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body sweete” (679-82). In martyring and entombing him, the monks seem to transform 
the clergeon’s body instantly into a relic. Here, the boy’s body is uncorrupted and again 
impermeable. The marble is “cleere,” his body is “sweete” and safely “Enclosen,” which 
signals a firm barrier against entrance or exit. Though his soul seems to have been 
instantly saved, his body remains in the world. Not only is it enclosed in marble by the 
monks, but the Prioress concludes the stanza by saying “Ther he is now, God leve us for 
to meete!” (683). Though this may be simply a convenient way of ending the tale, 
showing that in the timeline of the story he rests in his tomb, “now” pulls us back into the 
main frame of the Tales, suggesting that as the Prioress speaks we have left the long ago 
in which “Ther was” a city where these events took place, and that even as the pilgrims 
travel to Canterbury, the clergeon’s body is locked in marble, in some sense suspended 
until the resurrection (488).  
That the clergeon’s body seems still in the world, fresh and sweet despite his 
death, suggests his superhuman status as a martyr. He has escaped the ravages of time 
and death in that he does not rot. Morrison notes: “Death typically suggests decay or 
change. The miraculous, nondecaying relic and the miraculously preserved dead saint’s 
body suggest the normality of decay and the exceptionality of preservation by their very 
miraculous natures” (88). However, the clergeon cannot completely escape abjection. In 
the same way negation in the description of the Prioress’s eating habits calls to mind the 
gross possibilities of mess and grease, the insistence that the clergeon’s body remains 
“sweete” also conjures up the privy. For Barbara Nolan, the bizarre juxtaposition of the 
clergeon’s body and the privy creates an intimate link between them (36). No matter how 
sweet his body is, that sweetness exists in contrast to the smell of the excrement by which 
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he was surrounded – literally in the pit, and figuratively in the world. The Jews hire their 
assassin at Satan’s command, “This innocent out of this world to chace,” suggesting that 
this tiny martyr is too pure for this world (566). The only thing the text tells us about the 
child’s body after it has been mutilated is that his neck is “ykorven” and that his body is 
“sweete.” However, given his time in the privy the specter of a befouled body always 
attends our perception of him. Kathy Lavezzo acknowledges that “the tale does not state 
that the child is soiled,” but she nevertheless calls the clergeon an “excrement-covered 
schoolboy,” and cites the haste of his burial as proof that he is tainted by the smell of the 
pit (376). The idea of the space in which he lay haunts and disturbs us, prohibiting the 
clergeon from fully escaping the abjection of human, bodily filth because we, the reading 
audience, have our digestion of the tale disrupted at the privy (611). As Morrison puts it, 
“The black hole of the privy is the central image around which all the other images swirl, 
the site of both abjection and glorification” (87). Because she is human like us, the 
Prioress’s falsely faultless eating will also end in a privy, and so it is not surprising that 
the image lingering with us at the end of this tale is the end: the end of the human cycle 
of digestion. Though the clergeon’s impermeability has allowed him to move – or to be 
moved – above the cycle of waste and abjection, it is in that cycle that we, bound by our 
bodies and their cycles, uncomfortably but unavoidably remain.209  
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 This seems to suggest that at this moment, at least, we remain within the physical, rather than the 
spiritual, journey associated with The Canterbury Tales. With its frame of a two-way journey inaugurated 
and concluded with a dinner, our voyage also entails a return, closing off the cyclical form that governs 
both the Host’s proposed game and our bodily processes. Nevertheless, the complexity of the privy image, 
of translation, and of the pilgrimage itself corrodes and resists absolutist readings. The pilgrimage serves as 
a kind of suspension between one place and another, reaching no definitive destination. Even the unfinished 
nature of The Canterbury Tales prevents an absolute reading, because we cannot know what more, if 
anything, Chaucer intended.  
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The Second Nun’s Tale: Holy Preservation  
Whereas the Prioress cannot move beyond the privy despite her protagonist’s 
transcendence, the Second Nun and her tale offer a more successful abnegation of the 
body. As Julia Bolton Holloway posits, the Second Nun transforms “excrement back into 
sacrament, scatology back to eschatology” (205). Denying bodily permeation, finally 
through the absence of the body itself, is what allows the Second Nun to make this 
transformation. While the Second Nun may escape physicality more successfully than the 
Prioress, her tale still suggests through negation the abject necessities of human existence 
to which we, unlike St. Cecelia, are bound. For Cecelia, the paradox of transcendence lies 
in her ability to resist through multiplicity: she exists in multiple contradictory categories 
throughout the tale – human and superhuman, virgin and wife, whole and fragmented – 
and her ability to occupy them all simultaneously marks her saintly superhumanness.   
The Second Nun’s bodily absence is apparent in her General Prologue portrait. 
After the lengthy description of the Prioress, we learn “Another nonne with hire hadde 
she, / That was her chapeleyne” (GP 163-64). Because there is no mention of the teller in 
the prologue to the Second Nun’s Tale, this line and a half of identification represents the 
Second Nun’s only physical existence, and it reveals none of her physicality.210 In being 
“chapeleyne” to the Prioress, however, we do see an immediate contrast between superior 
and subordinate: while the Prioress’s love of food and fineries makes her materially 
oriented, the Second Nun’s job as aide and secretary suggests she may be her superior’s 
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 Further, this line may not even be original to Chaucer. Benson says “It is usually believed that Chaucer 
left the line unfinished after chapeleyne and that, as Bradshaw suggested, the text was carelessly patched by 
someone else” (806). The Nun’s lack of physicality in her Prologue can, however, be contrasted against the 
Prioress’s other tale-telling companion: the Nun’s Priest, whose physicality Chaucer emphasizes in the 
Prologue and endlink to his tale.  
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intellectual opposite. Indeed, the Second Nun proclaims in her prologue that “bothe have 
I the wordes and sentence” of her tale, raising her above the rote memorization without 
comprehension that characterized the clergeon and the Prioress (SNP 81). The text 
exaggerates this dichotomy, providing an extremely detailed description of the Prioress 
but giving the Second Nun no visible body. The dominant cultural discourse about the 
feminine and femininity in the Middle Ages presented women as overtly physical bodies 
(Laskaya 33). Because we are not given even a glimpse of her body, the Second Nun 
largely escapes this objectification; we are unable to judge her by referring to the 
category of the womanly.211 She gains and maintains authority through her absence (172).  
This bodily absence permeates the Second Nun’s prologue. Like the Wife of Bath, 
the Second Nun’s prologue is headless: no exchange between pilgrims brings it about, 
and Harry Bailley does not choose her to speak next. She simply begins. Unlike the Wife 
of Bath, however, who calls herself into full, experience-based existence, the Second Nun 
absents herself by beginning with a sermon. She directs our attention toward church 
doctrine and the vice of idleness, and does not even use a first person pronoun until her 
fourth stanza. Her invocation to Mary, privileging virginity and blaming her body for 
entrapping her soul, signals her distrust both of materiality and of permeability. The 
Second Nun says that “of [Mary’s] light my soule in prison lighte, / That troubled is by 
the contagioun / Of my body, and also by the wighte / Of erthely lust and fals affeccioun” 
(71-74). Clearly she thinks the body is a prison, a disease that infects and pollutes the 
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 Our inability is made even more apparent in the prologue to her tale, when she identifies herself as male: 
“I, unworthy sone of Eve” (62). This identification of the teller as a “sone,” like the feminine pronouns in 
the Shipman’s Tale, has been interpreted to mean the Second Nun’s Tale was originally intended for a 
different teller and Chaucer or his scribe failed to change this mistake in gender, or that the tale was written 
well before the Canterbury Tales were conceived and is not well integrated. We cannot know this and thus 
can only interpret according to the words of the tale.  
  
 
 
216 
soul. Yet, as with the Prioress, by denouncing the flesh in favor of perfection, she directs 
our attention to the imperfections and potential for penetration the (female) body 
contains. The “erthely lust” and the “contagioun / Of my body” raise the subject of 
intercourse, and her focus on Mary similarly introduces via the doctrine of immaculate 
conception the idea of bodily penetration.  
The Second Nun’s choice to invoke Mary while attempting to renounce the body 
is a curious move which, as in her depiction of St. Cecelia, proves both successful and 
futile. In introducing her muse, the Second Nun prays “thow Mayde and Mooder, doghter 
of thy Sone,” and adds “thou, Virgin wemmelees, / Baar of thy body – and dweltest 
mayden pure – / The Creatour of every creature” (36, 47-49). The Second Nun invokes 
Mary’s perfect and extra-human status by having her occupy two very human conditions 
simultaneously: maid and mother.212 Further, by stating Mary’s relationship to Christ as 
“doghter of thy Sone,” the Second Nun invokes another: Christ is at once father and son 
of this virgin mother (36). Even in a figure as faultless as Mary, the body cannot be fully 
escaped because it always retains material relationships to other bodies.213  
Like Mary, Cecelia inhabits multiple, contradictory categories – she transgresses 
what is naturally possible to become a figure who bridges human and divine. Her 
meaning is complicated through the impossibility of confining her to one genus or 
category; she comprises a rhizomatic proliferation of possibilities. The Second Nun 
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 This simultaneity allows readers to meditate on a doubleness she must know is impossible for human 
beings. In fact, it might be argued, she can see this impossibility in her superior the Prioress, whose 
attempts to be both lady and nun make her not fully either.  
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 This also seems to suggest a strange thread of divine incest: as part of the Trinity, Christ is Mary’s 
bridegroom but also her son. For dominant medieval culture, however, this would have been considered an 
inadequacy of human understanding of the Christian mystery, not inadequacy in the mystery itself.  
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concludes her prologue by providing a dense, complex etymology for Cecelia.214 The 
name means “‘hevenes lilie,’ / for pure chaastnesse of virginitee,” which highlights the 
untouchable state of her body while also qualifying its desirable coloration – her spiritual 
purity is matched by her physical paleness (87-88, 89). Her name also means 
simultaneously “the wey to blynde” and “‘Wantynge of blyndnesse,’ for hir grete light / 
Of sapience and for hire thewes cleere” (92, 100-01). She is a path for the blind even as 
her heavenly wisdom eliminates blindness. Finally, her name is a conjunction of 
“heaven” (caelum) and “Leah,” which invoke her spirituality and her wordly 
industriousness (95-98).215 Though these definitions do not meld well, and some even 
seem to contradict one another, none is excluded. John Hirsh suggests this etymology 
shows that a fixed epistemology and the search for singular meaning is faulty and 
ultimately inadequate; Cecelia exceeds any single category (169).  
In the tale itself, Cecelia’s constant activity and multiplicity are implicitly 
expressed in conjunctions: the first stanza of the tale alone contains the word “and” five 
times as we discover all the elements that constitute Cecelia. She is Roman and noble, 
and she was brought up in the Christian faith, and she bore the gospel ever in her mind 
and never ceased to praise, love, and to dread God (SNT 121-25). As the circumstances 
of her impending marriage unfold, again the word “and” is enunciated, allowing Cecelia 
to inhabit more and more categories without negating any of them until she has assumed 
the status of wife and virgin. When Almachius asks her “Of thy religioun and of thy 
bileeve,” she stuns him by replying “Ye han bigonne youre questioun folily… that 
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 Chaucer draws this etymology from Jacobus de Voragine’s Legenda Aurea.  
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 In this Cecelia seems also to comprehend Leah and Rachel simultaneously: Leah as the active life, 
Rachel as the contemplative.   
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wolden two answeres conclude / In o demand; ye axed lewedly” (427, 428-30). By asking 
her to divide her religion and her beliefs, Almachius has created divisive, insufficient 
categories where the answer should be both and all.216 In critiquing his logic rather than 
answering his question, Cecelia rejects his categories; she maintains her own agency 
before the man who claims control over her physical life and death (Hirsh 166). Even this 
strict division meets her correction, as she counters Almachius’s claim of “bothe power 
and auctoritee / To maken folk to dyen or to liven” by asserting he “ne mayst but oonly 
lyf bireve” because only God has the power to create life (471-72, 482). Thus Cecelia’s 
existence as a concatenation of meanings and conjunctions exemplifies not only the 
insufficiency of human categories to comprehend her, but the awesome and ineffable 
divinity of God to create such multiplicity within one woman.  
When we encounter Cecelia’s body, we find it assertively present and empowered 
through its permanently closed status. As Laskaya explains, despite the Second Nun’s 
attention to Cecelia’s incredible beauty and her present – albeit stifled – sexuality, her 
virginity becomes a power rather than a liability, giving her an agency Chaucer’s other 
virginal female characters lack (167). Whereas the body of the clergeon in the Prioress’s 
Tale was closed to the extent that his youth and devotion vouchsafed his purity, Cecelia 
seems closed against any kind of sexual encounter by divine mandate. Like the clergeon, 
Cecelia never ingests what she rejects, but because the issue must be raised in order for 
her to reject it, the suggestion of ingestion – in this case the penetration of sexual 
intercourse – is never far away. Her virginity (and therefore her untouched sexuality) is 
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 In the Legenda Aurea, Almachius asks for Cecelia’s status in life and then, when she says she is a 
Roman noble, clarifies that he was asking about her religion. Here too she replies that his question was 
flawed: “Interrogatio tua stultum sumit initium, que duas responsiones una putat inquisitione concludi” 
(Jacobus 1186).  
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mentioned repeatedly in the tale, but her refusal of physical procreation seems replaced 
by a spiritual fecundity as she converts and collects followers (Benson 5). As the 
clergeon’s body was pierced by Mary’s sweetness to provide him with divine nutrition in 
material form, Cecelia is “fulfild of Goddes yifte” and “The fruyt of thilke seed of 
chastitee / That [God] hast sowe in Cecile”; her body is fertile, but the seed that makes it 
productive is her virginity (275, 193-94). Though the metaphor of sowing a seed has 
sexual connotations, here faith and miracle are sown by God and thus a seed of chastity 
presents a beautiful impossibility: rather than literally impregnating her, as in the case of 
Mary with Christ, God has filled Cecelia with unending chastity. She becomes a spiritual 
mother; her words, not her body, produce a line of followers who gladly convert and are 
martyred for their devotion.217  
Despite the suggestion of sexual capability enacted through Cecelia’s spiritual 
productivity, her body is, until and even including its unsuccessful decapitation, far more 
impermeable than that of a normal human being. She prays that God “kepe hir 
maydenhede,” asking that her body never be penetrated (126). While she awaits her 
wedding, she is “allone in heart” with God, and asks again that “my soule and eek my 
body gye / Unwemmed”; she refuses not only sexual intercourse but also to some degree 
food, since “Every seconde and thridde day she faste” (135, 136-37, 139). Her 
determination to remain untouched and thereby be clean is emphasized again when she 
persuades her husband to live chastely. She tells him “if that ye in clene love me gye, / 
He wol yow loven as me, for youre clennesse” – emphasizing the connection between 
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 The circumstances of her torture verge on sexualizing her as well, because though her punishment is to 
be burned in a bath of flames, being shut into a “bath” calls to mind an image of bathing, and therefore calls 
attention to her female body, possibly stripped, within a bathtub. Whether this is just for audience titillation 
or whether it is to further emphasize her impermeable-but-human body is uncertain.  
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intercourse and defilement by connecting chastity with cleanliness (159-60). 
Interestingly, both Cecelia and her new husband Valerian recognize that the corruption of 
her body will lead to death, though initially they understand the reason differently. 
Valerian assures her that if the angel she claims keeps her body turns out to be another 
man, “Right with this swerd thane wol I sle yow bothe” (168). Though he would kill her 
for adultery, Cecelia already knows the corruption she would face through allowing her 
body to be penetrated would be death for her; it would lead to damnation (137).  
Cecelia’s fasting marks her body as closed in another sense. Caroline Walker 
Bynum writes that food – and lack of it – played a crucial role for religious women in the 
Middle Ages. Because women were more closely aligned with food preparation than 
men, food became a tool for gaining and holding agency. Bynum explains “Food-related 
behavior was central to women socially and religiously not only because food was a 
resource women controlled but also because by means of food women controlled 
themselves and their world” (HFHF 193). By deciding what, how much, when, or 
whether she would eat, a woman could assert control over her body in a way she could 
not in social situations. Mystics and other women who fasted aggressively or refused 
food aside from the Eucharist were exercising limited authority in religious politics: 
though resistant, most priests agreed to provide the Eucharist more frequently to these 
women than to other laypeople to prevent them from starving to death.218 For Cecelia, 
fasting allows her to express her devotion to God and control her body, further cementing 
it closed. As both Bynum and Morrison point out, severely limiting or completely ceasing 
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 Preventing starvation is often a reason provided for why priests submitted to the wishes of these 
religious women, though fasting for a medieval person could have a range of different meanings: 
sometimes this referred to eschewing specific food items, like meat or other luxuries, sometimes to 
refraining from food during daylight hours (HFHF 37).    
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one’s food intake has physiological consequences on the body. Morrison explains “The 
eating practices of late medieval female mystics include the lack of toleration for food. 
Self-starvation would stop typical female excretions, such as menses,” and further, that 
“Female mystics assured their purity, their lack of filth, by not defecating or 
menstruating” (53). With no materials entering the body, there would be no materials 
exiting either, resulting in a closed system which, though not sustainable, was 
temporarily incorrupt.219 Cecelia’s bodily boundaries are closed orally and genitally, and 
this closure extends even to substances less polluting than defecation or menstruation. As 
she sits in the boiling bath of flame Almachius has ordered, “She sat al coold and feelede 
no wo. / It made hire nat a drope for to sweete” (521-22). Far from not incinerating her 
flesh, this torture is not even enough to make her sweat. Though she does bleed when her 
neck is “ycorven,” her body’s margins are stronger and less permeable than those of a 
regular human being (532). Like the hair shirt she dons under her golden wedding robe, 
Cecelia’s faith seems to surround and replace the physicality of her flesh.220 
Her extreme bodily closure and her ability to live despite this belies – or at least 
complicates – Cecelia’s humanity. Because human bodies are subject to flow, Cecelia’s 
physical stasis marks her as other. Since impermeability suggests wholeness, which 
implies completeness and perfection like the divine, Cecelia seems to rise above 
humanness rather than to sink below it. She tells Valerian that an angel “Is redy ay my 
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to excrete materials, it will inevitably waste away and be corrupted by death. Thus not even complete 
closure guarantees purity for physical bodies.  
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 The strength and bodily control Cecelia possesses is matched in Urban. Unlike the abbot in the 
Prioress’s Tale who is unable to control the tears that flow from his eyes as the clergeon is saved, when 
Valerian declares his faith Urban “The teeris from his eyes leet he falle” (SNT 190). He has complete 
control over the margins of his body, allowing his tears to flow rather than being subjected to unrestrained 
weeping.  
 
  
 
 
222 
body for to kepe” and that if Valerian touches her “or love in vileynye, / He right anon 
wol sle yow with the dede” (154, 156). That an angel keeps her body suggests she is his 
possession, and thus, like the angel, on a plane above humans. Though she names the 
angel as the agent of Valerian’s death, she says Valerian would be slain “with the dede,” 
implying that the act of intercourse would be what kills him. This marks Cecelia as pure, 
but also purifying and decontaminating – her body would kill those who would violate 
it.221 Too pure to be experienced by a human man, she is already above the physical 
world.222  
The most powerful indications of Cecelia’s more-than-human status are her 
torture and martyrdom. To punish her for her refusal to convert to paganism, and for 
inciting followers to disobey his commands, Almachius orders his men to  
‘Brenne [Cecelia] right in a bath of flames rede.’ 
And as he bad, right so was doon the dede; 
For in a bath they gone hire faste shetten, 
And nyght and day greet fyr they under betten.  
The longe nyght, and eek a day also, 
For al the fyr and eek the bathes heete 
She sat al coold and feelede no wo. (SNT 515-21) 
 
This fire cannot kill, burn, warm, nor even make her sweat. She sits motionless, 
unaffected, for at least a full day and night; her temperance and integrity seem as natural 
to her as heat is to the fire. Yet the fire does not burn her. The paradox is reflected by the 
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 This ability of her body to radiate pureness in a way that affects the bodies around her resonates with the 
idea of Christ’s body “infecting” others with cleanness as I discussed in Chapter III. In more modern 
literature, we might also think of Nathaniel Hawthorne’s “Rappaccini’s Daughter,” in which Beatrice’s 
very skin contains the ability to poison; thus to touch her is to relinquish one’s life.  
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 Her more-than-human status extends to an ability to influence her environment. When she goes to 
Maximus’s house, “Cecile cam, whan it was woxen nyght, / with preestes that hem cristned alle yfeere; / 
And afterward, whan day was woxen light, / Cecile hem seyde with a ful steadfast cheere” (SNT 37-82). 
That no time seems to elapse between her arrival at night and the onset of day makes her seem like the 
bringer of dawn. She comes at night, and after she arrives it is day. Her lightness, like the “Wantynge of 
blyndnesse” that defines her name, is enacted literally here as well as figuratively in her conversion of 
followers: she enlightens them by showing them truth and by bringing day (SNP 100). 
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fact that she is put into a “bath” of flames. The heat of the fire juxtaposed against the 
physical coolness of her body emphasizes her femininity in medieval medical terms. 
According to the Galenic humoral system, coldness and wetness were women’s ruling 
qualities, while heat and dryness were men’s. Here, however, Cecelia’s cold, wet nature, 
rather than revealing weakness, is reinforced by her faith to allow her to transcend the 
body and withstand the heat of Almachius’s flames. The scene also evokes Cecelia’s 
femininity through the suggestion of nudity, since she is in a bathtub, and thus her sexual 
desirability and virginal resolve are highlighted again. Her torture also inverts the idea of 
baptism – the boiling waters are not intended to wash but to kill; instead they only 
validate Cecelia’s purity. She is already cleansed and reborn in spirit. When Valerian’s 
brother Tiberius wishes to convert, Cecelia tells him to “Go with thy brother now, and 
thee baptize, / and make thee clene, so that thou mowe biholde / The angels face of which 
thy brother tolde” (299-301). The physical act of baptism cleanses the outer body, but 
Cecelia explains it will also cleanse Tiberius of sins and allow his eyes to see the 
invisible things of faith – in this case the angel of God who protects her. Her fiery bath, 
unlike baptism, cannot penetrate her interior – it is barely able to affect her exterior body, 
except perhaps to cauterize her further against physical influence.223  
Almachius’s men set up Cecelia’s bath of flames “In hire hous” (514). This 
mention of Cecelia’s house invokes the common medieval metaphor of the body as a 
house.224 By telling his men to burn Cecelia within her house, Almachius reinforces the 
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 Cecelia’s bath also invokes baptism because it burns: in the Gospel of Matthew, John the Baptist 
promises Jesus will “vos baptizabit in Spiritu Sancto et igni” (Matthew 3.11).  
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 The metaphor of the body as a house was extremely common in medieval literature, with the physical 
structure of the human form serving as a cell but also a protective barrier around the soul (Lionarons 43). 
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physicality of her punishment. Her house – that is to say her body – is the only place 
Almachius can touch her, as her interior spirituality is faultlessly, impenetrably protected. 
It also suggests Almachius tries – and fails – to keep Cecelia’s torture “private” or secret, 
enclosing her within her house in an attempt to keep the public unaware.225 Her 
unceasing preaching and singing, however, make her own death very public, showing one 
more way she denies Almachius’s false boundaries – despite his attempts to control her 
body, he cannot silence her spiritual expression.  
Because the flames do not affect Cecelia’s body, Almachius sends a messenger to 
decapitate her instead. When the messenger arrives at Cecelia’s house, “Thre strokes in 
the nekke he smoot hire tho, / The tormentour, but for no maner chaunce / He myghte 
noght smyte al hir nekke atwo” (526-28). Not even three strokes of a sword can sever 
Cecelia’s head. Her body is superhuman. Though her flesh can be harmed, it is clearly 
more resistant to violent penetration than normal bodies; it repulses weapons the way she 
repulses sexual penetration.  
Despite her near impenetrability, the blood that wells from her neck and the way 
her followers treat it remind us of Cecelia’s closed-off sexuality. Her blood seems to 
mark her marriage to God, just as the seed of chastity God sowed in her marked her 
spiritual procreativity. When she bleeds, “The Cristen folk, which that aboute hire were, / 
With sheetes han the blood ful faire yhent” (535-36). This act of collecting her blood 
conjures up the image of the marriage bed: sheets stained by the blood from a torn hymen 
after defloration. Though Cecelia’s blood results from a physical wound, it might serve as 
a marker that her virgin body is now penetrated in spiritual marriage. Like Mary, Cecelia 
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Almachius would not want to make a public example of Cecelia; she might become an even stronger 
rallying point for her followers.  
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becomes an extracategorical woman: she is wedded to God but sexually unpenetrated, yet 
her body’s wound expresses the spiritual union she has entered.   
Because a local ordinance prohibits more than three strokes in an execution, we 
cannot know whether a fourth would have decapitated Cecelia completely. Instead, 
miraculously, “half deed, with hir nekke ycorven there, / he left hir lye, and on his wey he 
went… Thre dayes lyved she in this torment, / And never cessed hem the faith to teche” 
(533-34, 537-38). Her more-than-human status is displayed in a series of contradictions 
that break categorical boundaries and place her in a strange “betweenness.” She is half 
dead but still lives, and in spite of the narrator’s claim that she is in torment she tells 
Urban these three days are “respit” she has received from God before moving on to 
Heaven (543). Though her neck has been mostly severed, she is still able to draw breath 
enough to speak; she preaches ceaselessly for three days.226  
That Cecelia passively endures various torments; that her body hangs between life 
and death as she claims “respit” for herself suggests she inhabits the same kind of 
suspended state that the clergeon inhabited after his wounding. Time is disrupted in 
Cecelia’s “hous.” What should be a quick death is prolonged: time is held in check until 
Cecelia’s divine potency becomes fully actualized. Her “respit” is not just relief, it is a 
temporal lull or pause. But when her death comes, Cecelia’s transcendence is less 
uncertain than the clergeon’s. When she speaks to Urban about her followers, she tells 
him she asked God for three more living days “er that I go” (544). Whereas her actions 
since Almachius’s men trapped her in her house have all been passive, now she will 
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move under her own power.227 This corresponds with the figurative tie between house 
and body. Being burned and then wounded “In hire hous” has held her inside her body 
which, despite its purity, is still human. Thus like the clergeon, she has had to remain in 
the world until her body could be relinquished. To transcend to heaven, she must go on, 
leaving her house and body behind.  
Yet even in her transcendence Cecelia’s body is the site of contradictions. She 
tells Urban “that I myghte do werche / [Build] Heere of myn hous perpetuelly a cherche” 
(545-46). Her request will transform an earthly home into a spiritual space, paralleling 
her own transition from fleshly existence to heavenly “body.” This request to sacralize 
her home is Cecelia’s last utterance. Immediately after she asks for her house to be 
designated a church, Urban “The body fette and buryed it by nyghte / Among his othere 
seintes honestly. / Hir hous the chirche of Seint Cecilie highte; / Seint Urban halwed it, as 
he wel myghte” (548-51). Even as Cecelia names her body a spiritual place, it also 
becomes just a body; what was Cecelia has at once moved on to a higher plane, but has 
also become a corpse. That Urban both buries her body and consecrates her house 
suggests similar actions: as her religious comrade bearing the titles of both Saint and 
Pope, he must have performed all the correct Christian burial rituals over her body, and 
that he consecrates her living space suggests a parallel between house and body again.  
Cecelia’s home and body are marked by elements of preservation. Men serve 
Christ in the church her house became “into this day, in noble wyse” (522). This suggests 
an imperviousness to time’s decay. Normal human bodies are sites of abjection not only 
because they eat and defecate, but because they become corpses. Kristeva explains “A 
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decaying body, lifeless, completely turned into dejection, blurred between the inanimate 
and the inorganic, a transitional swarming, inseparable lining of a human nature whose 
life is indistinguishable from the symbolic – the corpse represents fundamental pollution. 
A body without soul, a non-body, disquieting matter” (109). In order to be a body but not 
a corpse, the potential for pollution must be removed. Cecelia links purity and 
preservation from the beginning of the tale: she asks God to “kepe hir maydenhede.” She 
does not want her virginity protected for a while, but kept in God’s possession forever, 
undamaged and unchanged. As she waits for her wedding day, she prays “my soule and 
eek my body gye / Unwemmed” (136-37). Here “gye” means “preserve,” which carries 
connotations of protection but also of stasis: she wants her soul and body to remain the 
same – undefiled as they are now.228 Similarly, in her explanation to Valerian about her 
required chastity she tells him he will gain God’s love if “ye in clene love me gye” (159). 
Chaste love will preserve her; it will protect her against spiritual damnation but also, it 
would seem, physical decay. Like a sterile container, once the seal has been broken and 
air let in, the process of decomposition begins and the contents will inevitably spoil. 
Cecelia herself points this out when she critiques Almachius and his hasty, misdirected 
speech. Mortal man’s power, she tells him, “ful litel is to dreede,” because it is “lyk a 
bladder ful of wynd, ywys. / For with a nedles point, whan it is blowe, / May al the boost 
of it be leyd ful lowe” (437, 439-41). In God’s grand scheme, Cecelia suggests, 
Almachius is no more than an air bladder, and his commands are neither powerful nor 
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lasting.229 By explaining that his edicts will blow away, Cecelia affirms only the 
constancy of God – the changing whims and statutes of mortal men are temporary and 
thus imperfect. Because she remains closed, Cecelia, and God’s design which uses 
Cecelia, prevents her body from spoiling and thus that body may transcend.  
We are given another instance of this motif of preservation in the rose and lily 
crowns Cecelia and Valerian receive. The angel who presents these crowns says he has 
brought them “Fro paradys to yow,” and that “Ne nevere mo ne shal they roten bee, / Ne 
lese hir soote savour, trusteth me” (227, 228-29). Their freshness and supernatural origin 
are confirmed when Valerian’s brother Tiberius marvels at their scent. He wonders “this 
tyme of the yeer, / Whennes that soote savour cometh so / Of rose and lilies that I smelle 
heer” (246-48). Out of season but ever-fresh, these crowns from Heaven will never rot. 
By wearing them, Cecelia and Valerian have taken the steps needed to avoid the rot that 
comes with sin. Cecelia makes clear this immutable state she and Valerian are striving to 
enter. She says to Tiberius, “ther is bettre lif in oother place, / That nevere shal be lost” 
(323-24). Preceded by Cecelia’s stated desire to be preserved, this idea that heavenly life 
will never be lost suggests enduring avoidance of the rot and decay that awaits all bodies.  
Preservation is not the same as everlasting freshness, however. Though the rose 
and lily crowns Cecelia and Valerian receive remain perpetually fresh, that Cecelia began 
life in a human body must be accounted for. This, and the fact that the Second Nun’s Tale 
is followed by the Canon’s Yeoman’s story about alchemy, make Cecelia’s bath of 
flames a significant final step in her transcendence. Alchemy attempts to transform base 
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matter into higher material – most frequently lead into gold – and central to alchemical 
success is the idea of a union, called coniuncto, which is often described as a 
metaphorical marriage (Schwartz-Salant 8). Cecelia’s goal is transcendence and 
resurrection in Heaven. But because she is human, she must undergo a transformation – 
in alchemical terms a transmutation – to prepare for this divine marriage. The idea of 
transmutation is “precisely the function of the alchemical coniuncto: it resides in a ‘third’ 
or ‘in-between’ space of relations” and is more than the sum of its parts (Schwartz-Salant 
14). Cecelia’s body, caught between life and death but also humanness and divinity, is 
transmuted – interstitial but also paradoxically both in each dichotomy.230 The tale itself, 
in fact, serves as a kind of coniuncto, as it “conjoins what it knows to be apart and 
different, even as Cecelia conjoins Roman and Christian or Jesus conjoins God and man, 
in a new body – it does not seek to transmute one thing into another, it seeks only to 
conjoin or combine two things in a new whole” (Shoaf 67). That heat was often the first 
step in transmuting the base matter – prima materia – toward the end goal suggests 
Cecelia’s cauterizing bath of flame performs a similar transmutation upon her, further 
perfecting her already impermeable body (Clack 2-3).  
The tale’s emphasis on Cecelia’s purity and whiteness places her literally and 
alchemically above ordinary humans. Base matter was subjected to heat and chemical 
processes until it changed from black to white to reddish gold, which signified creation of 
the Philosopher’s Stone (Clack 2-3). Cecelia’s “whitenesse” and her name’s etymological 
interpretation as “hevenes lilie” may suggest she is already at the white or albedo stage of 
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the alchemical transmutation (SNP 89, 87). That she bleeds when her neck is “ycorven” 
suggests she is still partly mortal, but also that she has perhaps more closely approached 
divine coniuncto, evidenced by the redness of her blood. Though the bath of flames does 
not physically heat or burn her, it has an effect on her mortality. In addition to proving 
her advanced impermeability, we learn “in that bath hir lyf she moste lete” (SNT 523). 
Though this is most obviously because Almachius has ordered his messenger to 
decapitate her while she sits amidst the flames, it could also indicate the fire’s influence 
on her body. She has released the part of herself that tied her to humanity, and now she 
must only complete the transmutation by relieving herself of the body she has inhabited 
during life, until it is truly perfected at the Resurrection.  
Though both saint and clergeon remain uncorrupt, they also both seem affected by 
their surroundings: Julia Bolton Holloway comments “unlike the child with his throat cut 
who could not die but was left amidst the ordure of a latrine, St. Cecilia lies in a cleansing 
bath of purifying flame” (206). Kristeva explains that “The abject is edged with the 
sublime. It is not the same moment on the journey, but the same subject and speech bring 
them into being” (11). While the abject confronts us with both the animalistic other and 
the bestial or primal parts of the self, the sublime allows us to remove ourselves from 
ourselves, sublimating or hiding the abject. If indeed the abject is borderless, it cannot be 
wholly contained; bodies will continue to flow and shift and produce whether or not we 
wish them to. For Kristeva, the sublime is like a blanket over the spill of abjection 
beneath. Linked etymologically not only to the idea of sublimation but also liminality, the 
sublime effects an edging, or bordering, atop the unboundable abject. Kristeva elaborates 
“In the symptom [that is, a non-assimilable structure within the body], the abject 
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permeates me, I become abject. Through sublimation, I keep it under control” (11). Here 
the word “under” is key, as she speaks of the sublime as an “impossible bounding” that 
rests atop the abject while it tries to contain it (12). While the Prioress’s Tale depicted 
flow through both town and body in its digestion metaphor, throughout the Second Nun’s 
Tale we have images of actions on the margin. As a Roman Christian and a woman, 
Cecelia is already on the margins of society. Her suspension between humanness and 
divinity, between life and death, between spiritual wifehood and physical virginity, locate 
her on the edges of possibility.  
Cecelia’s reliance on Urban emphasizes this motif of marginality: always located 
in the periphery, Urban provides a spiritual, Christian edging to the urban Roman center. 
Lurking in the catacombs, an ever expanding city of the dead, even Urban’s existence 
hovers between life and death.231 When Valerian finds him, Urban is described as holy 
and old and “Among the seintes buryeles lotynge”; he already lives in a community of 
dead saints (186). Tiberius emphasizes Urban’s marginality even more, asking 
“menestow nat Urban… that is so ofte dampned to be deed, / And woneth in halkes 
alwey to and fro, / And dar nat ones putte forth his heed?” (309-12). Acknowledging 
Urban’s status as politically and socially good as dead, Tiberius heightens the image of 
the spiritual man as just that – more spiritual than human, haunting the catacombs and 
secret city spaces like a ghost. Manifesting himself at the margins to offer spiritual advice 
shows Urban as a man on the border: he inhabits a body, but is less beholden to it than 
normal human beings.  
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Cecelia and Urban exist on the margins, trying in their dedication to spirituality 
and bodily closure to border a thing that cannot be bordered: the abject does not respect 
boundaries or laws, which is what makes it so threatening. Though the abject is not 
totally escapable, saints’ project of self-containment is different from the simple attempt 
to control bodies by divisively categorizing them. The Second Nun’s Tale instead 
displays resistance to categories through multiplicity, privileging wholeness; inhabiting 
multiple categories helps Cecelia keep her body whole and therefore sublimate or 
transcend what is abject about her humanness. Because she keeps herself sealed off from 
corruption – not repudiating her body but perfecting it – Cecelia crests above the abject 
into the sublime with her transmutation and superhuman transcendence, remaining 
undefiled, uncorrupted, and hence eternally preserved.232  
The clergeon’s and St. Cecelia’s superhuman bodies achieve living transcendence 
through paradox: they are spiritually impermeable, but that impermeability is exposed 
through their human wounds. As Kristeva asserts, abjection is not caused by a simple 
lack of cleanliness, but by what disrupts and disturbs order, breaking boundaries and 
rules (4). This should make the clergeon and St. Cecelia examples of abjection. Yet rather 
than wallowing in the filth of embodied life, the clergeon and St. Cecelia are able to 
escape abjection through their bodies’ resistance to borders and inversion of normal 
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 Her sublime status seems challenged by at least two things. First, the image of a woman with her head 
half severed is grotesque, and brings to mind the corpses and decay of abjection. However, Cecelia’s 
endless preaching means our lingering impression is of sound rather than sight – her words are more 
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order. The sublime may be only a momentary escape from or negation of the abject, but 
here it is used to attain unending divinity. Chaucer uses a system of exposed faults to 
display perfection, inverting and tangling the threads of normal embodiment, life, and 
death to show simultaneously the impossibility of attaining divinity, and its successful 
achievement.    
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CHAPTER VI. 
NEW LINES OF FLIGHT: PERFORMED IDENTITY 
As I near the end of this exploration, I find myself once again facing 
contradiction. Traditionally, in this kind of project I should take this space to make my 
closing arguments and insist once again that my reading – the way I have presented 
medieval nonnormative and becoming- bodies – is the correct interpretation that should 
be privileged above all others. But such a claim would place me in paradox. I have tried 
to conduct a rhizomatic investigation, viewing bodies as assemblages in themselves and 
in connection with the world and circumstances that surround them, and such a method 
cannot have singular entrances or exits. Rhizomes are multiplicities. They may rupture 
into lines of flight, but “the line of flight is part of the rhizome. These lines always tie 
back to one another. That is why one can never posit a dualism or a dichotomy, even in 
the rudimentary form of the good and the bad. You may make a rupture, draw a line of 
flight, yet there is still a danger that you will reencounter organizations that restratify 
everything” (Deleuze and Guattari 9). Making a definitive claim here that shuts down 
dialogue and possibility would be a move toward restratification. Poststructuralism 
privileges multiplicity over singularity, not rejecting interpretations, but encouraging us 
to accept more than one possible answer.233 Given this methodology of acceptance, 
inclusion, and plurality, the “conclusions” I draw here are not intended to collapse into a 
single, arboreal point, not to close down or constrict, as even the etymology of the word 
“conclude” requires, but to serve as new openings – a suggestion toward a new line of 
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flight that might be pursued amidst the rhizomatic tangle of how and what medieval 
bodies mean.  
In the preceding chapters I have traced the impact and influence of food and sex 
on medieval bodies as they are understood physically and culturally. Here, I will treat 
briefly two transformative bodies: Bertilak/the Green Knight from Sir Gawain and the 
Green Knight and the Loathly/Lovely Lady from Chaucer’s Wife of Bath’s Tale. Though 
feasting, hunting, sex and marriage are present in both SGGK and the WBT, they seem at 
once adjacent to and subsumed by the shifting, changeable bodies of Bertilak and the 
Loathly/Lovely Lady. When we look for behaviors or attributes that might “govern” or 
influence their transformations, we find a non-Christian magic – an extra-natural but not 
necessarily divine power that in changing their bodies marks them as more than but also 
perhaps as less than human.234 Bertilak in his Host and Green Knight form, and the hag of 
the WBT as loathly, as lovely, and as conscious imagined incarnations of the Wife of 
Bath, exceed the boundaries of all established categories of humanness.   
SGGK and WBT share not only fascinating transformative bodies, but also their 
genre: both are masterful Arthurian romances. SGGK places itself firmly in the history of 
the genre, tracing Camelot’s genealogy through Brutus back to Troy. The WBT 
historicizes itself through only the passing reference to “th’olde dayes of the Kyng 
Arthour” (WBT 857). Both have roots in Celtic folklore and legend, which are more 
interested in magic and interactions between humans and the faerie or the supernatural 
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 That is, the ability to shift one’s shape is a super- or extra-human ability, and yet the shapes these bodies 
occupy could be considered sometimes monstrous, aligned with animals, or otherwise “less than human.” 
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than in chivalry or religion.235 The magic that enables Bertilak’s and the Loathly Lady’s 
bodily transformations is positive and life-sustaining rather than a demonic or divine 
intercession. Rather than concentrating on digestive and sexual behaviors, as I did in 
previous chapters, which are natural and divinely ordained, here I will analyze the 
transformations allowed by this magic.  
The Loathly Lady and Bertilak also differ from other bodies I have examined in 
their ability to change more than once. Each of the other changeable bodies I have 
discussed either undergoes a representational transition from one type of body to another 
–Belshazzar, for instance, is identified as a man and then aligned with canines – or is 
caught between and outside the bounds of several categories, never fully occupying any 
of them – as the AMA giant approaches monster, beast, and human, or St. Cecelia, who is 
human and impervious. Bertilak, however, moves back and forth between the form of 
Green Knight and human host and hunter. The Loathly Lady, though we see her 
transform herself only once, seems capable of changing again since the magic she calls 
on is her own. Her identification with the Wife of Bath, who writes herself into the tale in 
multiple bodies thanks to the transformations she has undergone in her life, also gives the 
impression of moving back and forth between types of bodies.236  
Given this multiple shifting, the project of determining what Bertilak and the 
Loathly Lady “are” or “mean” is a thorny one. For a rhizomatic reading, all aspects of 
their personas must be examined, and doing so leads to contradictions that are difficult to 
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 SGGK certainly intersects powerfully with Christian and chivalric codes and contains possibilities for 
patristic readings. I am not discounting these religious resonances, but suggesting they take a back seat, so 
to speak, to the magical and metamorphic qualities of the romance. The supernatural here takes precedence 
over “natural” bodily behaviors without the kind of negative or divinely inspired connotations it might 
accrue in an exemplum or hagiography. 
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 For more on the Wife of Bath and time, see Shimamura.  
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reconcile. To exemplify this, and make a tentative attempt toward uncovering their 
identities, I wish to turn to Judith Butler’s comments on drag and performativity. 
Drawing on Esther Newton, Butler explains that drag – a structure and method of 
impersonation – not only works as a mechanism of fabrication but also “fully subverts the 
distinction between inner and outer psychic space and effectively mocks both the 
expressive model of gender and the notion of a true gender identity” (Gender Trouble 
186). Drag is a double inversion. It performs an outward appearance that differs from the 
socially constructed understanding of the body within. Yet by calling attention to this 
difference, drag suggests the appearance being performed is a more accurate 
representation of the inner “being” of the performer than the body or gender the 
performer anatomically occupies. Not limited to clothing, but encompassing also 
corporeal signs like depilation, cosmetics, patterns of speech and body language,  
The performance of drag plays upon the distinction between the anatomy 
of the performer and the gender that is being performed. But we are 
actually in the presence of three contingent dimensions of significant 
corporeality: anatomical sex, gender identity, and gender performance. If 
the anatomy of the performer is already distinct from the gender of the 
performer, and both of these are distinct from the gender of the 
performance, then the performance suggests a dissonance not only 
between sex and performance, but sex and gender, and gender and 
performance. (187)  
 
Obviously neither Bertilak’s nor the Loathly Lady’s anatomical sex is in question in 
either of their forms, and though arguments could be made about the Loathly Lady’s 
performance of gender as other-than-woman thanks to her desire for masculine authority 
or her perceived sexual undesirability, there is no doubt that she is in fact female and that 
she will occupy the female and feminine role of wife to the knight.237 Yet because both 
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 Because gender politics and the understanding of gender as separate from sex is a modern idea, I do not 
think the question of gender as Butler explains it applies well to much medieval literature. I am not 
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perform their identities by inhabiting multiple outward appearances and behaviors, their 
changeability and the question of which form, if any, “truly” comprehends what they 
“are” or what they mean is akin to the multiple inversions drag reveals.238  
I do not propose to read Bertilak and the Loathly Lady as “in drag” or claim that 
Butler’s argument may be applied perfectly and analogously to these medieval figures. 
Centuries of difference in how we understand bodies, humanness, and representation 
separate these texts, and numerous methods and approaches to interpretation exist for 
each, which would make an exact application of Butler’s theories both anachronistic and 
arboreal. Instead, I wish to read Bertilak and the Loathly Lady side by side with Butler’s 
theories, mapping them together to show one way we might understand how they deal 
with issues of bodily transformation and identity. Mapping, we remember, is a conceptual 
                                                                                                                                                 
suggesting subjects such as transvestitism or same-sex relations did not exist, as they not only did but are in 
some cases well documented, but I am cautious about using “gender” the way Butler does because its 
rhetorical meaning is so different from what medieval people probably considered about sex and identity. 
While gender in the sense of whether a human being is recognized and identifies him or herself as a man or 
a woman is important for establishing social standing or inclusion in cultural or political issues, I believe it 
becomes less crucial when we have not yet determined whether a particular body is even considered 
human. Carolyn Bynum has written “while it is true that medieval philosophers sometimes tried to define 
person (and it is important that this was their category for thinking about the human, not essence [esse]), 
they did not usually in these discussions deal with gender” (“Why All This Fuss About the Body?” 18). In 
transformative or becoming- bodies, shifting between roles, definitions, and categories of understanding, in 
some cases not even species is fully apparent – or applicable, as applying a species designation would be 
too limiting. We might instead refer to “genus status,” moving a level above species in an effort to be less 
restricting.  
 
238
 Even with the caveat that medievals did not usually deal with gender in their discussions of personhood, 
it may seem strange to refer to the concept of drag independently from questions of gender or sexuality. I 
believe, however, that this separation expands rather than diminishes the impact of drag. Drag does not 
have to refer just to issues of gender identity in a cultural milieu where identity is based on different 
questions and conventions. Indeed, even in modern society I think drag can refer to performances of race or 
cultural belonging differentiated from gender. Though she still ties it to a homosexual attitude toward social 
roles, Esther Newton acknowledges that “‘Drag’ has come to have a broader referent: any clothing that 
signifies a social role, for instance a fireman’s suit or farmer’s overalls” (3, n.7). Katrin Sieg has written 
about “ethnic drag” as cross-racial casting in theater but also as a performance of race as a masquerade in 
West and reunified Germany. Drag is on the same continuum as performativity, but its masquerade and 
inversion qualities make it more complex than simple performance. Its subversion applied to identity 
formation troubles the essence of being and allows for multiplicity and changeability: the double inversion 
to which Butler points correlates with the multiple identities within the “same” body the Green Knight and 
the Loathly/Lovely Lady exhibit.  
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key to the rhizome in that it both opposes and expands tracing. Deleuze and Guattari note 
that the arboreal model – the tree that provides an originary and single-stranded 
interpretation – operates through tracings or exact recreations. An arboreal model, or 
tracing, works “on the basis of an overcoding structure or supporting axis, something that 
comes ready-made. The tree articulates and hierarchizes tracings; tracings are like the 
leaves of a tree” (Deleuze and Guattari 12). On the other hand, “The rhizome is 
altogether different, a map and not a tracing. Make a map, not a tracing. The orchid does 
not reproduce the tracing of the wasp; it forms a map with the wasp, in a rhizome… The 
map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the 
unconscious. It fosters connections between fields” (12). So when I place Butler’s ideas 
about drag and performativity beside the play of bodies and identities operating in SGGK 
and WBT I am not attempting an exact tracing, but rather am reading her theory with the 
literature in a rhizomatic map of possibility. This is not drag as we commonly understand 
it, or even exactly as Butler lays it out. But reading the theory and the literature mapped 
together allows us a way of understanding Bertilak that accounts and allows for his 
multiplicity even as he identifies all his collective selves with a singular name at the end 
of the poem. Reading the Loathly Lady and her intersection with the Wife of Bath with 
Butler’s theories shows us a way this female character can create herself, perform herself, 
and rhetorically wear multiple bodies at multiple spaces of human and supernatural 
time.239 
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 It is important to consider the difference between performativity and agency. Though Bertilak and the 
Loathly Lady perform their own identities, neither is completely self controlled; Bertilak claims to be 
Morgan le Faye’s pawn while the Loathly Lady is part of a story told by the Wife of Bath, related by the 
Pilgrim Chaucer. Both poems are told by poets responding to pre-existing cultural and social conventions 
and historical traditions which color their understandings and therefore representations of bodies. But in 
this, they are not unlike any person trying to perform him or herself: social constructions will always 
influence how an identity is understood. Nevertheless, mapping these texts together with Butler provides a 
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Thus in finalizing this exploration I invoke the rhizome in two ways: first, in 
mapping Butler’s theories of performativity and identity against the bodies Bertilak and 
the Loathly Lady “put on” and occupy, I will show that no unchanging inner being 
defines exactly what or who these bodies “are.”240 They exist, and we understand them, 
based on the textual actions and appearances by which they are represented. Second, by 
concentrating on magic and transformative, performed identities, rather than on food and 
sex, I will mark a new direction in my examination of extracategorical bodies. Deleuze 
and Guattari ask: “Is it not the essence of the map to be traceable? ... Do not even lines of 
flight, due to their eventual divergence, reproduce the very formations their function it 
was to dismantle or outflank? But the opposite is also true. It is a question of method: the 
tracing should always be put back on the map” (13). In taking up this new line of flight, 
the previous line of food and sex practices is woven back into the map.241  
Butler would have us replace the concept of an essential core of being and instead 
recognize identity as performative: “acts, gestures, and desire produce the effect of an 
internal core or substance, but produce this on the surface of the body, through the play 
of signifying absences that suggest, but never reveal, the organizing principle of identity 
as a cause” (185). That the gendered body Butler discusses or the transformative body I 
am considering “is performative suggests that it has no ontological status apart from the 
                                                                                                                                                 
way of understanding the performer as capable of multiple forms and meanings – not adhering to or 
remaining within any rigidly drawn categorical lines.  
 
240
 To that end, I have tried wherever possible to avoid essentializing or permanent terms like “is,” “are,” 
and “being” to describe Bertilak and the Loathly/Lovely Lady.  
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 Because we are always trapped in and by language, any act of interpretation in a sense forces us into an 
arboreal reading. Criticism becomes a tracing on a rhizomatic text, pulling out and stabilizing individual 
threads of a collectively unstable and infinite text. We can never completely escape this because language 
is both necessary and (imperfectly) determinant, but we can try. Recognizing the rhizomatic quality of the 
text itself and accepting multiple interpretations in every critical effort is, I think, the closest we can come 
to escaping this arboreality.  
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various acts which constitute its reality” (185). That is to say, “there is no performer prior 
to the performed” (“Imitation and Gender Insubordination” 24). Bertilak and the Loathly 
Lady, then, must be understood based on their movements and transformations within 
their respective texts. Without making any move to close down and conclude, then, in 
what follows I will offer brief readings of Bertilak and the Loathly Lady not as beings 
with firm ontological cores, but as performances of identity that resist categorization 
through multiplicity and metamorphosis. 
Bertilak Does Drag: Knight, Host, and Hunter in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight  
As the Green Knight, Bertilak has been interpreted to represent death, life, 
judgment, nature, barbarism, the wisdom of age, monstrosity, and supernatural 
courtliness.242 Yet as Ross G. Arthur has pointed out, Bertilak as a figure, and the poem 
itself, both resist through their complexity any kind of exact decoding. Arthur declares 
“When a critic has completed his work, the poem often seems diminished or even 
trivialized, as the shimmering complexity of the surface of the text is replaced by 
schematic patterns that are not only less complex but also far less interesting” (3-4).243 
Much modern criticism, indeed, now focuses on the idea that Bertilak’s role in the poem 
must not be funneled into a single function or univocal allegory. If he is a metaphor for 
something, he is also simultaneously representative of something else. As J. A. Burrow 
suggests, “If there is one single and sufficient truth about the Green Knight of the first 
fitte, it is that he positively bristles, bewilderingly, with suggestions and significances” 
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 For some of these interpretations, see Arthur; Benson; Bloomfield; and Burrow.  
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 See also Prior, who asserts “An overly allegorical reading tends, I believe, to reduce the poem to a not 
very engaging sermon. In the process, exegesis removes a poem’s language play, its versification, its poetic 
figures, its wit and humor – in short, many of the qualities that make Sir Gawain and the Green Knight 
such a brilliant and successful poem” (93).  
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(4). These significances and suggestions are, I would add, hints of his transformative 
capability and his freedom from a singular ontological core.244  
Because he exhibits contradictory tendencies – friend and foe, nature and culture, 
life and death, monster or giant and human lord, invading guest and host, courtly and 
wild – Bertilak can easily be classified as opposites held in resolution. But Bertilak is 
always, in each of these binaries, a figure of bothness.245 He doesn’t resolve antagonistic 
qualities; he performs them all. He operates, I suggest, to break the idea of binary 
opposites; he enacts their insufficiency to contain a complex body such as his. Bertilak is 
rather an assemblage of attributes and actions stretched like a multi-stranded, web-like 
bridge between categories; his identity (or identities) embraces all his attributes at the 
expense of none. Bertilak of course seems to be dual: the threatening, supernatural Green 
Knight and the lordly host of Haut Desert. If we read him as performative, however, he 
enacts not two, but as many as four personas: Green Knight, lordly host, but also a 
hunter, and, as Marie Borroff notes, a different Green Knight at the end of the poem from 
the Green Knight he was at its start (Borroff 108). Only then, after we have seen him in 
all versions of himself, do we learn he is the “same” person, and that he “is” Lord 
Bertilak. His revelation of his name – his self identification – acknowledges that he 
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 The blend of source materials behind the Green Knight as a character also contributes to his complexity 
and transformative capacity. The eighth century Irish “Fled Bricrend” is the likely source of the beheading 
game. The French “Livre de Caradoc” and “Perlesvaus” may also be sources for the story, also featuring an 
exchange of beheadings by a threatening, magical being (Loomis 7-11). Bertilak’s physical appearance 
shares characteristics with medieval wild men – hairy, human-shaped but uncivilized forest dwellers 
populating medieval folklore. His greenness, which appears in none of SGGK’s analogues, associates him 
with the folkloric figure of the Green Man or “Jack-of-the-Green,” a lusty, leaf-covered, regenerative 
representation of springtime and reproduction (Benson 65, 67). The incorporation of characteristics from so 
many figures and sources, as well as the Gawain-poet’s mixing of French verse form, the long alliterative 
line from Anglo-Saxon poetry, and a vocabulary that blends Middle English, Norse, and Anglo-Norman 
words make Bertilak irreducible. He is a kind of rhizome in himself.  
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 For more doubling and binaries, see Haydock 86.  
  
 
 
243 
encompasses all his previous performances; Bertilak “is” an assemblage of rhizomatic 
lines of flight overflowing and moving between existing categories of stable being.246  
As Butler explains, the acts and gestures that produce the effect of an ontological 
core are performative “in the sense that the essence or identity that they otherwise purport 
to express are fabrications manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs and other 
discursive means” (Gender Trouble 185). That is, our understanding of an unchanging 
being is produced through the way a person presents himself or herself to the world, and 
how that presentation is understood. Though our usual understanding of drag involves 
clothing socially marked as “gendered” worn by a person with the opposite anatomical 
sex, “corporeal signs and other discursive means” extends beyond this, including all 
aspects of how the body is presented: movement, physical appearance, speech, and 
interactions with others.247 To track Bertilak’s metamorphosing identities, we must 
carefully assess his corporeal signs and discursive methods.  
In Bertilak’s initial appearance, we are bombarded with a list of wildly 
contradictory attributes that, once assembled, produce only an amorphous understanding 
of what stands before us. The Green Knight is “an aghlich mayster, / On þe most on þe 
molde on mesure hyghe” (SGGK 135-36). Further, “his lydes and his lymes so longe and 
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 I am not suggesting Bertilak “is” any one of these personas more than the others, but that he performs 
each as fits his circumstances, and that together they do give us greater understanding of his existence in his 
body. He is not any one self, but selves: a true assemblage.  
 
247
 Clothing does, however, often provide a strong first impression about a body’s identity or identities. In 
fact, though for the purposes of length and time I have not delved into questions about clothing and dress 
here, in at least six of the seven works I discuss in this dissertation clothing plays an important role in 
determining meaning and status, often in the same episodes in which I have analyzed food and sex 
behaviors. The giant’s kirtle and potential nudity in the Alliterative Morte Arthure, the soiled garments at 
the wedding feast and the angels’ spotless garb in Cleanness, Haukyn’s stained coat in Piers Plowman, 
Cecelia’s golden gown covering a hairshirt in the Second Nun’s Tale, and Bertilak’s armor and girdle as 
well as the Wife of Bath’s costume all play significant roles in how we understand these characters. As a 
covering for the body, clothing resonates with issues of purity, borders, inside versus outside, and social 
status within the bounds of humanness. I believe this is a line of flight worth pursuing, in these and perhaps 
other texts as well, but such an exploration will have to wait for another project.  
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so grete, / Half-etayne in erde I hope þat he were, / Bot mon most I algate mynn hym to 
bene” (139-41). Already the poet has created a constantly shifting picture of this figure: 
he is awe-inspiring, as tall as the tallest man, but so swarthy and long in limb that he 
might be instead – or perhaps also – half giant. The narrator thinks this person is of giant 
stock, but also believes he is probably just a man; this uncertainty simultaneously 
humanizes the figure and makes him more mysterious. The ambiguity only increases as 
the narrator’s descriptions continue. In addition to his uncertain height, “of bak and of 
brest al were his bodi sturne, / Both his wombe and his wast were worthily smale, / And 
alle his fetures folȝande in forme, þat he hade, / Ful clene” (143-46). Here we have 
contrast again: a sturdy, broad torso with a slim, shapely waist, all formed with exquisite 
fairness.248 He now resonates in the audience’s imagination as half-giant and therefore 
potentially monstrous, but also as handsome, stalwart knight and as perfectly beautiful, 
like a faerie or a courtly heroine. Within half a stanza, however, civilization and wildness 
are juxtaposed again. He wears “clene spures… / Of bryȝt golde, vpon silk bordes barred 
ful ryche,” which identify him as a courtly, civilized knight (159). We then immediately 
learn that “scholes vnder þere þe schalk rides” (160). What do we make of an elegantly 
armed knight with bare feet? This Bertilak is in constant flux because he exceeds any one 
category we might invoke to frame him: every time we think we have a clear picture we 
can identify with some culturally determined ensemble, a new detail puts him outside it. 
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 Burrow comments of this contrast that “There is nothing monstrous about the burly body, slender waist 
and long, thick limbs… The Green Knight is, in fact, a fine figure of a man, according to the medieval 
courtly ideal. But it is to be remarked that the poet takes up this conventional contrast between massive 
body and slender waist and develops it in such a way as to suggest the indeterminate character of the 
stranger… This expression of doubt is worth noticing, for the whole of the following description hovers in 
a similar way between the monstrous supernatural and the merry human” (13).  
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Until (and perhaps even after) we have seen Bertilak in all his forms, any sighting of him 
will challenge interpretation.249  
But the Green Knight’s most obvious and best known identifying feature, one 
original to SGGK, is his coloration, and it is here that we can read with a modified 
conception of drag in mind. When we learn of his greenness, it is in concert with his 
clothing and accessories. He is “oueral enker grene,” as well as “al grayþed in grene þis 
gome and his wedes,” as though the greenness of his body is continuous with (or cannot 
be separated from) the clothing he wears (150, 151). The poet layers on details of 
greenness, which include the Green Knight’s hose, banners, belt, armor, jeweled 
decorations, holly branch, battle-axe, and horse: all are “þat same grene” as the man 
himself (157). But despite knowing his body itself is green in color, the idea of his 
placement “in” green is emphasized. He is “grayþed in grene” and “gered in grene,” 
which emphasizes the idea of dress or adornment, rather than permanent skin coloration 
(151, 179 my emphasis). The greenness he radiates seems linked to his identity, but he is 
also within it like a costume he has put on. His greenness is not tied to “to be” verbs; in 
fact, the verb associated with his skin color is ambiguous. When his strange tint is 
revealed, we learn “For wonder of his hwe men hade, / Set in his semblaunt sene; / He 
ferde as freke were fade, / And oueral enker-grene” (147-50). The Middle English 
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 With Bertilak already stretched across multiple human analogues, the narrator also provides animal and 
vegetable comparisons. The Green Knight’s hair “of his hed of his hors swete: / Fayre fannand fax 
vmbefoldes his schulderes. / A much berd as a busk ouer his brest henges… Watz euesed al vmbetorne 
abof his elbowes” (180-84). His hair is literally and figuratively tangled: snarled between identification as 
mane-like and bush-like. Like the AMA giant, Bertilak could be read as a figure of becoming-, as many of 
his corporeal signs and behaviors suggest animal, vegetable, and monstrous qualities. Yet even as this 
knotted mane allies him with his horse, the Green Knight’s wildness seems to exceed animals. While his 
hair is in tangles, “Þe mane of þat hors much to hit lyke, / Wel cresped and cemmed, with knottes ful mony 
/ Folden in with fildore aboute þe fayre grene… Þe tayl and his toppyng twynnen of a sute” (187-91). 
Contrasting the unruliness of Bertilak’s hair against the perfectly combed and plaited hair of his horse 
creates yet another fusion of opposites: his horse seems suddenly courtlier than its rider, yet as an animal, 
the horse should be the one linked to the bestial or uncivilized world. 
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Dictionary defines “ferde” as a verb of motion or travel as well as “to be, appear, or 
seem” (“ferde” [v.] MED). Thus Bertilak “fares” as a man “oueral enker-grene,” which 
does not necessarily restrict him to this form. Greenness is, as the poem will show, not 
his essence but his outfit – the drag he has put on – for this particular performance.250  
Whereas Bertilak’s initial performance as the Green Knight is characterized 
mainly by corporeal signifiers, his performance of the Lord of Haut Desert, which 
vacillates between his functioning as host and hunter, features a more discursive shaping 
of identity. He is described physically, and his appearance has its own signifying 
importance – most notably a kind of excess that, despite its varied descriptors of 
enormous height, broad girth, thick beard and sturdy stance, is still within the realm of 
human possibility. However, it is Bertilak’s continual recreating of verbal contracts – a 
form of performative speech – that separates him as jovial host from his other forms and 
adds a layer to our understanding of this figure. One of the first things we learn about him 
as host is that though his face is “Felle… as þe fyre,” he is “fre of hys speche” (847). 
Though to be “fre” often designates the liberality nobility liked to claim as their special 
virtue, it also indicates “freedom” as we understand it: unrestricted, generous, and liberal 
in thought or action. Bertilak’s “fre”-dom of speech takes the form in his host role of a 
kind of authorship or creative force: he rewrites himself into his host form through the 
repeated compacts he establishes in each of his interactions with Gawain.251  
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 There is, of course, much more to be said about the Green Knight’s entrance and initial appearance in 
Arthur’s court. For more analysis of his appearance and characterization in this scene, see Anderson 173; 
Burrow 14-16; Prior 104; Haydock 86; and Tolkien 75.  
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 This “fre”-dom as a creative force seems evident not only in Bertilak’s movements within the castle and 
in the forest, but in the structure of the castle itself. Initially described as a sturdy building with feature after 
feature of flawless construction, it also “pared out of papure purely it semed,” that is, like a paper cut-out 
that could fall over at a breath of wind (802). It is real – Gawain enters and the building remains three-
dimensional – but in learning more about it our initial perceptions are cast into doubt as incomplete.  
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Just as the Green Knight established a covenant with Gawain, so Bertilak draws 
up a contract with his guest. He frames the contract as a game in which each player will 
exchange whatever he wins during the day. They both agree to the exchange the three 
days prior to New Year’s Day. Each day Bertilak hunts outside the castle – each time 
following a different set of behaviors and conventions. By renewing the contract each 
evening – even if the words are all but identical – Bertilak reestablishes himself as host, 
whereas from morning till evening he has been a deer hunter, boar hunter, fox hunter. 
With each (new and) repeated oath, Bertilak performs a new version of himself: still 
connected to the Bertilak of the previous day,252 he leaves the construction of himself 
contingent on that day’s fulfillment of the promise he has entered into. The first evening, 
after Bertilak and Gawain have sealed their promise with wine, the narrator explains they 
have “Recorded couenantez ofte; Þe olde lorde of þat leude / Cowþe wel hald layk alofte” 
(1122-25). That the lord knows how to keep a game going perhaps hints at his connection 
with the Green Knight, or foreshadows the continuation of the game to come, but “layk” 
can also designate an action, deed, activity, behavior or conduct. Thus it primarily 
signifies movement: Bertilak enacts this self through his behavior. Because this idea of 
action is mentioned in close proximity with the covenant he has demanded, we know this 
exchange game and its continual reassertion relates to his performance of identities.253  
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 And, of course, connected to his Green Knight form through the idea of a contractual agreement itself.  
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 A contract, as a legally binding document, and a game, as innocent entertainment, provide another 
fusion of opposites. By setting up his exchange of winnings as both, Bertilak again breaks binaries by 
allowing both to exist at the same time.   
 
  
 
 
248 
Bertilak’s movement and rewriting of self is contrasted against Gawain’s 
immobility.254 Each night, after spending the day enclosed in the castle, Gawain agrees to 
Bertilak’s covenant.255 On the second day, when Bertilak says “I haf fraysted þe twys and 
faithful I fynde þe,” the faithfulness Bertilak points to suggests Gawain has remained 
literally and figuratively stationary – not only does he remain within the castle, but he has 
not ceased to uphold their agreement from the first day (1679). Bertilak’s literal and 
figurative movement, however, leaving the castle and assuming a new role each day, is a 
rewriting of self. Therefore he must remake their contract each time he reassumes his 
host role, constructing this self by reaffirming their covenant.256  
 Performing anew his host role each night implies that the Bertilak outside the 
castle is not the same as the Bertilak inside it. His performance as hunter is all motion; he 
rides from sunrise to sunset, aggressively chasing the deer, spearing the boar, and 
hounding the fox. His movement into this role takes place as a costume change. He “puts 
on” his persona as a hunter just as he wore his greenness in his first appearance. As his 
woodsmen assemble for the deer drive, Bertilak “watz not þe last / Arayed for þe rydying 
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 The interactions between Bertilak and Gawain, and how each impacts the other’s identity, are fruitful 
areas for investigation that I hope to incorporate when I revisit this project for publication. Gawain’s own 
changes in identity, his performances (particularly the exchange of kisses with the host, about which 
Carolyn Dinshaw has written provocatively) and drag (he accepts and wears a girdle that not only protects 
him but becomes a sign of his sin and his sense of self) certainly merit investigation.  
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 After the deer drive, “efte in her boudying þat bayþen in þe morn / Ty fylle þe same forwardez þat þay 
byfore maden… Þay accorded of þe couenantez byfore þe court alle” (1404-08). On Bertilak’s triumphant 
return from the boar hunt, he demands the same agreement again: “I schal hunt in þis hold and halde þe 
towchez, / Chaunge with þe cheuisaunce bi þat I charre hider. / For I haf fraysted þe twys and faithful I 
fynde þe. / Now ‘Þrid tyme, þrowe best’ þenk on þe morne” (1677-80). 
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 Bertilak’s authorial abilities also appear in his host role as he relates the boar hunt to his court. He 
“schewez hem þe scheldez and schapes hem þe tale / Of þe largesse and þe lenþe, þe liþernez alse / Of þe 
were, of þe wylde swyn in wod þer he fled” (1626-28). Though this is his topic, we are not privy to his 
actual words. We know only that he has “shaped” the tale, which could imply revising the day’s events. We 
cannot know how he represents himself or whether his version of events matches what the narrator has 
previously depicted. This could be a rhetorical reshaping of himself as well as the story.  
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with renkkez ful mony” (1133-34). For the boar hunt, “Þe douthe dressed to þe wod, er 
any day sprenged” (1415). Rising to embark on the foxhunt, “Þe lorde, þat his craftez 
kepes, / Ful erly he watz diȝt” (1687-88). The repetition of this act of dressing each 
morning – readying himself for the day in the woods – echoes the repeated remaking of 
the contract each evening. Since we do not see specifics of his clothing, as we do in the 
hyperbolically detailed episode of Gawain’s arming, the actual clothes Bertilak wears 
seem unimportant here. More than simply dressing for the day, he is adorning himself in 
the identity of hunter – outfitting himself in the drag required for his current performance. 
  When Bertilak meets Gawain at the Green Chapel, he seems at first to come full 
circle and again occupy the form of the challenger who had entered Arthur’s hall. Marie 
Borroff, however, has suggested this second incarnation of the Green Knight is markedly 
different from the wild green challenger. This Green Knight, she argues, is diminished – 
less green and less threatening, more akin to Bertilak the host. His assumption of more 
human characteristics results in his greenness being attributed to his clothing rather than 
his body (Borroff 104-107). But though he is described at least three times in this scene 
as “in þe grene,” Bertilak is also called “þat grene gome” (2227, 2259, 2295, 2239). It 
seems he is still both: a man clad in green, and therefore, and also, a green man. Once 
again he is performing a role of greenness, yet the difference between this performance 
and his previous one is that here he unravels both the mysteries of the poem’s tests and 
some of his own mystery by naming himself. I would contest the reading of Bertilak as 
less green, therefore, and posit instead that in this form the Green Knight is not 
diminished but settled. Where the host was all exuberant movement, this figure is more 
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stationary, leaning on his axe and addressing Gawain calmly.257 He has now exposed all 
his selves, and this is why it is here that he names himself: “Bertilak de Hautdesert I hat 
in þis londe” (2445). Now this man, who has skirted between categories and resisted 
binaries by signifying as multiple throughout the text, is Bertilak – an identity he claims – 
and only now at the end of the poem are we as an audience equipped to comprehend 
him.258 He must be viewed retrospectively through all his performances to even approach 
an understanding of the assemblage he is.259  
Bertilak follows his identification, however, with an acknowledgment that seems 
to limit his agency. He says he operated “Þurȝ myȝt of Morgne la Faye, þat in my hous 
lenges” (2446). Further, he admits that Morgan “wayned me vpon þis wyse to your 
wynne halle” and “wayned me þis wonder your wyttez to reue” (2456, 2459). Most 
critics have interpreted this to mean Morgan is responsible for his Green Knight form, 
and therefore the jovial, brown-bearded host is Bertilak’s “true” form. However, 
Bertilak’s acknowledgment that “knight of the grene chapel men knowen me mony” and 
the terror of Gawain’s guide on the way to the Green Chapel suggest he has performed 
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 Of course there is still movement attendant to the scene: this Green Knight sharpens his axe, uses it to 
vault over a small stream, and strikes and feints at Gawain. But this performance seems much more 
discursive: he reveals the importance of his mission and his identity as he stands stationary before Gawain. 
Gone are the roiling red eyes of the first fitte or the leaping and embracing of the castle scenes.  
 
258
 Cohen and Wheeler warn that “we ignore the complexity of identities when we read them backwards 
from some fixed, unambiguous endpoint,” and declaring this figure to be Bertilak, understandable now that 
he has named himself, seems to verge on doing just this (xi). However, Morgan’s involvement in his 
physical form, as well as the ambiguity about which form is “really” his prevents any kind of fixity about 
this figure. He may be Bertilak, but what Bertilak means is adjusted and reworked by each of his 
performances. I am not claiming his character can be unambiguously understood, only that we must look to 
all of his roles in order to come even close to understanding what he entails.  
 
259
 Were we reading Bertilak as a figure of becoming-, he would now be becoming-imperceptible, Deleuze 
and Guattari’s last and infinitely incomplete stage of the process. This is a nice way of thinking about him, 
as all the personas he has performed must be impossibly reconciled within one single body. Since a man 
cannot be green and not-green, mobile and stationary, courtly and monstrous, all at once, he can only be 
imperceptible to us, and perhaps somehow interpretable through that imperceptibility: he exists to break 
categories and expectations, not to be understood according to their rigid parameters.  
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his Green Knight form previous to his appearance at Camelot (454, 2091-2117). This is 
an infamous and feared figure, not a one-time creation, and therefore cannot be written 
off as a disguised double for what and who Bertilak “really is.”260 J. J. Anderson has 
addressed this quandary: “Not only is [Bertilak] a shape-shifter, but there is the question 
of which of his two shapes is the primary one, and, following on from this, the question 
of whether he has any real being at all, or is simply conjured up by Morgan in a shape 
appropriate to her purpose of the moment” (216). Bertilak’s transformative ability, I 
suggest, is his real being(s). He has no firmly established ontological core; he is his 
performances as each unfolds. To “be” Bertilak, as he names himself, suggests he is an 
assemblage of these performances, not one shape that is more real than another. Neither 
do I think Morgan has total control over Bertilak’s movements. He outfits himself, as we 
have seen, and thus exercises his own influence over each of his performances. Indeed, 
our final view of this figure is as “þe knyȝt in þe enker grene / Widerwarde-soeuer he 
wolde” (2477-78). This does not tell us he returns to Hautdesert,261 nor does the poem 
suggest he remains under Morgan’s control; he sets off, choosing a destination as 
mysterious to us as the one he came from when we first saw him, ready to perform his 
identities as circumstances require.  
Alisoun’s “Olde Daunce”: Fantasy of Self-Creation in the Wife of Bath’s Tale  
Alisoun, the Wife of Bath and Chaucer’s sole secular female pilgrim, is the only 
pilgrim besides Chaucer himself who tells two tales in The Canterbury Tales, and she 
stretches her performance of self over both stories. She calls her autobiographical 
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 See also Burrow 27, 119; Cooper 288-89.  
 
261
 Although Bertilak does invite Gawain to return to Haut Desert with him, the poem does not indicate that 
he goes back there himself.  
  
 
 
252 
Prologue a tale, but it is in her Tale where she truly creates the multiplicitous existence 
she desires. Only in a world of Arthurian romance in which fantasy and magic are 
possible does she show us what she really wants out of life, love, marriage, and 
womanhood. The Loathly/Lovely Lady in her Tale is her surrogate, in the sense that her 
doubleness betokens the multiple, contradictory selves that the Wife performs. All 
Alisoun’s identities are discursive and rhetorical;262 in her fiction, she creates a magical 
reality in which a woman can be both old and young, submissive and sovereign, 
independent widow, wife the equal of her husband, and cherished virgin; all things 
Alisoun claims to have been, and none of which she is willing to renounce as a central 
element of who she is.  
Even before she introduces her tale’s famous protagonist, Alisoun makes clear a 
desire for bothness – a blending of fantasy and reality that allows multiple possibilities to 
exist at once. The first words of the Tale establish a world of long-past make-believe: “In 
th’olde dayes of the King Arthour, / Of which that Britons speken greet honour, / Al was 
this land fulfild of fayerye” (856-58). Just as quickly as she brings this magical, yet 
historical world into view, however, complete with an elf queen and dancing maidens, 
she revises our understanding of this lost reality. That world, she says, “was the olde 
opinion, as I rede; / I speke of manye hundred yeres ago. / But now kan no man se none 
elves mo” (862-64). Now the world is full of friars, who occupy the landscape “As thikke 
as motes in the sonne-beem” (686). Further, “This maketh that ther ben no fayeryes. / For 
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 This makes her invocation of the Loathly Lady tradition fitting, for as S. Elizabeth Passmore and Susan 
Carter point out, the Loathly Lady is a “manifestation of a concept, created out of ideas” (xiii). That is, she 
has no extratextual referent, and thus is, like Alisoun’s idea of a perfect woman, impossible to create in 
reality. It may be noted that when Alisoun is described, the focus is on her appearance, but when she speaks 
for herself she does not dwell on this. Rather, she makes herself out of her words, not out of her body, even 
though so many of her words are about her body and thus influence how we see and understand that body 
as she builds it rhetorically.  
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ther as wont to walken was an elf / Ther walketh now the lymytour himself” (872-74). 
Norman N. Holland has argued that here Alisoun offers a  
sort of scholastic principle of disjunction. There are no more elves because the 
friars are everywhere… and (the unstated premise) two things cannot occupy the 
same place at the same time. Thus, the either-or quality of her setting for the Tale 
foreshadows the sharp alternatives the loathly lady offers her knight and also 
reflects the basic either-or quality of ‘maistrie.’ (284)  
 
I however rather think Alisoun’s line-by-line interlacing of one world with the other has 
the opposite effect: providing us with the possibility of “and” rather than “or.” Her quick 
back-and-forth movement between the time of elves and the time of friars creates a sense 
of dual existence: though she has told us Arthur’s magical world is long past, she returns 
to it for her tale, and it seems to exist in conjunction with her contemporary world of 
religion, where friars have taken faeries’ places under trees and behind bushes. She 
presents two worlds jostling in the same landscape; their rhetorical proximity conjures an 
image of simultaneity, even though reality deems this impossible.  
This impossible simultaneity continues when the knight – the Tale’s villain and 
“hero” – discovers the Loathly Lady in the woods. Before seeing her, he has what Arthur 
Lindley calls “a ludicrously perfunctory and apparently pointless vision” (3). In the 
middle of the woods,  
He saugh upon a daunce go 
Of ladyes foure and twenty, and yet mo; 
Toward the whiche daunce he drow ful yerne, 
In hope that som wisdom sholde he lerne.  
But certainly, er he cam fully there, 
Vanysshed was this daunce, he nyste where. 
No creature saugh he that bar lyf, 
Save on the grene he saugh sittynge a wyf –  
A fouler wight ther may no man devyse. (991-99)  
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As Lindley and others have noted, the twenty-four dancing ladies seem to be replaced by 
or become the old hag. Youth is encompassed by old age, beauty by foulness, and the 
many by this one. Most important here, however, is not just the mysterious, magical 
abilities this melding suggests the hag possesses, but the idea of multiplicity within an 
individual. Like the world Alisoun narrates, which can be populated by faeries and friars 
simultaneously, through the magic of romance this foul old “wyf” can be one and many. 
To understand her and her importance to Alisoun, we must understand the dancers as part 
of this old woman, and her ability to control these different aspects of being as part of her 
performance of selves.263  
The Loathly Lady’s transformative power as rhetorical and physical becomes 
clear after she weds the unwilling knight and addresses the disgust he expresses for her in 
the “Pillow Lecture.” He complains about her lowliness, her ugliness, her age, and her 
poverty. Her lecture to the knight – ostensibly to instruct him in the qualities and actions 
that comprise true nobility – delivers a message of the power of performativity and self-
creation. As she works her way through each of her characteristics the knight considers 
faults, she credits the self, not surroundings or circumstances, with determining who and 
how a person is. Of nobility, she explains, “He nys nat gentil, be he duc or erl, / For 
vileyns sinful dedes make a cherl. / For gentillesse nys but renomee / Of thyne 
auncestres, for hire hiegh bountee” (1157-60). She cites the Roman king Tulius Hostillius 
to prove that, “Ther shul ye seen expres that it no drede is / That he is gentil that dooth 
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 Given the knight’s quest and his predilection for beautiful young women, it makes sense that the Loathly 
Lady could have used this form of the dancing ladies to attract him to her. He seems drawn to this youthful, 
mystical dance, only to have it dissolve around him and be replaced by a new form of reality: the old hag to 
whom he will owe his life. However, the knight is also seeking knowledge, and knowledge comes with age. 
The dancers invoke the dance of love in the Roman de la Rose; Old Age is explicitly kept out of the garden. 
Since the knight’s desire is a desire to know what women want, the dancers, who are emblems of desire, 
are and are not the old lady, who is both fantastic and utterly real.  
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gentil dedis” (1169-70). She concludes that through the grace of God, “Thanne am I 
gentil, whan that I bigynne / To liven virtuously and weyve synne” (1175-76). Gentility is 
not rank, riches, or any other hereditary or biological thing: it is a performance of self.264  
Just as she performs her own gentility, the Loathly Lady proves her physical 
transformative power, telling the knight “I koude amende al this, / If that me liste, er it 
were dayes thre, / So wel ye myghte bere yow unto me” (1106-08). The power to change, 
then, is hers – she “koude” amend her appearance and station in life according to her own 
knowledge and abilities. Her desire – that she can change if she wants to – gives her 
agency: intellect and will constitute a fully informed act of choice. When she enacts her 
transformation, she not only furthers the idea of performativity, but reminds us of 
Alisoun’s desire to occupy multiple aspects of womanhood simultaneously. She offers 
her knight husband a choice between two versions of herself: an old, ugly but faithful 
wife, or a young fair wife who may cuckold him. This is a clear dichotomy: he may 
choose either beauty or faithfulness.265 However, when given the opportunity to choose 
for herself, she redefines what she will be outside these masculinely predetermined 
categories of wifely identity. Assured of her sovereignty, she vows  
By my trouthe, I wol be to yow bothe –  
This is to seyn, ye, bothe fair and good. 
I prey to God that I moote sterven wood,  
But I to yow be also good and trewe 
As evere was wyf, syn that the world was newe. 
And but I be to-morn as fair to seene, 
As any lady, emperice, or queene, 
That is bitwixe the est and eke the west, 
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 This corresponds with the English Loathly Lady tradition, in which the Loathly Lady character helps the 
hero or future king amend or learn appropriate behaviors: you are what you do, not what you were born 
into. See Passmore and Carter for more.  
 
265
 Even the knight seems to want multiplicity: his clear desire is for both beauty and faithfulness, 
reinforcing the human desire for simultaneity and the insufficiency of categories even though we live in 
time and therefore inside some kinds of unavoidable dichotomies.  
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Dooth with my lyf and deth right as yow lest. 
Cast up the curtyn, looke how that it is. (1240-49)  
 
Not only does this point to the insufficiency and fragility of the previously established 
categories, it shows her setting her own rules.266 As she speaks the words that will now 
define her, we can imagine her becoming what she speaks. Indeed, when the knight pulls 
back the curtain he sees beside him exactly what has just been described. She has become 
a new self: “she so fair was, and so yong therto… And she obeyed hym in every thing / 
That myghte doon hym plesance or liking” just as she has promised (1251, 1255-56). 
Like the narrating voice shaping the story, 267 the Loathly Lady’s transformation is 
rhetorical: she has spoken herself into a new identity, performing it through words that 
become corporeal in the world of the text, much like Alisoun’s introduction to her selves 
in the Prologue.  
For the sake of identification I have been calling this transformative figure the 
“Loathly Lady.” However, she is never called this, or given any name aside from “wyf” 
by the narrator throughout the tale. Further, her identity changes: long before her physical 
change, for us she is no longer loathly.268 Indeed she seems, in her silence and devoted 
obedience, to be no longer the same person at all. Reading with Butler, and characterizing 
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 Though she describes the choices, making it seem like agency is hers, it is worth nothing that the 
Loathly Lady’s categories have been determined by the misogynist tradition. As a male created character, 
she cannot step completely outside the rigidly upheld possibilities for types of womanhood; she can only 
resist whenever an opening presents itself. In this way, she is like the religious women Bynum references: 
though it is extremely limited control, their refusal of food is their choice – knowledge and will – a small 
instance of agency within the patriarchy.  
 
267
 Alisoun’s abilities as a shaper of stories can be seen in the Midas episode in her Tale, in which she not 
only makes the barber of classical myth Midas’s wife, but omits the story’s ending, in which Midas’s secret 
is exposed and he becomes an object of ridicule. In her Prologue, I would argue her interpretation of events 
in her fifth marriage is another place she shapes her story to suit her own purposes.  
 
268
 The readers’ perception of her changes as a result of who she “is” according to her rhetorical 
presentation. She enacts herself through words first, performing a self not based on appearance, then echoes 
this transformation physically as she metamorphoses for the knight.   
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the Lady’s transformation as a performance of self or selves, we can conclude that rather 
than an ontological core of being, this figure – this person who comprises youth, age, 
beauty, foulness, magic, and submission in an assemblage of what it might be to be a 
woman – is a performance of identities, just as Alisoun tries to be. Within this fantasy 
where magic can affect a corporeal transformation out of words, she can be anything she 
performs and yet also contain all her previous selves.  
As a storyteller and weaver by trade, Alisoun’s attempts at rhetorical self-
definition rival those of her protagonist. But the relationship between Alisoun and her 
characters is complex. As Lindley has quite rightly pointed out, “Once we’ve 
recognized… that the hag is obviously a projection of the Wife, we then have to notice 
that as someone who denounces property, covetousness, and social privilege, she’s also 
not the Wife’s representative. What appears to be identity is also opposition. Alisoun’s 
advocate is also her accuser” (2). Within her own story, both the romance and the 
autobiography, Alisoun presents a constant flow of blending and resistance, pushing 
against established categories even while collapsing into them.269 But it is the way 
Alisoun appears in the Tale that shows us what she wants: to be able to exist through 
performance in a way untenable in the textual reality of the fourteenth-century pilgrimage 
in which she physically exists.270 Like the insistence on dual realities that cannot coexist 
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 The Wife of Bath’s Prologue contains an enormously fruitful ground for a discussion of multiplicity, 
insufficient categories, and resistance to boundaries that I would like to explore when I revisit this project 
for publication. I have chosen not to address it here for reasons of time and space: it is too big, and too 
complex and nuanced a field, to do justice to at present.  
 
270
 Of course I am not suggesting Alisoun was a real person with extratextual existence. She has “physical 
existence” only in the sense that within her textual reality, she is presented as very corporeal – much of her 
life as she tells it revolves around her body. Thus her textual existence cannot be severed from an 
understanding of her as a physically defined person.  
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in the “real world,”271 Alisoun’s desires surface in her narrative as a desire for plurality: 
to be able to have multiple forms that cannot be integrated in the same person at the same 
time.  
Throughout the Wife of Bath’s Tale, groups of women appear in conjunction with 
category problems. As the knight searches for an answer to what women want most, he 
finds “he ne koude arryven in no coost / Wher as he myghte fynde in this mateere / Two 
creatures accordynge in-feere” (922-24). No one he asks agrees upon a single answer, 
though as the queen outlined the quest there is supposed to be one. No response fits the 
schema he was given, and as a result we receive a vision of women as multiple: none of 
them is the same, and yet they are supposedly all tied by something. Halfway through the 
exploration into women’s multifarious desires, Alisoun herself breaks into the story by 
taking up a first person voice, no longer speaking of “women” but of “us” and “we.” She 
makes womanhood a collective, speaking for all women and denying none of the answers 
– women want all of these things, and she presents them as all equally desirable and 
equally possible – as if all women are also within her.272  
The collective of women Alisoun establishes through this listing of female desires 
crops up at the moments of judgment in the tale as well. Not only are there multiple 
women with whom she identifies – the elf queen, the raped maiden, Arthur’s queen, 
Midas’s wife, the Loathly/Lovely Lady – there are also groups of women. Just before she 
switches from third to first person narration, Alisoun lists the female desire “oftetyme to 
be wydwe and wedde,” a reflection of her own experience and perhaps a marker that she 
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 This “real” world could refer either to the textual “reality” of the Canterbury pilgrimage or to the 
physical extratextual reality of Chaucer’s reading audience(s).  
 
272
 All of the answers the knight hears are propositions Alisoun broaches in her Prologue. They are tied – at 
least in one way – because they are all things she desires for herself.  
  
 
 
259 
is about to inject her own perspective once again (928). When the knight stands before 
the queen to give his answer, the assembly includes “Ful many a noble wyf, and many a 
mayde, / And many a wydwe, for that they been wise” (1026-27). As they consider his 
answer, Alisoun lists these categories again: “In al the court ne was ther wyf, ne mayde, / 
Ne wydwe that contraried that he sayde” (1043-44). By establishing and highlighting 
three major categories into which women fall – virgins or maids, wives, and widows – 
Alisoun projects herself into the court in all of the identities she has performed over the 
course of her life. Her virginal self, transformed at the age of twelve into a wife to an old 
man, is reflected in both these maids and the maiden from whom the knight “rafte hire 
maydenhed” at the beginning of the Tale (888). The wives, which include the queen and 
the Loathly/Lovely Lady, are the main powers in the story, as Alisoun’s wifehood has 
served as her main identifying feature throughout her life, even manifesting itself in her 
title as the Wife of Bath.273 And the widows, granted respect thanks to their wisdom, have 
a freedom Alisoun has enjoyed at least four times as each of her husbands died.274 In 
including all these options and fitting herself into each through her own history, Alisoun 
expresses dissatisfaction with single categories: rather than choosing a single option, she 
wants it all, and the answer the Loathly Lady teaches the knight – that women want 
sovereignty – provides this flexibility because it grants choice.275 Like the Loathly Lady, 
it collapses the many into one, which paradoxically contains many within itself. If 
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 In Middle English “wyf” or “wif” can mean woman as well as our modern idea of wife. Alisoun’s 
vehement defense of her five marriages in her Prologue, however, suggests it is her marital status, not her 
gender, that her title emphasizes (“w f” [n.(2)] MED).  
 
274
 For more on the freedoms associated with medieval English widowhood, see Mirrer and Carlson and 
Weisl.  
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 Though again, the choices have themselves been determined by how men characterize women. This is 
perhaps a way of noting how categories entrap us even as we tried to resist and escape them – Chaucer 
recognizes the pervasiveness of categorization even as he points to its insufficiencies.  
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Alisoun wants to choose “both,” in this world of Arthurian romance she can; here bodies 
are not ruled by strict categories, but by the magic of self-constructed transformation, and 
Alisoun wields the power to shape the story, and thus the power – within this fiction 
within a fiction – to shape her-selves.  
Conclusions in the Rhizome 
Clearly a short exploration such as this cannot come close to accounting for the 
complexities of these bodies – either those of Bertilak and the Loathly Lady or the others 
I have examined. But it does pull us toward thinking about bodies in the physical 
existence their textual representation conjures for us, and how that imagined physicality 
affects our understanding of them. Carolyn Bynum has suggested that “no one in the 
humanities seems really to feel comfortable any longer with the idea of an essential 
‘bodiliness.’ We tend to reject both a ‘bodiliness’ that is in some way prior to the 
genderings, sexings, colorings, or handicappings particular persons are subject to and a 
body that is easily separable from the feelings, consciousness, and thoughts that occur in 
it” (“Why All This Fuss About the Body?” 2). Bynum quotes a friend struggling with 
critical representations of medieval bodies: “There’s so much written about the body… 
And in so much of it, the body dissolves into language. The body that eats, that works, 
that dies, that is afraid – that body just isn’t there” (1). In this project, by focusing on the 
foundational, life-sustaining activities bodies must engage in – intercourse, consumption, 
and finally self-identification as physically performed through a rhizomatic lens – I have 
tried to return to, embrace, and accept this kind of material bodiliness Bynum finds so 
often missing from critical study.276  
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 And yet I am forced to do so with words, so the physicality I point to is always funneled through 
language. This is perhaps why this bodiliness is missing; we can only try, but not achieve, a sense of 
  
 
 
261 
By asking questions about the vastness of the territory surrounding, encroaching, 
and overlapping what it is to be “human,” I have attempted to understand something 
more about humanness and personhood than what restrictive language-based categories 
can tell us. As Michael Uebel has noted, “The medieval body is not a passive entity 
shaped by a dominant seat of mind or reason but an ensemble” (371). If there are 
“essential” qualities of medieval bodies, these qualities seem to be flux, resistance, and 
multiplicity. Bodies cannot be transcribed into a carefully drawn hierarchy of being, but 
should be mapped onto a messy, physical, interconnected web of relations that expands 
the distance and population of what falls between the animal kingdom and the kingdom 
of the divine. This places us in an ever-shifting middle, a middle that flows and 
transgresses, much like the era that produced the literature I have studied. Cohen and 
Wheeler have stated, “The power of the Middle Ages is the fact that it is middle to 
nothing, that it does not end, that we encounter its processes of becoming only through a 
dangerous becoming process of our own” (xviii). The texts we study, and the 
interpretations we make, continue to reverborate through this constant middle just as the 
rhizome proliferates intermezzo, as Deleuze and Guattari remind us (25).  
Yet within this tangled continuum of betweenness and becoming, we can still turn 
and gain perspective. Though we cannot stop or shut down the multiplicity of meanings 
the rhizome offers, we can pause and examine where such an investigation takes us, and 
how it resonates with our own experiences. In Undoing Gender, Judith Butler notes the 
socially articulated, fluctuating terms by which humanness is determined and recognized, 
and interrogates those terms “not to celebrate difference as such but to establish more 
                                                                                                                                                 
bodiliness in text because it is in text. Nevertheless, even if it does not fully recuperate this missing 
materiality, I think the attempt is worthwhile.  
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inclusive conditions for sheltering and maintaining life that resists models of 
assimilation” (4). The bodies in medieval texts may never have had bones and blood and 
flesh that breathed and died, but they are “real” in the sense that they affect our 
understanding of a world humans are part of, and we experience them even if we do not 
see them materially standing, sitting, eating, or dying before us. By noting the problems 
of exclusion and restriction raised by rigidly classifying fictional bodies, we can also 
question our own contemporary systems of category-driven thought. Bodies that exceed 
or exist outside “the norm” serve to show us  
how the norms that govern contemporary notions of reality can be 
questioned and how new modes of reality can become instituted. These 
practices of instituting new modes of reality take place in part through the 
scene of embodiment, where the body is not understood as a static and 
accomplished fact, but as an aging process, a mode of becoming that, in 
become otherwise, exceeds the norm, and makes us see how realities to 
which we thought we were confined are not written in stone. (29) 
 
Positing a more inclusive system for considering medieval bodies pushes us toward 
greater inclusivity in all our systems of thought, as they affect the textual and extratextual 
world.  
Given this push for inclusivity and multiplicity, I would like to step away from 
medieval fiction for a moment and briefly examine the final verse from the first song on 
Paul Simon’s 1986 album Graceland to evoke the powerful possibilities a rhizomatic 
reading permits. In “The Boy in the Bubble,” Simon pays homage to but also warns us 
about the risks, powers, and triumphs of modern technology. He sings “Medicine is 
magical and magical is art for the boy in the bubble and the baby with the baboon heart, 
and I believe… these are days of miracles and wonder and don’t cry, baby, don’t cry.” 
With another animal’s heart sewn into his chest, how human is this baby? He is open to 
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questions about representation, about belonging, about humanness and social 
acceptability and the importance of physiological makeup. Read arboreally, he is a 
conundrum: the blend of human and animal within him does not fit within a defined 
category. But if we overturn this verticality, we can see that he connects to the world in 
multiple ways. As living beings, Deleuze and Guattari explain, we “form a rhizome with 
our viruses, or rather our viruses cause us to form a rhizome with other animals. As 
François Jacob says, transfers of genetic material by viruses or through other procedures, 
fusions of cells originating in different species, have results analogous to those of ‘the 
abominable couplings dear to antiquity and the Middle Ages” (10-11). Evolutionary 
schemas, Deleuze and Guattari contest, are moving us toward the rhizome and away from 
the tree, making us continually more complex and more connected to the world, and 
rather than considering these fusions abominable, they should be embraced because they 
provide us with ever increasing opportunities.  
The baby in Simon’s song – his blood pumped by a heart that is like but also 
unlike ours – should not cry; he is not a freak or a hybrid as a rigid hierarchy might deem 
him – in a rhizomatic reading, he is an assemblage: perhaps both human and animal, but 
also a baby who requires care, a person who will grow and develop and deserve 
representation, and a living miracle who shows us the permeability and complexity of our 
bodies, real and fantastic. And he should not be limited to any one of these definitions. 
His body – all imagined bodies – do not end, not when they survive in the texts that 
(barely) contain them and continue to present us with pressing questions about 
representation, humanity, and physicality – theirs and ours.  
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